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Experiments in Part I of this thesis study the effects of taxed and untaxed income
windfalls on effort supply and tax evasion decisions. Traditional economic view within
the utility maximisation framework suggests that labour supply decreases if the share
of unearned income (i.e. windfalls) goes up. This has been questioned in the emerging
literature from field experiments on cash transfers. It is suggested that effort or labour
supply responses to cash windfalls are contextual and more nuanced. Reallocation of
effort supply, the size and nature (lottery, permanent or transitory) of the windfall are
among the factors that is important in determining this response. On the other hand,
little or no theoretical discussion exists on tax evasion responses to income windfalls as
financial incentives.
I find that effort supply reduces significantly in response to cash windfalls in a lab-in-
the-field experiment from Afghanistan. The response is elastic and effort provision
decreases as the share of windfall increases. Subjects are endowed with cash windfalls
and must choose either to provide effort by solving puzzles to earn additional income or
opt out. They could choose to opt out at any point during the effort provision without
losing any of their earnings. In addition, I find that effort provision is less responsive
when the first dollar of subject’s earnings is not taxed. There exists a specific type of
tax aversion such that subjects lower their effort provision if their windfall is taxed. In
both experiments, effort supply is lowered via an income effect but there are additional
tax-induced effects from taxing subject’s windfalls after the transfer has taken place.
The finding on tax-induced effects are novel contribution in this study.
Similarly, in the second part of the experiments subjects had to declare their labour
income and windfalls for tax purposes depending on the experiment. Tax evasion
x
increases but the respond is not drastic to either types of windfalls. However consistent
with previous experiments on tax evasion, two types of behaviour emerge: compliers
and evaders, and the share of those complying is higher than that of evaders.
More interestingly, I find that the most productive individuals evade the highest in both
experiments. This is a robust finding such that breaking down the data into terciles:
the average productive individuals evade less, and the least productive individuals evade
the least. This is a novel contribution in the study of tax evasion. It is possible that
the most able individuals consider taxes more disruptive and attach higher subjective
value to their hard-earned income. This finding captures the evasion levels observed
for wealthy individuals or legal entities who are consistently looking for loopholes to
evade or avoid paying taxes.
Part two
The purpose of the experiments in Part II of this thesis was to explore the effects of
introducing a fast track option that is legal on the level of administrative corruption or
bribery rates. The literature suggests that there are both moral and legal concerns.
However, in societies where corruption is normalized, the low likelihood of punishment
makes legal concerns negligible. In such ‘corruption trap’, moral concerns are the
determining factor. Timely bureaucracy in public services, common in low-income
countries, may give way to corruption but it can be minimized if preferential treatment
is offered institutionally.
In experiments in Part II of this thesis I study supply and demand for bribes separately.
I observe that subjects as citizens are willing to pay extra to avoid bribery when
presented with a legal channel to access services. Subjects go through a real effort task
and must wait to get paid unless they choose either the cheaper bribe or the more
expensive legal channel. Additionally, the bribe may imply a negative externality on
one other subject as it increases the latter’s waiting period. When that is the case,
subjects as citizens are less willing to choose the bribe option and prefer the more
expensive legal channel. In sum, people are willing to bribe but less so when a legal
channel is available or when it harms other people.
On the public official’s, I observe that introducing a more expensive legal channel does
not prevent them accepting bribes. The public official’s strategic concerns remain
at large and the motive to maximise private gains overruns moral concerns in the
xi
experiment. This finding echoes some of the findings from field experiments on this
issue. Therefore, additional measures are needed to constrain public official’s who
prioritise their private gains. These measures may include centrally supervised fast
track options where the cost of monitoring is lower or reduced human interaction by
adopting electronic procedures.
I use a novel structure for the experimental design in which individuals (citizens or
public officials) are fully accountable over whether bribery is enforced or not. In
previous designs, it would be up to the official to enforce the bribe and ultimately carry
the weight of imposing the negative externality on other citizens. Outcomes could be
interfered by confounds such as fear of punishment for breaking the law, conditional
cooperation i.e. the need to reciprocate when offered a bribe, and the competing bias
i.e. getting competitive upon the opportunity to interact with other players. Thus,
with the non-dynamic framework, subjects are not assigned roles and are left to decide
solely based on their preferences, with no further strategic concerns.
The pool of subjects is composed of low GDP per capita countries where bribery is
understood to be widespread. This is further supported by empirical evidence from
corruption perception measures such as CPI, WGI, BPI and ICRG. In accordance, in my
experiments subjects coming from countries associated with higher levels of CPI are also
found to be the most corrupt. Believing that others will accept bribes makes one more
propense to similarly engage in corruption. Consequently, (effective) communication
relative to observed and perceived corruption rates, when low, could further dampen
corruption – however, the opposite could also be true. Governments should take this
into account when choosing the information to be shared in anti-corruption campaigns.
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How does income windfalls from the government or any other source affect individual’s
supply of effort? If an effect exists, how does taxing those transfers matter for effort
responses? This subject has long been debated in several disciplines and economics is
no exception. Those who say it lowers supply of effort argue that the transfer produces
a lazy worker and demotivate hardworking citizens (Robins, 1985; Hum & Simpson,
1991; Bibler et al., 2019; Cesarini et al., 2017; Bø et al., 2019). Those who think
otherwise argue that provision of cash windfalls (or any other cash transfer) brings
about a new work attitude, which ultimately leads to improved well-being (Imbens et
al., 2001; Banerjee et al., 2017; Picchio et al., 2017; Baird et al., 2018; Gilbert et al.,
2018).
Combined with the above, is the subject of tax evasion behaviour, i.e. what are the
effects of income windfalls on reporting income for tax purposes? However, rarely have
the two subjects been studied together. Taxpayers are the same people who provide
effort/labour and make an earning. If their effort supply is responsive to cash windfalls,
it also naturally follows to investigate whether taxing windfalls matter for evasion
decisions. This is best exemplified by inheritance taxes or a tax on lottery winnings.
Furthermore, agents have different productivity levels, are their evasion responses all
the same or do they differ in some fundamental way? In part one of this thesis, I
discuss and provide evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiments designed to answer
these questions.
4 Introduction
From a taxation perspective, cash windfalls or direct transfers to recipients are ei-
ther taxable or untaxed by the tax authority. Examples include lottery winnings,
inheritance, social welfare schemes (unemployment benefit, universal credit, etc. . . )
and other conditional or unconditional government transfers. Nowadays, almost all
the governments practice some form of cash transfer programme. There is a growing
belief in economics that direct cash transfer (windfalls) is a better tool in the fight
against poverty than most non-direct transfers, for more see Baird et al., (2018). In
general, I define taxable windfalls such that taxpayers are required to report them for
tax purposes also, thus they have the opportunity to evade paying, whereas untaxed
windfalls are those with no evasion opportunities. I investigate the effects of these two
types of income windfalls.
In economics, the effects of financial incentives (windfalls) on labour supply is traced
via income and substitution effects. There is a consensus among labour economists
that leisure is a normal good. In a standard labour supply model, substitution effect
explains the change in the demand for leisure due to changes in the relative price for
leisure i.e. holding labour earnings unchanged, increasing windfall levels will increase
the relative price of leisure, which leads to lower consumption. On the other hand,
income effect captures the change in the purchasing power or consumption of the agent.
For instance, increasing windfall levels increases the agent’s feasible set or purchasing
power parity. This leads to higher consumption of leisure and less work. These are two
opposing forces and the net effect of these two should be studied empirically.
Lab experiments within labour economics have studied many aspects of effort deci-
sions. Earlier experiments have looked at a variety of work incentives. These include
studying the effects of different wage schemes (such as piece rate pay vs fixed amounts),
motivational crowding-out effects of monitoring regimes, distributional models of non-
self-interested agents, reciprocity in incomplete contracts and relative performance
(tournaments). For a full review of literature on this (see Camerer & Weber, 2013;
Charness & Kuhn, 2011). Windfalls as an incentive for work has rarely been studied
in the lab context. One of the obstacles is the scarcity of funds involved in carrying
out lab experiments, to capture windfall effects. Windfall effects on labour supply
responses are either short term or persist over long periods of time. Given the nature
of lab experiments, my findings capture short term effort responses as I don’t follow
up with the participants beyond the lab setting.
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On the other hand, the impact of windfalls on work incentives has been studied as part
of large social/field experiments. While findings from these experiments have brought
several new insights and directed policy debates, they are mixed and confounded. For
a full review of field experiment on transfers see Baird et al., (2018) and Banerjee
et al., (2017) with a focus on findings from developing and less developed countries.
Social/field experiments studying work incentives are often multidimensional in design
and attempt to study more than just labour supply of subjects. They usually take
place in more developed countries. It is therefore difficult to disentangle a clean effect
of windfall on supply of effort.
Several other issues accompany social/field experiments such as, randomisation not
being ensured and due to complexity, there is a lack of ability to control factors that
may also cause variations in labour supply responses. For example, it is not possible to
control movement of individuals/households in and out of the areas where experiments
take place. Moreover, the samples chosen for the experiments are not representative and
are usually drawn from the poorest end of the income distribution, making inferences
about the general population problematic.
Running experiments within labour economics is beneficial in that it allows a tight
control and therefore manipulation power over the factors that may affect labour supply,
which is normally measured using effort supply (Charness & Kuhn, 2011). Therefore, I
will be using these two terms interchangeably. Large amount of data is available on
labour market outcomes that is often circumstantial; that makes it difficult to study
relationships or disentangle causal effects.
In this lab-in-the-field experiment, I overcome some of the challenges mentioned above.
I run the experiment in a less developed economy where the experimental monetary
stakes are high (greater than their estimated average daily income). This makes it
possible to study windfalls in a lab setting. Besides flexibility, running lab-in-the-field
experiments have several other advantages in mimicking features of the ’real-world’ in a
controlled environment. It allows better representative sampling instead of focusing on
the poorest end of the distribution as in the social experiments which could convey a
specific type of behaviour. Lab experiments allow complete randomisation (Kangas et
al., 2019). In a controlled environment, the factors that may cause additional variations
are kept constant, thus allows to cleanly test and disentangle the windfall-induced
6 Introduction
effect on labour supply. In doing so, I abstract away from the confounding factors
associated with social and field experiments.
Understanding factors that affect effort supply in the labour market is important. There
is a direct link between individual effort supply (intensive margins) and productivity in
an economy. Understanding the impact of windfalls on productivity is key interest to
policymakers. There is an emerging literature that study the effects of cash transfers
on labour market outcomes such as searching or finding a job, attend job training
programme, number of hours worked (Banerjee et al., 2017; Alzúa et al., 2013).
Understanding the effects of the cash transfers on labour supply leads to better
decisions on how to design welfare programmes. It helps improve the system by making
it more efficient, and target specific objectives. Such as increasing effort supply in
cost-neutral manner. For example, if windfalls cause short term fluctuations in effort
supply, increasing the base salary will lead to better and higher effort levels on average
than bonuses.
Tax evasion is a hidden activity and therefore difficult to observe or/and study in the
field. Lab experiments have pioneered in this area and many aspects of tax evasion have
been explored, for a full review (Alm, 2019; Mascagni, 2018). However, the question of
windfall effects on evasion and specifically on the evasion of different productive agents
remains unanswered. Therefore, a lab-in-the-field experiment has several contributions
to make in this regard: first, where individuals have equal access to evasion and equal
chance of being detected, evasion can be directly observed and measured. Decisions
are money-incentivised and therefore have real consequences for the individual’s final
payoffs, especially with the high stakes involved in this experiment.
Knowing the windfall-induced effects on tax evasion of labour income (hard-earned
income), if any, brings new insights into our understanding of individual’s tax evasion
decision making process. Previous studies have shown that evasion induces a double-
loss mechanism: it reduces government revenues and has a negative impact on honest
taxpayers, for a review of the literature on this (Alm et al., 2016). The study has been
carried out in a less developed country where rule of law is fundamentally different
compared to a more developed country. In doing so, it brings new insights on whether
tax evasion behaviour follows similar patterns to those of more developed countries
or not. Although tax collection is quasi-voluntary, but an element of enforcement is
always present.
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In addition to this, understanding the behaviour of agents with different productivity
levels with regards to tax evasion decisions is important. Productive agents may have
different subjective valuation of their incomes compared to less productive agents.
Understanding this brings new insights and allows devising effective policy measures
more suited to different segments of the workforce.
I run two experiments to investigate the questions raised in this chapter. The method-
ology is based on lab-in-the-field experimental designs that are common in labour
economics and tax compliance. In experiment one, I test the effects of a taxable windfall
on effort supply of subjects and consequently on their tax evasion decisions. The second
experiment tests the effects of an untaxed windfall. Within each experiment, there are
three treatments: zero, low and high levels of windfall that subjects are exposed to,
resulting in a within-subject design.
Each session consisted of 12 paying rounds and in each round participants were
allocated randomly with an equal and exogenous probability, to one of the three
windfall treatments. They undertook a real-effort task to earn more income. In
experiment one, they had to declare their windfall and labour earnings from the real
effort task separately for tax purposes, whereas in the second experiment, subjects had
to report their labour income only.
Income windfalls reduced effort supply of subjects, and the reduction in effort increased
with levels of cash endowment, in both experiments. When the windfall is taxable, this
significantly demotivates effort provision compared to untaxed windfall. In other words,
the effort provision decisions are less responsive when the first dollar of subject’s income
is not taxed. This indicates that effort provision is sensitive to whether windfalls are
taxed or not.
With these results, I find that there is a pronounced aversion to taxing income once
it has been given to the subjects irrespective of it being earned through effort or a
windfall. In both experiments, effort supply is lowered due to an income effect such
that upon receiving additional windfall, subject’s feasible set or potential purchasing
power expands (even if temporarily in the lab). As a result they provide less effort.
The usual income and substitution mechanisms explains the labour supply reductions
upon receiving windfalls. However, when the windfalls are taxed there is an additional
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tax-induced effect that reinforces the previous effects. As mentioned earlier, these
findings echo short term responses rather than long term.
Subject’s tax evasion behaviour shows minimal responses to taxed windfalls and no
changes to untaxed windfalls. Consistent with evasion behaviour in the context of more
developed economies, two types of dominant behaviour emerge: a lot of evaders and a
lot of compliers (Choo et al., 2016). Moreover, there are less evaders than compliant
taxpayers in both experiments. However, subjects in the taxable windfall experiment
are more dispersed.
The most able individuals i.e. the most productive members evade the most. This
pattern is consistent as we move down the ladder of productivity from most to least
productive, for all taxpayers. There is no distinction whether the windfall was taxed
or not, the behaviour above remained consistent. A possible explanation could be that
those who consider themselves most able consider paying taxes more disruptive, as
they prefer to keep most of their income for themselves hence risking getting caught.
This result captures the evasion levels observed for the wealthier individuals or legal




Labour or effort supply has been studied from several angles. The findings in part
one of the thesis contributes to the emerging experimental literature on the effects of
windfalls on labour/effort supply.
The relationship between uncompensated wages (windfalls) and effort has been found
to result in a backward-bending labour supply curve in the study of animal behaviour,
one of the first experiments in this field (Battalio & Kagel, 1985). On incomplete
contracts, experiments were used to test efficiency wage theory (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof
& Yellen, 1988, 1990). In the gift-exchange game literature the role of reciprocity was
explored between wages and effort (Fehr et al., 1993). These experiments have been
replicated several times since then, and most have found that a positive reciprocity
exists between wage offers and labour supply (Charness & Kuhn, 2011).
Through these studies several factors has been found to be important for supply of
effort. Increasing piece rate pay increases effort supply (Swenson, 1988; Sillamaa,
1999; Dickinson, 1999). It was found that low piece rate pay reduces supply of effort,
however it was also found that not paying at all induced higher levels of effort than low
wages (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). This is somewhat counter-intuitive and interesting
contribution in this area. It clearly signals that wages are not the only reason why
effort supply may change.
10 Literature Review
Earnings were found to be reference dependent, such that each worker has a subjective
reference point, depending on the context, this could be daily, monthly and so on.
Once the earnings reach the reference point, a satiation is obtained for the earner
and this affects further supply of effort. This is related to Tversky and Kahneman’s
(1979) reference-dependent preference theory. Evidence of this behaviour is abundant
in experimental findings, for instance it was found that effort levels were affected by
subject’s expected earnings for the session in the lab (Abeler et al., 2011). This is a
type of reference point that can be observed and engineered in the lab. The debate on
reference points is also discussed in the non-experimental literature especially labour
supply of taxi drivers (Camerer et al., 1997), as an application of mental accounting
for money earned vs money unearned (Thaler, 1999).
While motivation to work is shown to be sensitive to changes in income taxes (Rick et
al., 2018) but it depends on redistribution and government interventions. If the state’s
performance and expenditure seem justified for the agent, their effort supply is not
reduced. This is important for this experiment, as I find that there are ‘tax aversion’
effects on motivations to work. Tax aversion is a non-financial incentive, primarily the
notion comes from psychology where it is loosely defined as when individuals avoid
paying taxes by travelling longer distances or waiting longer in the queues (McCaffery
& Baron, 2006; Sussman & Olivola, 2011).
Several mechanisms have been identified on how tax aversion operates, first, it is
argued that subjects decouple tax payments from public services that they receive in
turn (Mettler, 2011). Second, the feeling of lack of control over how tax revenues are
spent, leads to lower levels of effort (Lamberton, 2013). A third channel is when labour
supply decreases in response to falling net-wage (after tax-wage) (Kessler & Norton,
2016). The third channel is the most relevant to the findings in this section, that will
be discussed in more details as the results are explained.
The experiments in this part were carried out in Afghanistan, a less developed economy.
Less developed countries may be different from more developed ones due to the
composition of the economy. Substantial underemployment, tight labour markets, high
agriculture and informal employment sector are the most prominent features. Thus,
this study finds that provision of effort is re-adjusted substantially after receiving
cash windfalls in the laboratory. However, whether this behaviour persists beyond
the laboratory or not is beyond the scope of the study. Below, I review the most
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relevant literature emerging out of developing economies on the effects of cash transfer
programmes on labour supply of villagers. Cash transfers is a form of windfall gain to
agents.
In a field experiment from Malawi, Ambler and Godlonton (2019) test short term
labour supply responses to income given (windfalls) or conditioned income on effort.
They found that windfall gains allowed individuals to temporarily re-allocate labour
supply away from household work. Whether the effects of the experiment persisted over
time, was not studied. This resembles the effort supply response in my experiments.
A meta-analysis of 16 basic income trials (12 nations both developed and less developed)
found no evidence of significant reductions in average hours worked per week or labour
participation rates in response to basic income/windfall handouts (Gilbert et al.,
2018). One possible explanation for the no significant result is perhaps that they have
aggregated results from several heterogeneous social/field experiments. The design and
context of the 16 experiments differ from one another significantly and aggregating
labour supply measures may produce spurious results.
Another study re-examined the results of seven means tested randomised control trials
(RCT) in seven countries, also concluded that there were "no systematic" cash windfall
effects on hours worked (Banerjee et al., 2017). Some of the studies are from counties
like Brazil, Honduras, Mexico etc. . . which overlaps with the studies used in the
meta-analysis by (Gilbert et al., 2018) mentioned above. On a closer inspection of
the individual experiments aggregated for this re-examination shows slightly different
picture. These findings vary by country and experiment. Even Banerjee et al. (2017)
state that the number of hours worked declined in absolute numbers but find that the
overall effect when accounting for the re-allocation of the labour supply shows that the
quality of life has improved.
Studies on cash transfer programmes can be divided into two types: ones that discuss
labour market outcomes and others that focus on non-labour market outcomes. Nu-
merous studies have looked at the effect cash windfalls on non-labour market outcomes
as well as labour market outcomes. For a survey of literature on this see Baird et
al., (2018). With all this, results are mixed and further research is needed to highlight
other aspects of effort supply.
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Though less pertinent, the experiments in this study contribute to a broader literature
on the effects of social protection policies in the form of negative income tax (NIT) or
any credit transfer and wealth shocks in the form of lottery winnings or inheritance on
effort provision. One of the windfalls was taxable and the other wasn’t taxed in this
part of this thesis, motivates short term responses to windfall gains through inheritance
that is taxable and lottery winnings that aren’t taxed. The social experiments often
have boarder dimensions that also tries to study supply of labour. Direct country
comparisons are difficult given the differences in methodology and contexts, but social
experiments have resulted in mixed findings.
A survey of the data from four negative income tax (NIT) experiments in the US
between 1968-1972 showed that male labour supply declined by two weeks and female
labour supply declined by three weeks per employment year (Robins, 1985). However,
using the same surveys, Burtless (1986) argued that it was under-reporting of labour
supply earnings that contributed to labour supply decreases and not the windfall
effects. In the development literature this is referred to as "price effect" (Baird et al.,
2018). The concept refers to the fact that individuals may under-report income to
make sure they remain eligible for the cash awarded through the scheme. All the four
NIT experiments were conditional and three of them were means tested. Therefore, it
is possible that the decrease in labour supply was overstated.
The labour supply reductions were found to be heterogeneous, nuanced and often
depend on factors such as gender, non-wife income, young children, this was found in
an Annual Guaranteed Income experiment in Canada and the US (Hum & Simpson,
1991). Recent study of the same experiment show that there is evidence of wage
increases for those who received the transfers in the Canadian experiment (Calnitsky
& Latner, 2017). The Finnish government’s experiment to provide a ‘universal basic
income’ which targeted the unemployed individuals for a period of two years. During
this time, their employment status was monitored as well as other outcomes. The
full result of the study has not been released yet but preliminary results show that
individual’s employment did not change significantly over the two year period (Kangas
et al., 2019).
Another natural experiment that resembles the universality feature of the windfall in
this study, is the cash transfer to all citizens in Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend
(PFD). Evidence shows that $1000 increase in per person disbursement of cash leads
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to only 0.2% contraction in labour market on annual basis (Bibler et al., 2019). The
authors argue that giving out cash to all citizens will lead to a "positive demand
shock" in the short term and the higher demand for goods and services leads to higher
employments. The increase in demand for labour is interpreted as the direct effect
of cash windfall in the study of PFD. On the other hand, looking at hours worked
alone shows a 0.9 hours reduction per week following the cash disbursements. The
experimental findings in my study abstracts away from exploring positive demand
effects or changes in other socio-economic aspects. It studies the clean effects of windfall
provision on short term effort provision.
The findings from lottery winners are also mixed and there is no consensus, work effort
of winners declined in the US (Imbens et al., 2001) and Netherlands (Picchio et al.,
2017) but changed very little in Sweden (Cesarini et al., 2017). The caveat here is that
studying responses to lottery winnings does not represent a typical response to unearned
incomes. Inheriting large sum of money affects the recipient’s work effort too. This is
referred to as “the Carnegie Effect” which accurately captures the inter-generational
wealth shocks (Doorley & Pestel, 2020; Cahuc et al., 2014). In Norway recipients
lowered their work effort substantially (Bø et al., 2019), people retired early (Bloemen,
2011), dropped out of labour markets (Bloemen & Stancanelli, 2001; Holtz-Eakin et
al., 1993). It is noteworthy that some studies did not find any wealth effects (Joulfaian
& Wilhelm, 1994).
It is evident that results from social/field experiments and lottery winners vary by
country and by experiment. There are several reasons behind the heterogeneity. I
will suffice with the following: more than half of the studies did not have a control
group and no randomisation was carried out in allocating subjects into the trials. This
confounds results of these trials and further inferences. Invoking experimental methods
to study short term windfall effects will not suffer from most of the field experiment
challenges and produce less noisy data.
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2.2 Tax evasion
In the last two decades, experimental evidence alongside findings from the field on
tax evasion has explored new insights and shifted policy direction. However, in the
discussion on determinants of tax compliance, little attention has been given to income
windfalls effects (financial incentives).
Important factors that alter tax evasion of individuals can be generalised into two
types, (1) deterrence measures such as fines, audits, probability of detecting under-
reporting, monitoring/supervision. There is both laboratory (Alm, 2012) and field
experimental (Slemrod et al., 2001; Kleven et al., 2011) evidence that these measures
are relevant for tax evasion. Increasing audit probabilities lowers evasion levels and
higher audit rates have stronger effect on self-employed workers (i.e. those with the
opportunity to evade). These studies have also found that third-party reporting and
monitoring plays an important role in evasion decisions.
(2) Another class of factors important for paying taxes is non-pecuniary measures.
Evidence show that if an agent belongs to a circle of compliant taxpayers, they seem
to be more compliant and vice versa (Frey & Torgler, 2007; Lefebvre et al., 2015).
Intrinsic motivations defined as tax morale and religiosity are shown be positively
correlated to tax compliance (Torgler & Schneider, 2009; Halla, 2012; Dwenger et al.,
2016). Finally lack of information or false perceptions such as perceived probability
of audits is also important for tax evasion decisions (Erard & Feinstein, 1994). This
argument comes from the work of Tversky and Kahneman, where they show agents
overestimate the probability of risky events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Early economic models of tax evasion primarily focused on the importance of fines and
audits (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973). In practice both amounts of
fine and probability of being audited are very low in most countries1. The question to
explain why tax evasion/compliance levels are so high in most developed economies
moved beyond economic variables and looked into tax morale, subjective knowledge
of economic variables (e.i. perceived audit probabilities) and notions of fairness (i.e.
re-distributive and procedural). For a full survey of economic deterrents that are
1For example, audit probability was estimated at 1% in the US (Andreoni et al., 1998) and fines
rarely exceed 40% of the evaded tax.
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important for tax compliance (Mascagni, 2018; Alm, 2019). For a review of the factors
beyond economic variables (Kirchler et al., 2008; Muehlbacher et al., 2008).
The impact of financial incentives (windfalls namely) on tax evasion is not known. If
windfalls affect individual supply of effort, it may also affect their decision how much
of those earnings to report for tax purposes. Therefore as a contribution to this field,
the experiments in part one of the thesis investigates the effects of windfalls on labour
income reporting decisions (tax evasion) of subjects.
In principle, studying sources of income vis-à-vis compliance relates to the discussion
on sunk costs, property rights and house money (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Thaler &
Johnson, 1990; Loewenstein & Issacharoff, 1994; Davis et al., 2010). Individuals tend
to associate higher value to the same object obtained with performance rather than
luck. The argument is that investing effort in an object or activity (money in this case)
leads to sunk costs and a sense of property right (Durham et al., 2014). Within the
context of tax evasion, this implies that ‘hard earned’ income should be evaded more,
and taxpayers should be reluctant to give it away (as taxes).
On the other hand, a competing hypothesis later emerged that argued sunk costs
lead to risk-averse decisions in tax evasion contexts such that taxpayers don’t want to
lose more of their hard-earned income, thus the ‘reverse sunk cost’ term was coined
by (Muehlbacher et al., 2008). The implication of the competing argument is that
tax evasion/compliance of hard-earned income is higher compared to that of windfalls.
Windfalls are different from earned income in at least one fundamental way; no or little
effort is spent achieving them. It is this very feature that increases the proclivity to
spend them more rapidly than other assets/cash (Arkes et al., 1994). The experiments





I run two experiments: taxed windfalls and untaxed windfalls. Subjects in the taxed
windfall experiment were only allocated to a cash windfall that was taxable whereas
subjects in the second experiment were allocated to an untaxed cash windfall. Each
windfall had three treatments: zero, low and high. The exposure to three treatments
were randomised. There were 215 individuals in each experiment giving a total sample
of 430 participants. Each treatment was played 4 times leading to 860 observations
per treatment. All subjects were exposed to all treatments in a within-subject design,
which boosts the statistical power of the tests and estimates (Charness et al., 2012).
This paper is primarily interested in two questions: effort supply and tax evasion
responses in the presence of taxed and untaxed windfalls. The design ensures inde-
pendence of exposure and exogenous allocation of subject to each treatment to allow
for the error term to be uncorrelated with the variables of interest (Wooldridge, 2010).
Demand effects were minimised by reducing experimenter contact during the sessions,
and by explicitly stating that the project was funded by a UK institution and answers
provided had no bearing on other subjects nor on the experimenters.
3.1 Experimental procedures
The experimental currency was tokens and the exchange rate for 1 token was set to
25 Afghanis (AFN) (an equivalent of £0.30). Subjects in treatment zero received no
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tokens, in low received 15 tokens and those in high treatment received 30 tokens as
windfall. They could earn more labour income by completing a real-effort task where
they were paid at piece rate. Payoffs in the experiment were solely determined by
individual decisions and no interaction was allowed between subjects.
Each experiment had 12 sessions, the first experiment took place between August and
November 2017 and the second experiment was carried out between November and
December 2018. Sessions were held at different times during the day to minimise self-
selection biases. Recruitment emails asked subjects to take part in a decision-making
experiment. There was no mention of labour supply, tax evasion or compliance.
Following Fortin et al., (2007) and others, these parameters were kept constant: audit
probability of 5% and a penalty amount equal to 25% of the evaded tax if under-
reporting was discovered plus the unpaid tax liabilities. The tax rate in the experiment
was 35% of the reported income. These values were set to mimic tax parameters in
most common developing economies.
3.2 Afghanistan and subject recruitment
The subject pool used in both experiments were part-time students who also had
daytime jobs from Rana University, a privately-owned institution in Kabul, Afghanistan.
To highlight the importance of the findings of this study, it is essential to have an
overview of Afghanistan’s economic background. The population of the country is
approximately 32.2 million people of which over 25% live in the capital, Kabul (NSIA,
2018; Nassif et al., 2018).1 Afghanistan is in the bottom of the index for low income
countries and estimates showed that its GDP per capita was £372.2 in 2019 (IMF,
2019).
According to Survey of the Afghan People in 2019 households were divided into three
monthly income categories: low income category where 23.9% of respondents had an
income less than £50 (5,000 AFN), average income category where 65.8% had an
income of £50 – £203 (5,001–20,000 AFN) and high income households where only 9%
1It is important to note that there has never been a census in Afghanistan; all figures are estimates
and the 32.2 million people are the most common figure used regularly by the World Bank and other
international agencies in the country.
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reported incomes greater than £203 (< 20,000 AFN) (Akseer et al., 2019). Average
household size in Afghanistan is estimated to be 7 persons (NSIA, 2018), this gives an
idea of the daily average incomes.
The minimum amount paid in the experiment was £2 for 70 minutes which resemble
the high end of the average daily income. The first novelty of this study is that the
monetary stakes were high and the incentivised decisions within the experiment has
sizeable consequences. This adds to the validity of the results produced. The second
novelty is that the subject pool used in the experiment are part-time students who
also had jobs outside the university. This is an important distinction from previous
experimental studies on tax evasion and/or labour supply. The common criticism to
lab experiments is the extensive use of students who have not had a job or experienced
paying taxes yet. The subject pool in this experiment negates both of those criticisms.
3.3 Overview of a single round
A single round in the experiments involved six stages2. The first three stages were
repeated 12 times in each session, whereas stages four to six were only played once.
The experiments were carried out using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Once participants
arrived, they were randomly assigned to booths by drawing a number from an urn.
After reading out the instructions to them, hard-copy of the instructions was given too.
Stage one: Cash windfalls, small sticker cards labelled as ‘variable tokens’ were
given to each participant that could be easily peeled to see the amount of cash windfall
received for that particular round in the session. The three manipulations were 0, 15
or 30 tokens. Subjects were asked to peel the card and record their windfall earnings
in the space provided in z-Tree. They were told that they may or may not receive the
‘variable tokens’ in the following rounds. Participants could not lie in this stage.
Stage two: Real effort task or Opt out, subjects were asked to either take part
in a real effort task to earn more income or opt out to move on to the next stage
of the experiment. The real effort slider task used in this experiment was developed
by (Gill & Prowse, 2012), in it, 48 sliders are positioned at different points on the
2A full description of all the instructions can be found in Appendix A for taxed windfall experi-
ment 5.1, and untaxed windfall experiment 5.2.
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screen; subjects must move each slider to the middle position. They were paid at piece
rate of 1 token per correctly positioned slider. Participants had two minutes to do
this task in each round. For those who opted out, the real effort task was skipped,
and they moved to stage three directly. This could be done at any point during the
real effort task without affecting the earnings from the task. This was done to capture
those who were not willing to provide effort (L=0). Real effort tasks have been widely
used as proxy for labour supply in the experimental literature (Doerrenberg & Duncan,
2014). As pointed out in (Charness & Kuhn, 2011), hours worked and labour supply
are isomorphic and share many characteristics, therefore the puzzles are a good proxy.
Most importantly, the task is meaningless for the experimenter, so this controls for
any experimenter demand-effects that may skew the results.
Stage three: Income reporting, subjects were informed of their total earnings
and were asked to report their earnings for tax purposes. In the taxable windfall
experiment, they were asked to report their real effort and windfall earnings separately.
They could report earnings between zero to their gross income. Whereas in the
untaxed windfall experiment, subjects were asked to report earnings from the real
effort task only. At the end of each round, participants saw their total earnings and
total tax deductions individually. This is important because not knowing about the
wages of other participants (relative pay), the subsequent levels of effort remains
unaffected (Greiner et al., 2011; Clark et al., 2010).
Stage four: Risk aversion, I use the risky asset investment task developed
by (Gneezy & Potters, 1997). Each participant was given 4 tokens and could in-
vest part or all of it in an account. In this specific stage, each token was worth 25
Afghanis ($0.37). With a probability 0.5, the invested amount is successful and gives a
return of 2.5 times the invested amount or with a probability of 0.5 pays back nothing.
The uninvested portion and the outcome of this lottery is then added to the final payoff
of the participants. This gives a risk aversion index scaled 1 to 4 with 4 being risk
neutral/loving and 1 being most risk averse.
Stage five: Personality measures, a questionnaire about individual characteristics
and personal traits was carried out including eliciting participant’s tax morale and
attitude toward the government. I use a modified version of big five model that
encompasses one question per personality developed by (Woods & Hampson, 2005).
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The characteristics include emotional stability, agreeableness, extraversion, openness,
and conscientiousness.
Stage six: Payments, subjects were told that at the end of each session the final
earnings will be calculated using the average of three randomly chosen rounds. This
was done to avoid choosing a bad round for payment, creating wealth effects, satiation,
or irrational decisions see (Blumkin et al., 2012; Doerrenberg & Duncan, 2014). An
assistant experimenter was designated as the cashier at the exit door of the lab, where
participants were taking their payment sheets for payments. They were paid in private
and walked away.
3.4 Models and experimental hypothesis
To motivate the hypothesis, I use predictions of the following two theoretical models:
static labour supply model (Sapsford & Tzannatos, 1993; Aaberge & Colombino, 2014)
and Allingham-Sandmo model of tax evasion (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972).
1. Static labour supply model, a risk averse agent makes a labour supply decision
proxied by total number of hours worked h, taking the wage rate w, total number of
hours T , and non-labour income G as given. The agent must choose between hours
worked and leisure. Formally the agent solves the following problem:
max
h
E (U) = U (wh + G, T − h) (3.1)
where Y = wh + G and T = h + l. I assume that U(wh + G, T − h) is increasing in
leisure (l) and income (Y ) (i.e. decreasing in h). The model assumes that leisure and
consumption are normal goods.
The first order condition is:
dU
dh
= wU ′Y (wh + G, T − h) − U
′










The conditions for the existence of an interior solution is provided in the Appendix
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Equation 3.4 outlines the standard income effect on hours worked/labour supply
(measured in effort supplied in my experiment) in the following manner: if leisure is
normal good then the term U ′l > 0 which means the equation 3.4 is strictly negative
dh
dG
< 0. This is informs my first two hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Effort decreases with provision of windfalls, irrespective of whether the
windfall is taxed or untaxed.
In accordance with model predictions above, optimal level of effort supply adjusts by
the following mechanism. When individuals receive an additional cash windfall, it
increases their net income, via an income effect, the person will demand less effort
and more leisure. At the same time, receiving a cash windfall leads to a change in the
relative price of effort-leisure consumption (via substitution effect) such that demanding
the same level of effort as before will lead to further increases in earnings, meaning
that individuals should not lower their effort supply.
The income and substitution effects are exerting opposing effects on effort supply, with
the additional windfall-induced effect, the first hypothesis states that effort supply
will decrease in the presence of both taxable and non-taxable windfalls. The same
argument could be put differently, effort supply critically depends on different types
of technologies, and how elastic these types of technologies are in the presence of a
windfall. I anticipate effort supply to be highest in the treatment with no windfall,
and effort supply to decrease as windfall amounts increase in both experiments.
As a corollary from hypothesis 1, it follows that:
Hypothesis 2 Effort supply is higher for subjects in the untaxed windfall treatment
compared to taxed windfall.
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In addition, there is psychological and experimental evidence on tax aversion (McCaffery
& Baron, 2006; Sussman & Olivola, 2011), arguing that subjects suffer heuristics and
fail to make extensive use of information available to them. They wait longer queues
or travel longer distances to avoid paying taxes. Several channels have been identified
through which tax aversion operates; subjects decouple tax payments from public
services received (Mettler, 2011), feeling lack of control over fiscal spending (Lamberton,
2013) and falling net-wages that lead to reduction in effort supply (Kessler & Norton,
2016). In my experiment the falling net-wages in the after-tax state operate via taxing
windfall income.
2. Allingham-Sandmo tax evasion model, an agent must decide how much
income to declare to the tax authority when tax rate (τ), fine rate (f), and detection
probability (p) are given. Formally the agent solves the following problem:
max
x
E[U ] = (1 − p)U(Y ) + pU(Z) (3.5)
where income in the two states are: Y = w − τx and Z = w − τx − f(w − x). The
share of income declared for tax purpose is x whereas w is the wage rate.
The first order condition is:
dU
dx
= −τ(1 − p)U ′Y − (τ − f)pU
′
p = 0 (3.6)
It is straightforward to show that an interior solution to this problem exists. These are
provided in the Appendix 5.8 for brevity of exposition. Differentiating3.6 with respect





τ(1 − p)U ′Y [−RA(Y ) + (1 − f)RA(Z)] < 0 (3.7)
Such that D = τ 2(1 − p)U ′′(Y ) + (τ − f)2pU ′′(Z). In equation 3.7 with decreasing
absolute risk aversion, the sign of the bracketed term depends on the value of f; such

















, allows to rewrite the comparative statics in terms of
risk aversion. Assuming that w is the earnings from real-effort, then w∗ ≥ w + G
and accounts for the windfall income. A closer inspection shows that the fraction of







τ(1 − p)U ′Y [−RR(Y ) + RR(Z)] (3.8)
If the net effect of the windfall income increases total wealth, with decreasing relative
risk aversion, equation3.8 shows that the fraction of actual income reported also
decreases. This gives my third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Tax compliance falls with provision of windfall income.
Chapter 4
Effort Supply and Tax Evasion
Decisions
4.1 Effort supply and windfalls
Effort supply is directly observed and measured by the number of correctly slider
puzzles solved in the real effort task. Figure 4.1 shows effort aggregated for all subjects
over 12 periods. There is little or minimum learning effects throughout the real-effort
task except in round one of the taxed windfall experiment. Absence of learning effects
shows that the slider puzzles are good measures/proxies for studying effort supply
and with repetition subjects did not develop better skills in performing them in this
experiment, as was originally claimed by the developers (Gill & Prowse, 2012).
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Fig. 4.1 Learning effects
4.1.1 Summary statistics
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics on characteristics of the participants such as
age, gender, risk aversion, big five personality traits and their answers to the survey
questions about their attitude toward the government and paying taxes. For example,
the question about tax morale was similar the questions used in the World Values
Survey (Minkov, 2012). The average age of the participants were 22.23 in the taxed
windfall and 25 years old in the untaxed windfall experiment. While 61% were male
subjects in the former, only 54% were male in the latter experiment. I carry out a two
sample independent means test to compare the differences between these characteristics,
the p-values are reported in the last column. This allows me to see if the two samples
are homogeneous for the results to be compared with one another. For now, I postpone
this discussion for the section on analysis of taxed vs untaxed effort supply.
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics
Variables Untaxed windfall Taxed windfall P-value
Age 25.00 22.23 0.0000
(3.105) (2.243)
Male 0.54 0.61 0.0000
(0.500) (0.489)
Risk aversion 2.46 3.00 0.0000
(0.890) (1.030)
Audited 0.06 0.03 0.2905
(0.239) (0.165)
Caught 0.00 0.01 0.0280
(0) (0.0962)
Extraversion 4.68 4.46 0.0034
(2.784) (2.706)
Agreeableness 6.78 6.13 0.0000
(2.402) (2.633)
Emotional stability 5.00 4.43 0.0000
(2.869) (2.849)
Conscientiousness 4.12 3.78 0.0000
(2.727) (2.662)
Openness 5.80 5.33 0.0000
(2.668) (2.696)
Attitude toward the government 5.43 5.32 0.2222
(3.164) (3.144)
Lack of trust in the government 4.20 4.22 0.7711
(2.934) (2.820)
Knows evasion 6.18 5.80 0.0000
(3.168) (3.012)
Tax morale 6.83 7.20 0.0000
(2.715) (2.605)
Average Earnings £10.3 £5.8
(2.3) (2)
Number of subjects 215 215
Note: Mean coefficients; Standard errors clustered at the participant level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗:
p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.10, respectively.
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4.1.2 Average treatment effects
Average effort supply in the taxed and untaxed windfall experiment is summarised in
Figure 4.2. I begin comparing differences in the averages between treatments (zero, low
and high). In doing so, I employ a paired t-test (dependent means test). With a large
sample size, test results are asymptotically valid, see Appendix 5.3 for histograms and
box-plots showing the underlying normal distribution. Any differences in the paired
t-tests will be considered as treatment effects.
For the taxed windfall, supply of effort falls drastically when the amount of windfall
increases from none in the control treatment to high (p-value = 0.000). Similarly, I
observe significant reductions when comparing high to low treatment (p-value = 0.000).
However, the decline in effort provision is statistically insignificant between low and
the control (p-value = 0.2944). In sum, the level of effort provided in high treatment
is significantly lower than that of subjects in both other treatments who received lower
levels of windfall.
For the untaxed windfall experiment, the test of averages reveals that effort provision
in high treatment (p-value = 0.0273) is substantially less than that of the other
two treatments. However, this is only significant at 5% level, whereas the difference
between the control and the low treatment is statistically insignificant. The averages
are observable in Figure 4.2.
The reason why there is no treatment effect between low and control group in both
experiments, is perhaps a ‘stake size’ issue. Nevertheless, I do further regression
analysis controlling for other factors in the subsequent section which will produce more
robust results.
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Fig. 4.2 Average effort supply of taxed and untaxed subjects
4.1.3 Dynamics of effort supply
Testing for the simultaneity of effort and compliance
Given the nature of the research question in this paper and thereafter the experimental
design to study effort supply and tax evasion decisions jointly, it may give rise to a
potential endogeneity problem. Such that in the experiment, effort supply decisions
were followed by tax reporting decisions and the series of decisions were repeated for 12
periods. Investigating whether windfalls have influenced effort/labour supply and tax
evasion (income reporting) makes it difficult to determine whether effort decisions affect
reporting decisions and/or vice versa. In other words, this simultaneity bias makes it
difficult to determine the direction of the effect between the two choice variables. To
further explore this issue, consider the following points:
30 Effort Supply and Tax Evasion Decisions
Under a specific assumption, one could argue that subsequent effort supply decisions
in the experiment may depend on tax reporting. That assumption is: if a subject
calculates in his/her mind the optimal level of effort to supply and tax amount to evade
before the start of each round, and then executes that plan, a kind of simultaneous
two-dimensional optimisation. If true, this would give rise to a simultaneity bias or
endogeneity problem.
However, given the recent developments in behavioural economics, I argue that a simul-
taneous two-dimensional optimisation is unlikely for several reasons. The alternative
assumption I propose is that each subject thinks about how much effort to supply
myopically, completely ignoring what their tax reporting decision should be, and then
decide how much to evade conditional on the effort supply (sequential decision-making
that doesn’t involve two-dimensional optimisation). I make the case for sequential
decision-making with the following three arguments:
First, experimental evidence on ‘bounded rationality’ suggest that subjects in reality
do not optimise but rather satisfice by resorting to mental shortcuts (Rubinstein, 1997).
Therefore, making a simultaneous two-dimensional optimisation to be carried out
mentally highly unlikely.
Second, cognitive evidence on individual multi-tasking abilities points in the same
direction that efforts diverted into one task reduces the quality and time-spent thinking
about the other task significantly (Paridon & Kaufmann, 2010; Spink et al., 2008;
Schöttner, 2008).
Finally, in addition to the above, I provide evidence for the claim that subjects in
the experiment made their effort decision independently of their compliance decision.
To do this, I conducted a 2SLS analysis where in the first stage I instrumented labor
income compliance using tax morale as instrumental variable. In the second stage, I
regress effort on estimated compliance and the treatments. If the decision to comply
is done simultaneously with effort, one should observe a significant coefficient on the
compliance variable in the second stage regression. In both cases, the coefficient on
labour income is non-significant in either specification, supporting my conjecture.
There exists empirical evidence that tax morale is significant for tax evasion (Choo
et al., 2016; Torgler, 2006) but the same cannot be said for tax morale and effort.
The assumption is that there is no or little correlation between effort provision and
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the instrument i.e. cov[Lit, Zit] = 0. To my knowledge, there are no empirical and/or
theoretical studies that has found evidence linking the IV used here to labour supply
choices. The regression passes all the weak IV tests with tolerable degree of bias, see
Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Test of sequentiality
First stage estimates
DV: Labor income compliance Taxable Windfall Untaxed Windfall








F test of excluded instruments F (1, 214) = 5.14 F (1, 214) = 9.16
p-value 0.024 0.003
Second stage estimates
DV: Effort Supply Taxable Windfall Untaxed Windfall








Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 4.744 9.380
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value 0.029 0.002
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 34.947 69.157
Weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 16.38 16.38
N 2,580 2,580
Note: Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic is an under-identification test; the Cragg-Donald
Wald F test is a weak identification test. I report the statistic and the critical value
for 10% maximal IV bias. Standard errors clustered at the participant level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗:
p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.10, respectively.
Determinants of effort supply
With the assumption from the sub-section above, I use a random effects GLS estimator
to estimate treatment effects for effort supply. A Hausman test fails to find systematic
difference in the estimated coefficients by a fixed effects model, therefore a random
effects model is deemed more suitable.
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With n=430 subjects, each playing 12 periods while being exposed to each treatment
condition 4 times, I obtained a short-balanced panel dataset with few time periods and
many individuals where all individual units are observed in all time periods Ti = T
for all i. Consistency condition of the estimator requires that sample-selection process
must be random, and errors must not be correlated with regressors. Those are ensured
in the experimental design.
The Random Effects GLS model estimated here takes the following form:




itβ2 + αi + uit
The model estimates Effort supply of individual i(i = 1, 2, 3. . . .430) in period t(t =
1, 2, 3. . . 12). β0 is the intercept independent of individual and period effects. β1 is
the vector shows the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables. x′it is the
K-dimensional vector of explanatory variables (windfall levels: low, high and tax
treatment effects and their interactions). z′it is the individual characteristics which do
not vary over time. αi + uit is the error term with two components both are iid(0, σ2),
individual-specific error αi that does not vary over time, and a remainder uit which is
uncorrelated with respect to individual i and period t. Both components are mutually
independent and independent of all the regressors. A simple OLS does not consider this
error structure thus the reason for the use of generalised least squares (GLS) estimator.
The dependent variable Effort supply is continuous and takes values between 0 and
a theoretical maximum of 48 (the number of sliders). However, the maximum value
was never reached, rendering the need to use truncated models. Zero treatment where
subjects do not receive any windfall is used as the benchmark. Table 4.3, summarises
the results of this regression.
For taxed windfall starting with model (1), the level of effort supplied significantly
decreases with more windfalls; low treatment (−0.292∗) and high treatment (−1.634∗∗∗).
Thus, the labour supply of subjects in high compared to low has also declined
(−1.342∗∗∗), that is the difference between the coefficients in high and low treat-
ments. This finding is strongly significant and robust. Estimations in model (2)
controls for risk aversion, age, gender and period. The signs are still negative but the
difference between low and zero treatments is no longer significant (−0.197), however,
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Table 4.3 Determinants of effort
Taxed Windfall Untaxed Windfall All
DV: Effort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low -0.292∗ -0.197 -0.527∗∗∗ -0.532∗∗∗ -0.527∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.159) (0.188) (0.198) (0.188)
High -1.634∗∗∗ -1.586∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.698∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗















Constant 14.517∗∗∗ 11.148∗∗∗ 15.979∗∗∗ 11.305∗∗∗∗∗∗ 15.979∗∗∗
(0.345) (3.702) (0.371) (3.172) (0.371)
N 2,580 2,580 2,580 2,580 5,160
R2 0.01 0.05 0.002 0.01 0.03
Note: Standard errors clustered at the participant level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: p < 0.01, p <
0.05, p < 0.10, respectively.
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it is still significant for the high treatment (−1.586∗∗∗). This is clear evidence that
effort supply decreases significantly with taxed windfall endowments.
For untaxed windfalls model (3), effort provision is substantially lower for both treat-
ments compared to that of subjects in the control group. In low treatment subjects
provide (−0.527∗∗∗) points less effort and in high treatment the reductions were by
(−0.695∗∗∗) points. Similarly in model (4) when I control for risk aversion, age, gender
and period, the signs and the significance do not change. Again, this is clear evidence
that windfalls lead to negative effort supply responses. In light of these findings, I
report the following result:
Result 1. Supply of effort declines with higher levels of windfall in both taxed and
untaxed windfalls.
Consistent with the theoretical predictions as hypothesised, I find that real effort
supply in the lab significantly decreases when subjects are endowed with windfalls
(taxed or untaxed). Income and substitution effects are the usual mechanisms through
which this effect is explained. Income effect dominates and subjects substitute away
toward leisure. This leads to lower effort supply in the short run within the laboratory
context. The results are consistent and robust. As an example, these results are in line
with findings from social experiments (Robins, 1985), study of lottery winners (Picchio
et al., 2017) and the conditional cash experiment from Malawi (Ambler et al., 2019).
Moreover, the results from Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) study showed
that following a windfall disbursement, labour supply was reduced by 0.9 hours per
week. This finding particularly resembles, what I find in the lab with subjects who
receive a windfall. Yet considering the positive demand shocks created in the aftermath
of the windfall disbursement during the year, they find that benefits of the PFD
outweighs the costs incurred due to the fall in labour supply (Bibler et al., 2019). A
lab experiment abstracts the discussion on "positive demand shocks". This doesn’t
permit me to comment on whether the short term responses observed in the lab to
cash windfalls persist overtime and for how long. Nonetheless, I find experimental
evidence that effort decisions are sensitive to windfalls in the lab. Effort levels are
reduced as windfall increases.
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Tax effects
Figure 4.3 shows that average effort supply for subjects in the untaxed windfall is
much higher than that of taxed windfall. This difference points to the idea that taxing
windfalls has consequences for subject’s effort supply.
Fig. 4.3 Average effort supply by tax treatment
Although, the observable characteristics measured for subjects in both experiments does
not show complete homogeneity. Using a parametric t-test (two sample independents
means test), I compared differences in these characteristics for the two groups, p-values
are reported in Table 4.1: Summary statistics1. Of these characteristics the treatments
were similar across audit, caught, extraversion, attitude toward the government, and
lack of trust in government. They were different across age, gender, risk, risk aver-
sion, agreeableness, emotional stability, conscientiousness, openness, tax morale and
knowledge of evasion.
If we accept the groups are not very dissimilar, the analysis on the differential effects of
taxing and not taxing the windfall becomes possible. In addition, from observations of
1A Wilcoxon ranksum test (Wilcoxon, 1992), the non-parametric counterpart to the t-test produces
identical results.
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the averages in Table 4.1, it is evident that some of the differences are not drastic. For
instance, there are a few more males in untaxed windfall experiment than the taxed.
At worst, when I compare tax effects, the differences will give a noisy result, where
caution is advised.
With the assumption above, model (5) presents the pooled data for both experiments
in Table 4.3.
There is a negative coefficient on taxed windfall (i.e. tax treatment effect) indicating
that supply of effort falls by (−1.462∗∗∗) points when the windfall is taxed. Even
though subjects explicitly knew there was a flat tax regime in the experiment, there is
a strong tax treatment effect on effort provision. In addition to that, I interact low and
high treatments with the tax treatment dummy, I find negative significant results for
those in high and taxed windfall treatment (−0.938∗∗∗). With this in mind, I report
the following finding:
Result 2. Average supply of effort is substantially lower when windfall is taxed
compared to untaxed windfalls.
There may be a behavioural mechanism such as ‘tax aversion’ that causes this difference.
The windfall was not earned, and subjects knew it was a flat tax on an amount they
had spent no effort to achieve. The sense of ownership of the income once transferred
to a participant crowds-out the idea whether it was earned or not, ultimately leading
to ‘tax aversion’ behaviour. The idea that taxpayers suffer from a ‘net wage illusion’
proposed by (Fochmann & Weimann, 2013) does not apply to this finding. The
concept of net-wage illusion suggests that taxpayers provide more labour in response to
higher gross income with higher tax rates compared to equivalent wage reductions that
result in the same net wage under both cases. The context of their finding is different
and answers a different question.
Aversion to taxes leads to decreases in labour supply if a new tax is introduced. The
theoretical grounds for tax aversion come from the works of (McCaffery & Baron, 2006;
Sussman & Olivola, 2011). They discuss that average person suffers from heuristics and
biases in thinking. Agents fail to integrate parallel tax systems or make extensive use
of information (even when readily available) to decide about the end-state allocations.
Individuals wait much longer in the queue or travel further distances to avoid paying
taxes. Evidence of this was found experimentally in (Kessler & Norton, 2016).
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Model (2) estimates for the taxed windfall treatment shows that the sign for risk
aversion is positive and significant (0.735∗∗). Those who are more risk averse provide
more effort. One way to explain this is that risk aversion acts as incentive to work harder
via indirect mechanisms. Studies on the relationship between risk aversion and labour
market outcomes predict that risk averse individuals have lower probability of changing
their jobs, have lower reservation wage or attend on the job training (Pissarides, 1974;
Pannenberg, 2007). However, this finding is not robust in my estimates.
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4.2 Tax evasion and windfalls
Tax evasion is defined as one minus the ratio of reported labour income to actual labour
income earned via solving puzzles in the experiments. Financial incentives are the
taxed and untaxed windfalls in the two experiments. For the taxed windfall experiment
only, I also define windfall evasion as one minus the ratio of reported windfall to actual
windfall income. Therefore, the term tax evasion refers to evasion of labour earnings
alone, where much of the discussion is dedicated.
Figure 4.4 shows average evasion for taxed and untaxed windfalls aggregated over 12
rounds. Tax evasion for untaxed windfall is higher than that of the taxed windfall
group with the highest difference in rounds 1 and 2. Thereafter, the differences begin
to converge and completely disappear by round 12.
Fig. 4.4 Tax evasion by windfall type
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4.2.1 Averages analysis
I use a parametric paired t-test to carry out the test of differences between evasion
averages. Given the large sample size, it meets the assumptions of the parametric
tests2. Under taxed windfall, tax evasion is not different between treatments (zero,
low and high). I find no statistically significant deviations for average evasions when
windfall levels change from zero to low (p-value = 0.4354); or low to high (p-value =
0.6774), or zero to high (p-value = 0.7119).
Since the windfall endowed in this experiment was also taxable, there are substantial
differences in windfall evasions between high and low treatments. The associated
p-value = 0.0000 and those in high treatment evade significantly less than those in low
treatment. For the same experiment, there is significant evidence that subject’s tax
evasion (that is subject’s labour income tax evasion) is much higher than their windfall
evasion but only in high treatment (p-value = 0.000). Whereas the difference is not
significant for low treatment (p-value = 0.2328).
Result 4. Subjects evade labour earnings more than their windfall earnings only in
the high treatment.
This result may be driven by a behavioural response. There are two competing
hypotheses in this regard: investing time and effort in obtaining the labour income
leads to ‘sunk costs’ and ‘property right’ hence making taxpayers reluctant to handover
their hard-earned income to as taxes (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). I find evidence in support
of this hypothesis. Evasion of labour earnings were much higher than those of windfalls
at least in the high treatment. A competing hypothesis argued that because of investing
time and effort in obtaining labour income subjects might show a ‘reverse sunk cost’
behaviour toward evasion from fear of losing more of their income if under-reporting is
uncovered (Muehlbacher et al., 2008). There is no evidence in my data to support the
latter hypothesis.
For those in the untaxed windfall, I find no differences in tax evasion between treatments
(zero, low and high). There is no statistical evidence to show differences in tax evasion
between treatments, zero to low (p-value = 0.4571), zero to high (p-value = 0.8818)
2I do carry out non-parametric counterpart tests for robustness however the results are not reported
here.
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and low to high (p-value = 0.3714). These differences are small and clearly observable
in the Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Evasion averages
Evasion averages Taxed windfall Untaxed windfall
Tax Evasion Windfall Evasion Tax Evasion
Zero 0.52 0.58
(0.434) (0.372)
Low 0.53 0.56 0.57
(0.428) (0.472) (0.374)
High 0.52 0.43 0.58
(0.425) (0.455) (0.370)
N 2567 2567 2567
Note: Windfall evasion is one minus ratio of reported windfall gains to actual windfall
Tax evasion is one minus ratio of reported labour earnings to actual earnings
Mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
4.2.2 Dynamics of tax evasion
The analysis of averages is not very robust and only tests for significant differences in
the means (or medians for the non-parametric case). More robust regression analysis
is needed to test the direction and magnitude of the effects while controlling for other
factors.
Tax evasion is bound between zero and one. Mass points are observed at each end of
the distribution, see Appendix 5.4. Therefore, Generalised Linear Squares (GLS) and
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approaches produce biased and inconsistent estimates.
A Tobit model is appropriate for this purpose, the dependent variable is censored from
below and above (Tobin, 1958). Employing an OLS approach in this case treats all the
observations as actual values and not as lower (upper) limits of tax evasion. This leads
to inconsistent estimation of the coefficient of interest (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010)
To account for this, I use a two-limit random effects Tobit model such that: e∗it is the
observed evasions and potentially a censored version of eit. I assume that eit = e∗it
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when 0 < eit < 1; e∗it = 0 if eit < 0 and e∗it = 1 if eit > 1 .
e∗it = xitβ + zitγ + vit + ϵit
Where e∗it is observed tax evasion that takes values between 0 to 1. X is a vector of
treatment variables (low and high windfalls, with zero windfall being the benchmark)
for individual i (with i = 1, 2, . . . , 215) in period t (with t = 1, 2, . . . , 12). β is a vector
of coefficients of interest to be estimated; vit and ϵit are both i.i.d N(0, θ2), uncorrelated
to the treatment variables and independent of each other. Zit is a vector of control
variables used for robustness purposes and γ is the vector of estimated coefficients.
The results for this regression is presented in Table 4.5. In one of the experiments
taxpayer’s first dollar is taxed irrespective of the type of earnings. In the second
experiment the marginal tax rate on the first dollar of earnings is zero due the untaxed
windfall endowment.
Evasion in the taxed windfall experiment partially increases for those in low treatment
compared to control group. The estimated coefficient shows that tax evasion goes up
by (0.0593∗) points. This impact is robust for all specifications. On the other hand,
tax evasion of subjects in the untaxed windfall does not respond in both treatments.
Result 5. There is partial evidence that tax evasion increases in response to financial
incentives in the taxed windfall experiment.
The relationship between tax evasion and financial incentives (windfalls) seems obscure
at first. One way to explain this is through the falling net-wages argument. Once the
transfer is made to subjects, they no longer distinguish between earned and unearned
income. Therefore, they see their net wages falling after a tax. This instigates the
behaviour to re-adjust the losses via evading their earnings where possible. Of course,
the assumption here is no third-party reporting, the result is applicable to self-employed
individuals and contexts where voluntary reporting is possible.
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Table 4.5 Dynamics of tax evasion
DV: Tax evasion Untaxed windfall Taxed windfall
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low 0.0252 0.0253 0.0592* 0.0593*
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0333) (0.0333)
High 0.0254 0.0257 0.0106 0.0115
(0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0339) (0.0339)
Period -0.0124*** -0.0124*** 0.00916** 0.00906**
(0.00199) (0.00199) (0.00398) (0.00398)
Audited -3.012 -2.944 0.122 0.126
(64.99) (38.13) (0.110) (0.110)
Caught 3.080 3.011 0.0892 0.0829
(64.99) (38.13) (0.133) (0.133)
Effort 0.0203*** 0.0204*** -0.00556 -0.00511
(0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00423) (0.00423)
Risk aversion 0.00140 -0.0142 0.152** 0.172**
(0.0329) (0.0322) (0.0766) (0.0763)
Attitude toward the govt. 0.00670 0.0110 0.0390 0.0287
(0.00953) (0.00959) (0.0272) (0.0279)
Tax morale -0.0227* -0.0154 -0.0423 -0.0483
(0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0347) (0.0342)
Lack of trust in govt. 0.00364 0.00147 0.0597** 0.0623**
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0286) (0.0285)
Knows evasion 0.00204 0.00245 0.00242 0.0117
(0.00996) (0.0102) (0.0271) (0.0276)
Believes pays all taxes 0.0156 0.0184 0.0165 0.00805
(0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0322) (0.0321)
Age -0.0148 -0.0121 -0.0292 -0.0269
(0.00926) (0.00911) (0.0351) (0.0352)
Male -0.0539 -0.0520 0.115 0.0619











Constant 0.801*** 0.688** 0.441 0.468
(0.276) (0.294) (0.901) (0.906)
Observations 2,577 2,577 2,539 2,539
Number of subjects 215 215 215 215
Log Likelihood (LL) -1274.3 -1268.0 -1698.7 -1695.4
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parenthesis
Coefficients are average marginal effects
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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4.2.3 Tax evasion; analysis of tax vs untaxed windfalls
The tax evasion response to taxed windfall is different to untaxed windfall. All evasions
are higher when the windfall is not taxed, this can be see in Figure 4.5. This statement
is true for all treatments in the taxed vs untaxed windfall too.
Fig. 4.5 Tax evasion; taxed vs untaxed Windfalls
As discussed in Table 4.1: Summary statistics, the two groups in taxed and untaxed
windfall is not completely homogeneous. To recall, using a parametric two sample
independent means test, I compared the two groups. Treatments are identical in some
dimensions and no in others. With this level of heterogeneity, the following analysis on
tax effects will be noisy.
Under the assumption that the groups are semi-homogeneous, I compare tax evasion
using a paired t-test (a dependent means test) in each windfall level for the two groups3:
zero (p-value = 0,0013), low (p-value = 0.0882) and high (p-value = 0.0028). There
is evidence of statistically significant differences between the averages. This suggests
3This is because of the within-subject design where all subjects were exposed to all treatments.
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there is a tax effect, even though this was a flat tax regime on the unearned windfall.
This finding should be treated with caution, as I run a regression analysis on the tax
effects which controls for all other factors. The full results are presented in Appendix
5.5. I find no significant tax evasion responses to tax treatment.
The following findings (result 6-10) from regression Table 4.5 are not new, they have been
studied or discussed in previous studies. For a review of those literature (Alm, 2019).
Model (1) estimates that tax morale lowers evasion levels but only for subjects in the
untaxed windfall experiment. The estimated coefficient is (−0.0227∗). This is not robust,
when controlled for other factors, especially the big five, the significance disappears. I
find that conscientiousness decreases tax evasion for both windfall experiments. The
estimated coefficient for conscientiousness is (−0.0191∗) and (−0.0649∗) for taxed
(model 2) and untaxed (model 4) respectively. Both are significant only at 10% and
robust. Conscientiousness is the trait of being diligent or taking obligations towards
others seriously (Torgler, 2007).
Result 6. Subjects with higher conscientiousness has lower tax evasion rates in both
experiments.
Lack of trust in the government increases tax evasion. Subjects in the taxed windfall
treatment who say they do not trust the government report lower and lower levels
of their labour earnings. i.e. their evasion increases by (0.0623∗∗) points (model 4).
Attitude toward the government is determined by the level of services a state provides to
its citizens. In a way it measures the public opinion toward the government, given that
the level of satisfaction with government performances are usually low in majority of
least developed countries, it is no surprise that subjects in Afghanistan share the same
opinion toward their government. Their evasion increases as their trust in government
falls.
Result 7. Lack of trust in the government increases tax evasion in the taxed windfall
experiment.
Finally, those who indicate higher levels of emotional stability in the untaxed windfall
treatment, evade more of their tax liabilities. The estimated coefficient is obtained in
model 2, (0.0303∗∗∗). This is robust and significant at 1% test. However, the same
variable is not significant for taxed windfall subjects.
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Result 8. Those with higher emotional stability show higher tax evasion in the untaxed
windfall.
I find that putting in more effort increases tax evasion in the untaxed windfall but
not in the taxed windfall. Evasion is increased by (0.00204∗∗∗) points (model 2). This
is significant at 1% and robust for all specifications. This is because hard working
individuals or the most productive individuals value each unit of effort differently to
those in lower productivity levels. Therefore, their tax evasion level increases as they
know they will compensate by working harder the next round even if they get caught
and fined. Tax evasion of different productivity levels are discussed in the next section.
Result 9. Tax evasion increases with respect to effort supply only when the windfall is
not taxed.
Reporting one’s labour income is sensitive to their preference toward risk. Model (4)
estimates that risk neutral/loving individuals have higher (0.172∗∗) tax evasion. This
is only true in the case of the taxed windfall treatment. The more risk averse an
individual, the lower their evasion rates, as evading taxes is a risky decision. Although
the probability of detection was although 5% in the experiment, that seems to make a
difference for those with different risk attitudes.
Result 10. Tax evasion of risk neutral/loving individuals is higher in the taxed windfall
treatment but not in the untaxed windfall treatment.
4.2.4 Tax evasion and productivity levels
I divide subjects to three categories based on their productivity level: high, average,
and least productive groups measured by their average effort provision in the real effort
task. Doing so separates the most able individuals from the least, allowing to study
differences in their tax evasion behaviour. Observing evasion averages for taxed and
untaxed windfalls in Figure 4.6, there is a consistency in tax evasion behaviour with
productivity levels: The most productive group of individuals evade the most, followed
with the average productivity level and then the least productive individuals have the
least evasion.
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Fig. 4.6 Average tax evasion by productivity levels
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Carrying out a paired t-test for the taxed windfall, I find that tax evasion increases
as the productivity levels increase. In the zero-windfall treatment, I find differences
between the least vs average (p-value = 0.0014), least vs high (p-value = 0.0000) and
average vs high (p-value = 0.1003) productivity groups. These results are significant
at 1%, 5% and almost 10% level, respectively. In the low-windfall treatment, I find
that differences in tax evasion decisions are also significantly different as we move up
the productivity ladder (p-value = 0.0008; 0.0000; 0.0061) respectively. Similarly, for
those in high-windfall treatment, evasion differences increase as we move toward the
most productive group in the experiment. The associated p-values are (0.0055; 0.0000;
0.0142) respectively.
To carry out a more robust analysis, using a two-limit random effects Tobit panel
model similar to the one outlined in Section 4.2.2, I obtain the results in Table 4.6.
First, I pool the data for all treatments and look at productivity effects, as well as
treatment effects. Then using each treatment on its own, I examine differences in
productivity level of subjects. This way, I examine more robustly if the differences in
average tax evasions observed in Figure 4.6, are statistically important. Table 4.6
only presents the results for taxed windfall treatment. The tax evasion of the least
productive category is used as the benchmark.
Model (1) in the pooled data shows tax evasion partially increases for subjects with an
average level of productivity by (0.331∗) point when compared to the least productive
group. This is only significant at 10%. However, tax evasion substantially increases for
subjects in the high productive category compared to the least productive category
(0.657∗∗∗). This is significant at 1% test and robust with various specifications.
Splitting the data by windfall treatments and examining tax evasion decisions by
productivity tercile reveals interesting results. There is a consistent result across all
windfall treatments, as productivity levels increase, tax evasion increases. For instance
take treatment low: model (3) shows tax evasion for average productivity level is
higher by (0.353∗) points compared to least productive and consequently evasion of
high productive subjects is higher by (0.704∗∗∗) points than the benchmark.
Result 11. Tax evasion increases substantially with productivity levels when the
windfall is taxed.
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Table 4.6 Tax evasion taxed windfalls by productivity levels





Average productivity 0.331* 0.460** 0.353* 0.299*
(0.187) (0.195) (0.187) (0.172)
High productivity 0.657*** 0.747*** 0.704*** 0.572***
(0.190) (0.200) (0.192) (0.175)
Period 0.00826** 0.0103 0.00111 0.0102
(0.00393) (0.00674) (0.00822) (0.00655)
Extraversion 0.0407 0.0515 0.0289 0.0253
(0.0308) (0.0322) (0.0307) (0.0281)
Agreeableness -0.00388 -0.00889 0.0143 0.0109
(0.0295) (0.0306) (0.0295) (0.0271)
Emotional stability -0.0409 -0.0473 -0.0349 -0.0365
(0.0290) (0.0303) (0.0290) (0.0267)
Conscientiousness -0.0817*** -0.0885*** -0.0883*** -0.0683**
(0.0303) (0.0318) (0.0305) (0.0280)
Openness 0.0362 0.0216 0.0532* 0.0240
(0.0282) (0.0293) (0.0280) (0.0258)
Tax morale -0.0677** -0.0865** -0.0628* -0.0664**
(0.0333) (0.0347) (0.0332) (0.0306)
Believes pays all taxes 0.00784 -0.00373 0.00266 0.00653
(0.0309) (0.0320) (0.0311) (0.0283)
Attitude toward the govt. 0.0138 0.0181 0.0229 0.00482
(0.0271) (0.0282) (0.0269) (0.0248)
Trust in govt. 0.0342 0.0402 0.0274 0.0297
(0.0284) (0.0295) (0.0284) (0.0261)
Age -0.0254 0.0109 -0.0296 -0.0449
(0.0338) (0.0348) (0.0338) (0.0310)
Risk aversion 0.130* 0.125 0.0781 0.108
(0.0738) (0.0786) (0.0739) (0.0680)
Knows evasion 0.0194 0.0249 0.00607 0.0255
(0.0267) (0.0276) (0.0267) (0.0245)
Audited 0.130 -0.115 -0.0603 0.429*
(0.110) (0.207) (0.193) (0.222)
Male 0.0267 0.0261 0.0871 0.0121
(0.155) (0.160) (0.154) (0.142)
Caught 0.0748 0.210 0.209 0.175
(0.133) (0.263) (0.227) (0.277)
Constant 0.548 -0.109 0.760 1.105
(0.869) (0.906) (0.867) (0.798)
N (Observations) 2,539 847 847 845
Number of subjects 215 215 215 215
Log likelihood (LL) - 1689.7 -705.3 -630.2 -696.5
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses
Coefficients are marginal effects
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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For those whose windfalls were not taxed Figure 4.6, using a paired t-test of significance,
I find that tax evasion increases with increasing level of productivity. In the zero-
windfall treatment, the difference between the least and the average to high productive
group is statistically important. The p-value are (0.0236; 0.0799) respectively. However,
the differences between the least and the average productive group is insignificant
(p-value = 0.6384). For low-windfall treatment, the difference is only significant between
the least and the average to high productive category (p-values = 0.0099; 0.0822)
respectively. The difference between the least and the average productive subjects
is insignificant (p-value = 0.4781). Similarly, the difference in tax evasion of the
high-windfall treatment between the least and average to high productive subjects
is significantly different (p-value = 0.0030; 0.0085) respectively. Yet the difference
between the least and the average productivity groups is not significantly (p-value =
0.8675).
Although it is tempting to draw conclusions from the tests above, however, a regression
analysis similar to Table 4.6 has been carried out for the untaxed windfall experiment,
those results are less interesting and can be seen in Appendix 5.6. The most interesting
result is comparing tax evasions for least productive subjects to most productive ones.
For example, tax evasion consistently increases for high productive subjects, except for
the coefficient in model (6) all other estimates are significant at 10% or 5% levels.
Result 12. Tax evasion increases sluggishly with productivity levels when windfall is
untaxed.
The economic rationale behind the fact that highly productive subjects evade more
than less productive ones might be found in differences in their marginal utility of
additional labour income.
By evading more of their labour income the most productive group shows that they value
utility to their earnings more and are reluctant to hand it over as taxes. These subjects
consider themselves more able and attach more value to their earnings. When windfall
earnings are transferred to subjects and if the assumption that post-windfall transfer
state, subjects do not strictly distinguish between the sources of their income is true,
taxing those windfall earnings will reinforce the evasion behaviour more compared to
the situation when the windfall is not taxed. In other words, there exists a tax-induced
windfall effect on evasion decisions.
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4.3 Concluding Remarks
4.3.1 Effort supply
Handing out cash in the form of a windfall or any other transfer will lower supply of
effort. This is simply because agents find it relatively cheaper to substitute work for
leisure in the short run. In the two experiments, I observe that agents with higher
windfall endowment reduce their labour/effort provision even further. A limitation
of testing windfall effects on labour/effort supply in the lab is that it abstracts away
from other social changes such as ‘positive demand shocks’ or ‘systematic differences in
the lifestyle’ of the cash recipients. This is where findings from field experiments and
social experiment make contributions. The upside is that a lab experiment provides
clearer results and controls for confounds.
Taxing the windfall after being transferred to the agent has a direct impact on their
level of effort provision. This might be driven by tax aversion such that agents do not
have a strict separation in their sense of ownership after the windfall is transferred to
them. Individuals have limited information processing capability and suffer heuristics
when optimising. Taxing any portion of their combined earnings will negatively disrupt
and disincentivise their effort provision. Interpreting tax liabilities is considered simply
as losing income and that is demotivating, thus lowered levels of effort provision is
observed in the experiment.
In other words, taxing individuals first dollar, irrespective of the tax system has a
knock-on effect on their subsequent effort supply choices. Thus, providing disincentive
to provide full effort, compared to a situation where individual’s first dollar of earning
is not taxed. Responses to taxed windfalls are less drastic and the decline in effort
supply is smaller in magnitude too.
There are several limitations that are applicable in the case of experimental results as
every other research methodology. The most important limitation in the case of findings
in this experiment is whether the effort response to taxed and untaxed windfalls are
sustained over long periods or not. As mentioned earlier, the study takes place in the
lab and does not account for other socioeconomic factors that may take much longer
to have an impact on individuals labour supply behaviour. If we distinguish between
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effort provision and labour supply such that effort provision is often short term and
momentary when the task is being performed, then the results are strictly applicable to
short term effort provision behaviour. This has several implications: namely increasing
effort by increasing base salaries and not through bonuses or windfalls. However, this
type of distinction is not discussed in the experimental literature.
Exploring effort supply responses to more windfall types and possibly further increasing
levels of cash windfalls would be an interesting further research to explore. Doing this
will allow to explore if there is a threshold after which inertia kicks in and the decline
in effort supply gets sticky.
4.3.2 Tax Evasion
Taxpayers exhibit two types of behaviour in this study; evaders and compliers. Percent-
age of compliers in both experiments are higher than evaders. For the taxed windfall,
the percentage of compliant taxpayers is twice as higher than compliant taxpayers in
the untaxed windfall. The effects of two types of windfall treatments were studied on
evasion (taxed windfalls and untaxed windfalls).
There is weak evidence that evasion responds to financial incentives, namely minor
increases in response to taxed windfalls. There is no response to untaxed windfall
treatment. Once the windfall transfer is made, taxpayers do not precisely distinguish
the sources of their earnings. To re-adjust/recover the losses in the post-tax state,
taxpayers evade labour earnings to compensate, at the risk of being caught and fined.
This is only true for voluntary tax reporting circumstances and does not include
third-party reporting.
The other main finding of the study is on the tax evasion behaviour of taxpayers with
different productivity levels. Top productive taxpayers, measured by their ability to
provide effort, exhibit highest level of evasion. This behaviour is consistent as we move
down the productivity level, the average productive taxpayers and then to the least
productive taxpayer, their tax evasions fall respectively. There is little distinction in
responses to the fact whether the windfall is taxed or untaxed. Evasions are generally
higher for the most able taxpayer. This is because highest able individuals have
different marginal utility of labour to lower productive members, since earnings are
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tied to their effort, taxpayers feel more attached to their income. They are reluctant
to hand over their hard-earned income as taxes.
Finally, windfall evasion is lower than labour evasion. The difference between the two
is windfall being unearned in the experiment. This points out that a sense of ownership
or sunk costs are developed toward labour earnings (during the course of undertaking
the real effort task). That may explain why evasion levels for labour earnings is higher.
Similar to previous studies, I find that risk aversion lowers tax evasion due to risks
of being caught and fined, even though the probability of detecting under-reporting
was minimal in the experiment. Finally, lack of trust in the government also lowers
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5.1 Taxed windfall instructions
Welcome to today’s experiment at Rana University. You will be taking part in an
experiment on decision making. Starting from now, you are kindly asked to refrain
from communicating with other participants in this session. You will be paid for your
time and effort; your cash earnings depend solely on your decisions. You have been
provided with a hard-copy of the instructions, you may refer to these at any point
during the experiment or alternatively you can raise your hands and the experimenter
will answer your questions individually without disturbing others. It is important to
understand the rules of the experiment before you proceed so pay close attention to
the following instructions please.
In this experiment, your earnings are calculated in tokens and 1 token is equal to 25
AFN (£0.30). At the end of the experiment, the average of 3 randomly rounds are
chosen for payment purposes. Your token earnings will be converted, rounded up to
the nearest tens into Afghanis (AFN) and will be paid privately in cash. There are
two parts in this experiment.
Part A:
Stage 1: Each of you has been given a pack of scratch cards numbered 1 to 12. At the
start of each round, tore apart the card belonging to that round i.e. for round 2 tear
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apart card number 2 and scratch it to see the amount of variable tokens allocated to
you. After scratching, record the tokens you have earned from this in the box provided
in the z-Tree screen. In order to save and proceed to the following stage each time,
you must click confirm.
Stage 2: You are asked to solve 48 slider puzzles in order to earn more tokens. You
are paid at a piece rate of 1 token per correctly positioned slider puzzle. Each slider is
positioned at either end of the line (0 or 100) and your tasked to drag and place this
at 50 using a mouse. Only correctly positioned sliders will earn you tokens. You have
also been given the option to opt-out should you wish. You can do so by clicking the
SKIP red-button to opt-out of this stage at any point during the task without losing
any of your earnings. You have 120 seconds to complete this task.
Stage 3: All your earnings are taxable, and you will be presented with a tax form to
report your gross income for each round. There is a tax rate of 35% on your earnings,
for example for 10 tokens, 3.5 tokens taxes will apply. After you submit your tax
returns, the correct amount is calculated by the computer and is deducted from your
total earnings. There is also a 5% chance of being selected for tax audit: If you are
audited and if you have reported your earnings accurately, then no further action will
take place. Your final earnings will stay the same as before being audited.
If you are audited and if you have under-reported your earnings, in addition to the
correct amount of the tax, you will pay a fine equal to 25% of the unpaid taxes. The
audit probability is independent in each round and your previous filing behaviour
doesn’t change the audit probability for the next round.
Stage 4: The final screen will present the following information for that round:
• Your variable tokens
• Your tokens earned from the slider puzzles
• Your declared variable tokens
• Your declared slider task tokens
• Paid amount in taxes
• Net earnings (after tax deductions)
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• Whether you were audited or not
• Your final payoff for that round in tokens
Rounds repeat themselves after stage 4, i.e. after stage 4, it goes back to stage 1 and
you are required to scratch a new card for the variable tokens. The average of 3 random
rounds from this is chosen for payment.
Part B:
Stage 5: You will be asked to make an investment decision in the following manner:
you will have 4 tokens; each token is worth 25 Afghanis (£0.30). You are required to
invest this in an account that pays 2.5 tokens for every token invested with a probability
(p = 1/2); however, with probability (1-p) it pays back nothing. To determine the
outcome, the computer will draw a number between 1 and 10; if numbers 1-5 are picked,
then you lose the amount you allocated; if numbers 6-10 are picked, then you win 2.5
times the amount you allocated. The unallocated amount from the 4 original tokens
and the outcome of this lottery will be added to your final tokens in the experiment.
Stage 6: Finally, you will be presented with a set of questions to answer. With this
round the experiment comes to an end.
Stage 7: You will be notified of your final earnings in both tokens and Afghanis
(AFN). You are required to confirm this by clicking the button at the bottom of the
page. Once this is done, please notify the experimenter by raising your hand and wait
to be attended to for payment.
5.2 Untaxed windfall instructions
Welcome to today’s experiment at Rana University. You will be taking part in an
experiment on decision making. Starting from now, you are kindly asked to refrain
from communicating with other participants in this session. You will be paid for your
time and effort; your cash earnings depend solely on your decisions. You have been
provided with a hard-copy of the instructions, you may refer to these at any point
during the experiment or alternatively you can raise your hands and the experimenter
will answer your questions individually without disturbing others. It is important to
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understand the rules of the experiment before you proceed so pay close attention to
the following instructions please.
In this experiment, your earnings are calculated in tokens and 1 token is equal to 25
AFN (£0.30). At the end of the experiment, the average of 3 randomly rounds are
chosen for payment purposes. Your token earnings will be converted, rounded up to
the nearest tens into Afghanis (AFN) and will be paid privately in cash. There are
two parts in this experiment.
Part A:
Stage 1: Each of you has been given a pack of scratch cards numbered 1 to 12. At the
start of each round, tore apart the card belonging to that round i.e. for round 2 tear
apart card number 2 and scratch it to see the amount of variable tokens allocated to
you. After scratching, record the tokens you have earned from this in the box provided
in the zTree screen. In order to save and proceed to the following stage each time, you
must click confirm.
Stage 2: You are asked to solve 48 slider puzzles in order to earn more tokens. You
are paid at a piece rate of 1 token per correctly positioned slider puzzle. Each slider is
positioned at either end of the line (0 or 100) and your tasked to drag and place this
at 50 using a mouse. Only correctly positioned sliders will earn you tokens. You have
also been given the option to opt-out should you wish. You can do so by clicking the
SKIP red-button to opt-out of this stage at any point during the task without losing
any of your earnings. You have 120 seconds to complete this task.
Stage 3: Your earnings from the slider puzzles are taxable and you will be presented
with a tax form to report your slider puzzle earnings ONLY for each round. Your
variable tokens are NOT taxable. There is a tax rate of 35%, for example for 10 tokens,
3.5 tokens taxes will apply. After you submit your tax return, the correct amount is
calculated by the computer and is deducted from your total earnings. There is also a
5% chance of being selected for tax audit:
• If you are audited and if you have reported your earnings accurately, then no
further action will take place. Your final earnings will stay the same as before
being audited.
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• If you are audited and if you have underreported your earnings, in addition to
the correct amount of the tax, you will pay a fine equal to 25% of the unpaid
taxes. The audit probability is independent in each round and your previous
filing behaviour doesn’t change the audit probability for the next round.
Stage 4: The final screen will present the following information for that round:
• Your variable tokens
• Your tokens earned from the slider puzzles
• Your declared slider task tokens
• Paid amount in taxes
• Net earnings (after tax deductions)
• Whether you were audited or not
• Your final payoff for that round in tokens
Rounds repeat themselves after stage 4, i.e. after stage 4, it goes back to stage 1 and
you are required to scratch a new card for the variable tokens. The average of 3 random
rounds from this is chosen for payment.
Part B:
Stage 5: You will be asked to make an investment decision in the following manner:
you will have 4 tokens; each token is worth 25 Afghanis (£0.30). You are required to
invest this in an account that pays 2.5 tokens for every token invested with a probability
(p = 1/2); however, with probability (1-p) it pays back nothing. To determine the
outcome, the computer will draw a number between 1 and 10; if numbers 1-5 are picked,
then you lose the amount you allocated; if numbers 6-10 are picked, then you win 2.5
times the amount you allocated. The unallocated amount from the 4 original tokens
and the outcome of this lottery will be added to your final tokens in the experiment.
Stage 6: Finally, you will be presented with a set of questions to answer. With this
round the experiment comes to an end.
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Stage 7: You will be notified of your final earnings in both tokens and Afghanis
(AFN). You are required to confirm this by clicking the button at the bottom of the
page. Once this is done, please notify the experimenter by raising your hand and wait
to be attended to for payment.
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5.3 Taxed windfall histogram and box-plots
Fig. 5.1 Taxed windfall histogram and box-plots
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Fig. 5.2 Untaxed windfall histogram and box-plots
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5.4 Tax evasion histograms
Fig. 5.3 Tax evasion histograms (mass points at each end)
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5.5 Tax evasion; taxed windfall vs untaxed windfall
Table 5.1 Tax evasion; taxed windfall vs untaxed windfall
DV: Tax evasion (1) (2) (3) (4)
Low 0.00954 0.00953 0.0255 0.0256
(0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0168) (0.0168)
High 0.00764 0.00766 0.0277* 0.0278*
(0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0166) (0.0166)
Tax treatment -0.0836 -0.0871 -0.112 -0.114









Risk aversion 0.0566* 0.0572*
(0.0336) (0.0334)
Attitude toward the Govt. 0.0173 0.0155
(0.0108) (0.0109)
Tax morale -0.0401*** -0.0384***
(0.0134) (0.0135)
Trust in Govt. 0.0193* 0.0212*
(0.0114) (0.0115)
Knows evasion 0.00540 0.00782
(0.0109) (0.0112)
















Constant 0.597*** 0.643*** 0.657* 0.647*
(0.0487) (0.149) (0.342) (0.356)
Observations 5,160 5,160 5,160 5,160
Number of subjects 430 430 430 430
Log likelihood (LL) -3582.2 -3577.9 -3409.3 -3404.8
Standard errors are clustered at individual level in parentheses
Coefficients are marginal effects
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.6 Untaxed windfall; tax evasion by productivity
levels
Table 5.2 Untaxed windfall; tax evasion by productivity levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





Average productivity 0.0935 0.117 0.0937 0.104 0.140 0.174** 0.0505 0.0745
(0.0751) (0.0734) (0.0772) (0.0742) (0.0871) (0.0851) (0.0764) (0.0738)
High productivity 0.135* 0.137* 0.132* 0.146** 0.157* 0.131 0.136* 0.134*
(0.0706) (0.0703) (0.0726) (0.0711) (0.0818) (0.0810) (0.0719) (0.0706)
Extraversion -0.00845 -0.00648 -0.00755 -0.00304 -0.00628 -0.00671 -0.0117 -0.0106
(0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0109) (0.0110)
Agreeableness -0.00435 0.00663 -0.0167 -0.00772 0.00499 0.0211 0.00286 0.0123
(0.0129) (0.0136) (0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0150) (0.0158) (0.0131) (0.0137)
Emotional stability 0.0296*** 0.0291*** 0.0420*** 0.0364*** 0.0252** 0.0286** 0.0233** 0.0258**
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0104) (0.0103)
Conscientiousness -0.0237** -0.0189* -0.0332*** -0.0313*** -0.0226* -0.0157 -0.0136 -0.00890
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0110) (0.0108)
Openness -0.00857 -0.0111 -0.00475 -0.00476 -0.00774 -0.0152 -0.0123 -0.0141
(0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0117) (0.0119)
Tax morale -0.0168 -0.0121 -0.0278* -0.0124
(0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0144) (0.0125)
Believes pays all taxes 0.0160 0.0202* 0.00528 0.0168
(0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0135) (0.0117)
Attitude toward Govt. 0.0125 0.0168* 0.0178 0.00714
(0.00964) (0.00969) (0.0112) (0.00969)
Trust in Govt. 0.00399 0.00477 0.00716 0.00364
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0118) (0.0102)
Age -0.0108 -0.0126 -0.0123 -0.00837
(0.00916) (0.00920) (0.0105) (0.00918)
Risk aversion -0.0105 -0.0320 -0.00595 -0.0141
(0.0327) (0.0329) (0.0381) (0.0327)
Knows evasion -0.00148 0.00435 -0.0170 -0.00110
(0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0121) (0.0104)
Audited -2.971 -3.107 -3.436 -2.879
(35.10) (49.81) (61.54) (42.14)
Period -0.0118*** -0.00118 -0.00912*** -0.0194***
(0.00207) (0.00446) (0.00335) (0.00341)
Male -0.0567 -0.0385 -0.0552 -0.0686
(0.0587) (0.0592) (0.0675) (0.0588)
Caught 3.029 3.332 3.512 2.940
(35.10) (49.81) (61.54) (42.14)
Constant 0.587*** 0.893*** 0.620*** 0.874*** 0.487*** 0.978*** 0.578*** 0.883***
(0.131) (0.295) (0.134) (0.297) (0.152) (0.340) (0.132) (0.296)
Observations 2,577 2,577 857 857 860 860 860 860
Number of subjects 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215
Log likelihood (LL) -1611.2 -1349.2 -611.1 -511.8 -613.4 -524.3 -649.1 -584.2
Standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses
Coefficients are marginal effects
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.7 Static labour supply model
5.7.1 Equilibrium existence
Equation 3.3 represents a tangency condition between the slope of the budget constraint
(w) and the slope of the indifference curve (U ′l /U
′
Y ). For the purpose of existence of
interior solution we suffice with the tangency which diagrammatically can be shown.
We could show this formally using Kuhn-Tucker conditions but intuition from the
tangency condition is perfectly clear. It is also possible that G is high and w is low,
which will result in a corner solution, i.e. it would be optimal not to work at all (see
(Sapsford & Tzannatos, 1993); (Aaberge & Colombino, 2014).
5.7.2 Comparative statics
To obtain dh/dG, we totally differentiate equation 3.4:
Adw + Bdh + cdG = 0 (5.1)
A = (U ′Y + wU
′′
Y h − U
′
l ) (5.2)
B = (w(U ′Y w − U
′
l ) − (U
′′
Y w − U
′′
l ) (5.3)
C = (wU ′Y − U
′′
Y ) (5.4)
U(wh + G, T − h) must be concave in h, therefore, B < 0. In addition SOCs require
U
′′
Y ≤ 0 and U
′′






Assuming leisure is a normal good, we get that dh
dG
< 0.
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5.8 Allingham-Sandmo model (1972)
5.8.1 Equilibrium existence
For existence of an interior solution, first order condition must be positive at x = 0
and negative at w = 0. To find the conditions for a maximum, we must differentiate
equation 3.6 for second moments:
dU2
d2x
= D = τ 2(1 − p)U ′′Y + (t − f)2U
′′
Z (5.6)
when x = 0 and x = w
−τ(1 − p)U ′(w) − (τ − f)pU ′(w − fw) > 0 (5.7)
−τ(1 − p)U ′(w(1 − τ)) − (τ − f)pU ′(w(1 − τ)) < 0 (5.8)
Rearranging and assuming p = τ , the conditions can be rewritten as:
pf > τ
[
(1 − p) U
′(w)
U ′(1 − τ) + p
]
(5.9)








At the very core of it, corruption can be presented as a social dilemma such that
a transaction benefits two or more individuals at the cost of other members of the
society. There is a negative externality incurred directly or indirectly that harms others.
In the interaction between citizens and public officials, the citizen has the choice to
bribe or not to bribe, whereas the public official could choose to reject the bribe or
accept it. While referred to as "petty" or "administrative" corruption, examples of these
may include payments to skip long queues, avoid court summons, escape speeding-
tickets, evade taxes, gain employment or avert legal requirements/certification to win
government contracts. When aggregated over time, these practices potentially have
terrible consequences and can lead an economy to a “corruption trap” (Rose-Ackerman,
1999).
According to Global Corruption Barometer in 2017, 1 in 4 people around the world
paid a bribe to access public services in the past 12 months (Barometer, 2017). Bribery
affects everyone negatively but leaves individuals at the poorest end of the income
distribution worse off compared to those at the highest end. In addition, corruption
undermines development and weakens institutions within a state. The negative growth
effects are much stronger for poorer countries where corruption is believed to be more
widespread (Klitgaard, 1991; Bardhan, 1997; Lambsdorff, 2007). Given the global
scale and the crippling effects of administrative corruption, devising effective policy to
understand demand and supply of bribery is paramount. Bribery is one of the many
forms of administrative corruption. Analogous to markets, there is supply (agents and
78 Introduction
corporations) and demand (public officials) for bribes. Citizens who offer or ‘supply
bribes’ to gain favourable treatments or skip long waiting lists do so to “grease the
wheels” (Leys, 1965; Lui, 1985). Bribes allow citizens to make the slow bureaucratic
setting, where institutional quality is low, more efficient. Public officials who ‘demand
bribes’ do so to provide preferential treatments for reasons such as acting purely out of
self-interest to maximise private gains.
In this spirit, I study supply and demand for bribes and explore the effects of introducing
a legal fee option as an institutional reform on the rate of bribery. In essence, the idea
is to test whether the introduction of a two-tier system of service delivery can deter
citizens from offering bribes and public officials from accepting bribes knowing that
the citizen had the choice for a legal route but chose to bribe. Previous experiments
studying bribery have looked at the effects of staff rotation (Abbink, 2004), symmetric
vs asymmetric monitoring systems (Lambsdorff & Nell, 2007; Basu, 2011; Abbink et
al., 2014; Engel et al., 2016) and the four-eye principle implementation (Schikora, 2011;
Frank et al., 2015; Bodenschatz & Irlenbusch, 2019). I will deal with this literature in
more details in the literature review chapter.
In addition, I examine how moral and strategic concerns change depending on the
existence of negative externalities imposed on the rest of the society due to the
corrupt transactions. In doing so, this study gives further evidence to the findings in
Barr and Serra (2009). I explore the role of beliefs in predicting as well as actually
engaging in bribery and taking up the legal fee by eliciting first-order beliefs. Finally, I
explore whether the changes are sensitive to gender, as in Lambsdorff & Frank (2011),
Rivas (2013), and to differences in students vs non-students.
There are several advantages in using experiments to study bribery (administrative
corruption). Experiments allow greater degree of control by removing the identification
problem as well as measuring/observing bribery directly. Corruption simulations are
designed experimentally to replicate specific aspects of corruption in order to test the
ramifications of monetary/nonmonetary incentives and anti-corruption policies (Roth,
2002). Most importantly, there are two aspects of decision-making one must remember
when we speak about corruption: 1) subject’s view of corruption, 2) subjects’ propensity
to engage in corrupt decisions. For a full review of studies based on perception measures
of corruption that focuses on the first aspect (Rose-Ackerman, 2005). However, to
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Fig. 1.1 Importer, Officer and Government
study the second aspect of decision-making, other methods such as experiments are
more flexible and useful.
Previous laboratory experiments studying briber-bribee interaction do so with variations
of a similar corruption game. A standard dynamic bribery game runs as follows: subjects
are matched and assigned to the role of public citizens, public officials and/or firms (for
studies with three players). As modified trust games, the moves are either simultaneous
or sequential and either one-shot or repeated over several rounds. A bribe is offered by
a citizen or a firm to the public official in return for a favourable decision. Usually,
this ‘corrupt’ transaction has a negative externality on the payoffs of other subjects
taking part in the experiment or some other variations like lowering payments to a
charity. The public official either accepts or rejects the offer. If the official rejects,
the game ends. If the official accepts the offer, they must return the favour. Then,
manipulations take place within this context. In some of those, other citizens can
retaliate against the corrupt transaction at a personal cost, whereas public officials can
accept/reject and/or return/not return the favour, see Figure 1.1, is an illustration of
one such configuration by Abbink & Wu (2017).
Nevertheless, the current study adopts a novel non-dynamic experimental design where
individuals (citizens or public officials) are fully accountable over whether bribery is
enforced or not. In previous designs, including the one depicted in Figure 1.1, mostly it
would be up to the public official to enforce the bribe and ultimately carry the weight of
imposing the negative externality on other citizens. In such dynamic designs, outcomes
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could be interfered by confounds such as conditional cooperation i.e. the need to
reciprocate when offered a bribe, and the competing bias i.e. getting competitive upon
the opportunity to interact with other players. Thus, with a non-dynamic framework,
subjects are not assigned roles and are left to decide solely based on their preferences,
with no further strategic concerns.
Assigning roles in experiments may interfere with the natural course of decision-making
or may fail to trigger the expected frame of mind. Therefore, it is important that
subjects are not told to act as public officials or citizens. In addition, most bribery
games end if the subject chooses not to bribe, while choosing to bribe ensues a series
of consecutive decisions that will entice experimental curiosity and compel subjects to
choose the bribe option more often as in Figure 1.1.
It is for the reasons outlined above that a non-dynamic design is better suited to study
bribery decisions. To reiterate, there are two novel contributions in the study of bribery.
First, it studies the effects of introducing a legal fee that allows for a preferential
treatment on offering and accepting bribes. Second, the non-dynamic experimental
approach that studies supply and demand for bribes separately, eliminates some of the
criticisms pointing at the experimental designs in this area.
In experiment one, subjects (citizens) had to complete a real effort task of entering
random sequences of letters and numbers correctly to earn a lump sum. This was
done to invoke sense of ownership of the earnings. Next, subjects were allocated
randomly to one of the three treatments. In No Legal Fee (henceforth NLF) they faced
a choice between two payment options to receive their earnings in the experiment:
default, free of charge with longer waiting time and another option to pay a bribe
with no waiting time. The bribe option had a negative externality such that one other
participant in the experiment would be forced to wait twice as the default waiting
time. Previous experiments have motivated the negative externality by imposing the
loss on five or more other participants (Abbink et al., 2002; Barr & Serra, 2010). The
negative externality is something economically meaningful, corruption impacts others,
and motivating it this way captures whether the briber/bribee cares. The Legal Fee
and Negative Externality (henceforth LFNE) treatment was the same as NLF but
added a legal fast-track option to pay a fee to speed up the payment process with no
negative externality. Choosing the legal fee was more expensive than bribing. Legal
Fee (henceforth LF) was the last treatment, which was exactly as the same as LFNE
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but the bribe option did not have the negative externality attached to it either. This
was done to see if negative externality had an impact on the decisions.
In experiment two, public officials had to decide whether to reject or accept a bribe
offered to them by subjects from another experiment. The public officials were told
that subjects in an experiment had the choice to pay a bribe, pay a fee or neither
(depending on the treatment). Now, it was up to them to decide whether to process
the payments of those who paid a bribe or not. Public officials were allocated randomly
to one of the four following treatments:
No Legal Fee (henceforth NLF), public officials in this treatment were presented with
the storyline from the NLF treatment from the Citizen’s bribery chapter. They were
told that subjects taking part in an experiment faced a choice of two options to get
their payments processed: default, free of charge with relatively longer waiting time
(11 days), or paying a bribe against a premium with no waiting time. The bribe option
associated a negative externality such that it forced one other participant to wait 11
additional days to receive their payments (total of 22 days). With this information,
public officials were then told that now it was up to them to process the payments by
accepting or rejecting the bribes offered. Public officials were told that there were two
non-active participants in the same experiment as them who would incur the negative
externality, should they choose to accept the bribe. Again, the negative externality
associated to accepting the bribe by the officials was that one other passive participant
in the experiment would be made to wait twice as much as the default waiting time.
The gains from the bribe would then directly benefit the official.
The Legal Fee and Negative Externality (henceforth LFNE) treatment was the same as
NLF but the deviation was introduced in the story told to the public officials such that
subjects participating in an experiment also had a legal option against a 9p premium
but chose not to do so. Legal Fee (LF) treatment was the same as LFNE but in the
story presented to the public officials, they were told that the bribe option had no
negative externality. Up until now the stories presented to the public officials in each
treatment mirrored those in Citizen’s Bribery chapter. I add a fourth treatment Legal
Fee and Probabilistic Negative Externality (henceforth LFPNE) with the following
variation: the story presented to the public officials were the same as that of LFNE
and LF treatments but the negative externality had a 50% probability of materialising.
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The idea was to capture a "moral wiggle room" hypothesis as in Dana et al., (2007)
using the probability of negative externality incurring or not.
Officials had to make a choice to accept or reject the bribe that was offered to them by
complete strangers in another experiment. Since this was a non-dynamic design, two
passive participants were recruited as the rest of the society such that each public official
decision would affect their payoff to ensure that the experiment remained incentivised
and there was no deception. The use of passive participants to incur the negative
externality is common in bribery experiments (Barr & Serra, 2009). In other words
in experiment one, bribees were taken as passive and did not make any decisions, in
experiment two, bribers were assumed passive and did not make any decisions however
they were not the same subjects. Therefore, in the supply and demand for bribes,
there is no specific link between the citizen and the public official.
In experiment one, I find that many citizens pay the legal fee (i.e. take up the fast track
option) because they want to grease the wheels. They prefer a solution that does not
imply a negative externality on the rest of the society. This could be due to two reasons:
to avoid harming others (empathy) and self-image or social-image concerns. While
they care about the negative effects of their decision on other’s outcome, they also
care about their image. This is either their self-image (their perception of themselves)
or social image (other’s perception of them). Citizens are willing to incur additional
costs in doing so. In weak institutional settings, moral incentives are the determining
factor. High supply of bribes can be minimised if preferential treatment is offered
institutionally. I also find that beliefs about what constitutes the norm strongly predicts
whether the individual will engage in bribery or not. Believing that others will accept
bribes makes one more propense to similarly engage in corruption.
In addition, females indicate a general aversion to preferential treatment (both the
paying bribes or the legal fee) compared to male subjects. Students are less corrupt
(offer less bribes) than non-student subjects. Consequently, effective communication
relative to observed and perceived corruption rates, when low, could further dampen
corruption – however, the opposite could also be true. Governments should take this
into account when choosing the information to be shared in campaigns that are aimed
at fighting corruption.
83
In experiment two, despite caring about harming others, introducing a fast track option
alone does not prevent public officials from accepting/demanding bribes. The costs
imposed on others does not outweigh the private gains to the public official. Thus,
this leads to choosing the legal fee less. This is what standard economic models of
utility maximisation framework predicts too. Moreover, overall bribery rates are lower
whenever there is a negative externality attached to it. Two types of reasoning emerge
as prominent, those who maximise their gains which is referred to as ‘profit-maximisers’,
and the ‘rationalisers’, who show signs of conflict and unease about harming others,
and yet accept bribes.
To curb bribery acceptance or demand for bribes by the public official, complementary
measures are required to support the effects of a fast track option that provides prefer-
ential treatment to the public. These may include adopting piece rate pay/efficiency
wages or a central processing mechanism where monitoring is less costly. This way the
public official’s private gains are restricted and the decision to accept bribes is made
costly.
Students indicate higher levels of bribe acceptance than non-students. However, when
controlled for age, the difference is no longer present. In addition to this, I confirm
previous studies findings on cultural background. Bribe acceptance rates are much
higher among subjects from countries ranked higher by the CPI ranking too, also
found in Fisman & Miguel (2007). This provides further validity to the findings in the
experiment.
The rest of part two of the thesis is divided as follows: chapter two reviews the relevant
literature, chapter three outlines experiment one, which discusses offering (supplying)





Early theoretical research on corruption uses a principal-agent framework (Rose-
Ackerman, 1978; Becker & Stigler, 1974; Klitgaard, 1991; Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000).
It assumes a benevolent principal controls/monitors the actions of the corruptible agents
in the administrative hierarchy. If so, anti-corruption policy measures should be based
on three principles: increasing the cost of corruption for the official (penalties, effective
monitoring), reduce its benefits (limits to discretionary powers of officials, balancing
administrative monopoly) and increase the benefits of acting honestly (Mookherjee &
Png, 1995; Marjit & Shi, 1998; Waller et al., 2002; Schulze & Frank, 2003).
These policy measures could be classified as addressing strategic concerns of the
decision-making aspect i.e. punitive and legal measures to prevent corruption. The
question is whether the legal fee (fast track option) acts as a substitute to offering
and accepting bribes to access public services. Given that bribes may have social and
personal costs, the question arises whether these costs matter for the parties involved
in the transaction.
In broader terms, this study contributes to the literature that incorporates moral and
strategic concerns in studying corrupt decisions. Examples of strategic concerns include
those discussed under the principal-agent framework above. While, moral concerns
manifest themselves in several ways, here I limit the focus on four types that I deem
most relevant to this study:
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First, individuals resist unfair transactions and are willing to enforce fairness, by
focusing on the effects of their action on others’ well-being (Kahneman et al., 1986;
Engel, 2011). This is empathy, the ability to care for others and it plays an important
role in explaining aspects of altruistic behaviour (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Batson,
1990; De Waal, 2008; Klimecki et al., 2016). Humans are not pure egoists and have
“the capacity to share feelings of another” (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990).
Second, individuals are concerned about how they act as well as how others judge
their actions. Both self-image and social-image concerns have been heavily re-
searched (Bodner & Prelec, 2003; Güth et al., 1982; Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009;
Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007). Formally, self-image concerns could be defined as “the
psychological benefits and costs of seeing oneself doing good or bad compared to a
moral ideal” (Baumeister, 1999). On the other hand, social-image concerns could be
defined as “one being observed and judged by others against some moral ideal” (Elster,
1989).
Third, individuals care about preserving relative outcomes. Even if others’ outcomes
are not affected, they are willing to give up their own material payoffs to make the
outcomes more similar/equal (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr
& Fischbacher, 2003). In other words, aversion to preferential treatment which is a
specific type of inequity aversion. In addition, procedures on how an outcome has come
about matters for fairness (Fehr & Gächter, 2002, 2000).
Fourth, individuals use self-serving biases or what I refer to as rationalisation to make
themselves or others seem/look ‘honest’ even when they behave dishonestly. This is
when several narratives are employed by the individuals who act in their own self-
interest to justify their action (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; Grossman & Van der
Weele, 2017; Shalvi & Leiser, 2013).
Previous studies of bribery explicitly discuss the negative externality effects of acting
corruptly (Barr & Serra, 2009; Abbink et al., 2002). The Barr and Serra (2009)
paper finds negative externaltiy effects while the second paper does not. However,
little discussion is devoted to the mechanisms or reasons why there is an effect. The
behavioural factors mentioned above are all important and they have been studied in
other aspects of decision making.
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Whether negative externality associated to the corrupt decision matters or not is
experimentally tested in (Abbink & Hennig-Schmidt, 2006). In their bribery game,
if the bribe was accepted and the service was returned by the official, a cost was
incurred on all other 16 participants. The authors found no evidence supporting the
hypothesis that the negative externality prevented players from engaging in bribery.
They argued that negative effects are negligible and campaigns to nudge consciousness
about welfare-reducing effects of bribery may not be very effective.
Similarly, in another experiment where negative externality was motivated by the
deviations in total amount of bribe offered by a group of three subjects while competing
amongst themselves, they also competed against a reference group. The group with
the highest deviation in bribe offers from that of the reference group then received the
lowest payments in the experiment (Büchner et al., 2008). Authors concluded that
negative externality does not play a role in decision-making process.
However, the null findings on the negative externality effects in Barr and Serra (2009)
and Banerjee (2016) were challenged. In a modified one-shot ultimatum game, they
found that bribery rates for citizens offering and public officials accepting bribes
declined significantly when there was a negative externality attached to the bribe.
There were several differences between this experiment and its predecessors which
renders direct comparison of the results difficult. For instance, this was a one-shot
game whereas in Abbink et al., (2002), subjects played a repeated game. Here, the
incurred negative externality was on five ‘other members of the society’ who were
inactive participants in the experiment.
The reasons behind the null results, as argued in Barr and Serra (2009) was the
‘negative reciprocity’ and ‘conditional cooperation’ amongst the players. Conditional
cooperation arises due to the repeated nature of the games such that a player gives
the matched partner the benefit of the doubt or just an implicit cooperation develops
between partners. Negative reciprocity happens when players react negatively to their
partner’s negative actions (magnitude does not have to be the same). In other words,
subjects in the previous experimental settings reciprocated in a ‘quid pro quo’ manner
or a tit-for-tat strategy.
As discussed earlier, the experiments in this study breaks down the conditional co-
operation and negative reciprocity incentives and eliminates any competition arising
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by adopting a novel experimental design. This is to determine the effects of negative
externality, including its underlying behavioural mechanisms.
Furthermore, this study contributes to the growing experimental literature on testing
effectiveness of anti-corruption policy measures. By introducing a legal fee as an
alternative to bribery, the study attempts to widen the spectrum of choices for citizens
to access public services, at least those who can afford it, and make it harder for public
officials to break the law.
Previous studies explore the effects of several policies. Lowering the cost of monitoring
may help reduce corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Designing a different punishment
mechanism for corrupt public officials, the citizens and conditioning the punishments
on the delivery of corrupt decisions has been suggested as one way to encourage
whistle-blowing which in turn lowers monitoring costs (Lambsdorff & Nell, 2007). A
similar notion such as letting the "briber go free" was proposed by Basu (2011) that
suggested a fundamental change in the legal domain for certain types of bribery.
Most legal systems consider the briber and the bribee guilty if the corrupt exchange is
uncovered “symmetric system”. The proposal argued that this creates a reciprocity for
both parties to stay quiet. In order to give one of the parties engaged in administrative
corruption or bribery an incentive to act as a whistle-blower, the law should consider
the briber not guilty. This will create an incentive for bribers to come forward and
expose corrupt practices “asymmetric system”. Immediately there are several problems
with the proposal as well as the advantage of "breaking the silence". Bribery hierarchy
is a major issue in most legal systems. If one gets caught taking bribes, there is a
possibility to bribe the very agency that has caught you in the first place. Bribery
is only a small part of the bigger problem of institutionalised corruption. So, an
asymmetric system may not guarantee reducing bribery. In addition, the asymmetric
system doesn’t remove all the incentives to pay or take bribes. Other legal precautions
are needed to make sure an asymmetric system is not abused.
Nonetheless, the effects of asymmetric vs symmetric system discussed above on ha-
rassment bribery was tested experimentally in Abbink et al., (2014). The paper found
that when bribe giving is legalized, reporting increases and bribe demands decrease.
In the experiment, the official had the option to retaliate against the whistle-blower
and this lowered reporting rates but not significantly. The incentive to report under
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asymmetric regime is therefore intrinsic. The above results were challenged by the
findings in Engel et al., (2016). The authors carried out two experiments (loaded and
neutral language) with symmetric and asymmetric monitoring systems in Germany
and China. They found that bribery rates were high under both systems.
Interesting results have been found on group decisions vs individual decisions in
studying bureaucratic processes in the context of corruption. Almost in all cases,
group decisions have led to higher bribery rates compared to individual decisions.
Four-eye principle is the introduction of an additional official in the administrative
process for decision making. The idea is that the additional pair of eyes will act as
a monitor to lower corrupt transactions and deter the first official from engaging in
corruption. This was tested experimentally using students from Munich (Schikora,
2011), China and Germany (Frank et al., 2015) separately. Both studies found that
bribery rates increased when an additional public official was included to make the
final decision jointly. They argued that individual profit-maximising motives in the
experiment crowded-out altruistic motives. In a one-shot game and repeated game
setting Bodenschatz and Irlenbusch (2019) attempted to test the same policy question
once more. They noted that bribery rates decreased with repeated games whereas for
the one-shot game there were no effects.
Staff rotation is another policy practiced in several government offices including
Germany. The policy involves moving public officials from one department to another
in order to prevent the establishment of a cooperative behaviour between staff and
clients. In an experiment, Abbink (2004) showed that staff rotation significantly reduced
bribery, almost by 2/3. This experiment does not discuss the cost of implementing
such policy or the dissatisfaction caused to labourers due being moved every now and
then. The level of information about the corruptibility of the public official has a
significant impact on citizens’ behaviour. The idea was tested and found supporting
results in Ryvkin and Serra (2012). Staff rotation is one of those mechanisms that
brings about uncertainty about the behaviour of the partner.
Rewarding those who report bribery or corruption is another policy that was adopted
by the government of Singapore. The effectiveness of such a policy was tested experi-
mentally in Abbink and Wu (2017). They found evidence from a repeated game setting
that permitting both parties to report (symmetric reporting mechanism) did in fact
significantly reduce bribery.
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Given that engaging in bribery is a risky act, individual risk attitudes is of importance
in paying or receiving bribes. Experimental findings show that bribery rates are
not significantly different among risk-loving, risk-averse and risk-neutral individuals.
However, it has been found that belief about probability of getting caught i.e. perceived
probabilities is very important in reducing bribery (Berninghaus et al., 2013). The
effects of perceived probabilities links to the works of Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
on judgement under uncertainty. The implication of this finding is that increasing the
degree of uncertainty amongst the citizens leads to lower corruption levels.
While these policy measures result in mixture of findings with regards to bribery rates,
there are no studies on the effects of a legal fee (fast track option) that resembles several
features of a bribe in the first place, the stark difference being that the latter is illegal.
This study contributes to the list of policies to tackle bribery as an adverse phenomenon.
Finally, this study adds to the existing debate and findings on whether the following
factors are important in studying corrupt decision-making: gender, student status and
cultural background of individuals.
There is evidence suggesting that women are risk averse, more sensitive to social
cues, less competitive and less selfish than men. For a review of the literature on
this see Croson and Gneezy (2009). The evidence on increasing the share of female
participation in the public sector on corruption is mixed (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et
al., 2001; Sung, 2012; Jha & Sarangi, 2018). A cross-national experiment was carried
out in Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore by Cameron et al., (2009). This study
showed that Australian women accept significantly lower bribes than men. In Singapore
the opposite was true. There were no gender differences between India and Indonesia.
Though indirectly related, in an experiment comparing male and female willingness
to deceive, authors showed that men’s willingness to deceive were significantly higher
than that of women’s who were facing identical situations (Dreber & Johannesson,
2008). In addition, Lambsdorff and Frank (2011) found that as public officials, women
accepted less bribes than men when they were offered bribes. Less percentage of women
reciprocated the favour compared to men and the rate of reporting the bribe were not
very different between the genders. Similar results in the context of corruption were
found for women in Rivas (2013). However, it was also found that women would act
more opportunistically than men if the risk of detection was negligible (Armantier &
Boly, 2011; Schulze & Frank, 2003).
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Cultural norms may shape individual perceptions and influence attitudes towards
corrupt decisions. Experimental evidence from Singapore (ranked 5th in CPI 2003),
Indonesia (ranked 122nd in CPI 2003), India (ranked 83rd in CPI 2003) and Australia
(ranked 8th in CPI 2003) produced puzzling results: in general it was found that Indian
subjects were likely to offer bribes and less likely to punish the bribees compared to other
three countries. Singaporeans and Indians had similar acceptance rates, and both were
much higher than Indonesian and Australians. Singaporeans were much more tolerant
of corruption whereas Indonesians were much strict. Considering these puzzling findings
that CPI ranking countries did not match the experimental findings, the authors ruled
out ethnicity/nationality as a driver of corruption (Cameron et al., 2009). This led
them to argue that recent institutional reforms and values communicated through
those reforms explains their results better than cultural background.
However, using data on parking tickets issued to diplomats in New York city, found
a positive relationship for diplomats with unpaid tickets and corruption perception
index (CPI) in their home country (Fisman & Miguel, 2007). They concluded that
in societies where corruption is the norm, individuals have higher expectations that
government officials are corrupt too.
Whether country of origin affects propensities to engage in corruption and whether
time spent away from the country of origin changes those propensities was studied in
Barr and Serra (2010). It was found that the former is a strong predictor of individual’s
willingness to engage in corruption. They also found that time spent in the UK was
important in what they referred to as "socialisation". They observed that subjects
from low CPI countries with the highest amount of time spent in the UK had lower
propensity to engage in corrupt transactions. They argued that some norms prevalent
in their home countries were carried across yet conformity to those norms declined
over time.
Within every culture there exists social enforcement mechanisms, one of those may be
the sense "social identity" of belonging to a low corrupt country, when this is the case,
it may affect agent’s propensity to engage in corruption. The idea was experimentally
tested in the US with a subject pool of second-generation immigrants (Salmon & Serra,
2017). They found evidence that socio-cultural norms do play a role and bribery rates
were much lower among those participants who identified themselves from countries




To remind ourselves, the aim of this experiment is to study supply of bribes. Often the
supply and demand of bribes are studied jointly in the experimental settings. I argued
that the interaction between experimental subjects gives rise to a number challenges,
namely negative reciprocity and conditional cooperation. The following experiment is
designed with no interactions. In doing so, it removes the burden of making a decision
which is solely on the public official as the second mover and avoids decisions enticed
by curiosity.
3.1 The Experimental procedures
Subjects were not exposed to all treatments. There were no interactions between
subjects while the experiment was taking place either. Each round was repeated only
once. Participants were completely randomly allocated to each treatment.
The experiment did not have risk of detection (punishment). The rationale behind
this is twofold: The research question is to study paying bribes which is a small part
of the problem in the wider context of corruption. For this reason eradicating it,
is considered as secondary for the authorities. Secondly in most less developed and
developing countries where bribery is widespread, it goes unnoticed i.e. the probability
of getting caught is very low and therefore negligible. Moreover, I abstract away from
the use of neutral language and provide full setting to the experiment. The default
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option was presented as ‘default’, bribe was presented as ‘bribe’ and fast track was
presented as ‘fast track fee’. Again, this is done to add realism with the assumption
that those engaged in bribery are almost always aware they are going to pay a bribe
irrespective of the language used. Furthermore, if there are any effects (i.e. framing
effects), they remain constant across all treatments.
Experimental findings are mixed on non-neutral vs neutral language1. For example
(Abbink & Hennig-Schmidt, 2006) do not find differences for corruption games. They
stated that in bribery games the intentions are understood irrespective of semantics.
This result is particularly important in relation to the experiment in this chapter. On
the other hand, there are experiments that find framing effect, such as (Barr & Serra,
2009).
The experiment was conducted online in November 2019 and participants were recruited
via the Prolific platform (http://prolific.co). Subjects who have already signed
up in this academic research platform normally receive an email informing them about
taking part in a decision-making experiment. The subject pool was pre-screened by
country whose GDP per capita is lower than 35,000 USD per annum (IMF, 2019).
I followed two objectives with this pre-screening: to ensure recruiting subjects from
less developed economies where bribery is believed to be more common. Second,
financial stakes in the experiment were set to match the minimum wages in the UK,
which is much higher when converted to other currencies internationally. This way
the experiment is relatively high stake and captures corrupt transactions better. The
experiment was designed using Otree software (Chen et al., 2016).
3.2 Overview of the experiment
3.2.1 Real effort task
Participants needed to complete a real-effort task of randomly selected letters and
numbers in the spaces provided. In order to move to the next stage, they had to
1It is noteworthy that in the wider discussion within experimental economics evidence on framing
effect has been found in many settings: dictator games (Brañas-Garza, 2007; Eckel & Grossman,
1996), public goods games (Andreoni, 1995; Cookson, 2000), prisoner’s dilemma (Liberman et al.,
2004) among others
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enter 20 sequences correctly within 10 minutes. Subjects were told that doing the real
effort task will earn them £1.5 lump sum. The use of real effort tasks is common in
experimental economics (Abbink & Serra, 2012). The reason behind using a real effort
task is for subjects to exert effort. This allows them to develop a sense of ownership
and feel that they have earned their money.
3.2.2 Willingness to pay (WTP) pilot
As mentioned before, to determine the cost of the bribe and the fast track fee to be
used in the actual experiment, first a separate willingness to pay (WTP) pilot with a
sample size of 101 participants was carried out. I used the multiple price mechanism
to elicit subjects’ willing to pay for the bribe and the fast track fee (Andersen et al.,
2006). As a result of the pilot, the fast track fee was set to be 50% more expensive
than the bribe.
3.2.3 Treatments
Each treatment was varied in one crucial aspect to investigate the research questions
in this chapter. I used the payoffs earned in the real-effort task to delay payments
to the subjects (citizens) by conditioning the time of the payment on their chosen
delivery mechanism/option. As subjects signed up and read the instructions, they were
promised that they would earn £1.50 by taking part in this experiment. At the end
of the real-effort task, they were explicitly told that they had correctly entered the
sequence of numbers and earned money. The idea of earning one’s payoff was made
salient to ensure that subjects felt that it was their earnings.
In total there were three options available depending on the treatment, default, pay
a bribe or pay the fast track fee. Each subject was then presented with the delivery
mechanisms to choose from to receive their earnings. This was done specifically to
replicate the notion of ‘harassment’ or ‘administrative’ bribery. It is when individuals
are entitled to receive a service for free and get agitated by being asked to pay for it.
Following the real effort task, subjects were exposed to one of the following treatments,
in a between-subject design.
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3.2.4 No legal fee (NLF)
In the No Legal Fee treatment each subject had earned their lump sum and were
presented with two payment (delivery) options. The first was a default system,
choosing this option was free of charge and entailed 11 days of waiting time to receive
their payments. The second was paying a bribe, choosing this option was costly (6
pence per transaction) and entailed no waiting time. If chosen, the payments were
processed and paid on the same day. This was done to replicate the idea of "greasing
the wheels". However, this corrupt transaction had a negative externality on one other
member of the society. One other subject taking part in the same experiment/session
was pushed down the line and must wait 22 days in total to be paid. Thus, offering to
bribe directly harmed another subject by making them wait 11 additional days relative
to the default option.
This is how the notion of negative externality on other members of the society was
motivated. Several other mechanisms have been used to do this experimentally. For
example, reducing payoffs for all of the participants in the experiment (Abbink et al.,
2002), or recruiting additional participants who aren’t directly part of the experiment
and reducing their payoffs for each corrupt transaction (Barr & Serra, 2009; Chaudhuri
et al., 2009). Others promised to give money to a charity but deducted the payments
against each corrupt transaction (Lambsdorff & Frank, 2010). For a full review of
pros and cons of each method see (Abbink & Serra, 2012). Making subjects wait to
be receive their earning is closer to representation of one of the forms of administrative
corruption, after all, time is a scarce commodity.
By choosing to pay a bribe, other members of the community were treated unfairly.
Choosing to ‘bribe’ cost 6 pence (£0.06) which was deducted directly from the total
earnings of £1.50 in the experiment. Each subject had to actively chose by clicking
whether they wanted to offer the bribe or not. To elicit reasons why subjects, choose a
specific delivery option and to capture the behavioural responses for decisions a survey
was carried out at the end of each treatment.
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3.2.5 Legal fee and negative externality (LFNE)
This treatment was the same as NLF but introduced an additional delivery mecha-
nism/option. Subjects had the default and paying a bribe options; in addition, they
could choose to ‘pay the fee’ that was legal and had no negative consequences on others.
Choosing to pay the fee was costly (9 pence) and entailed no waiting time. Bribing still
had a negative externality of impacting someone else’s payment time by an additional
11 days of waiting time. Once presented with three choices and their consequences,
subjects had to actively choose by clicking on their preferred option.
3.2.6 Legal fee (LF)
The legal fee treatment was the same as LFNE however the bribe did not have the
negative externality. In other words, choosing to bribe to receive earnings on the same
day differed from paying the legal fee in their costs. The costs chosen for the bribe
and the fee were elicited by a willingness to pay (WTP) pilot experiment discussed
above. Eliminating the negative externality from the bribe in this treatment allows to
test the hypothesis whether it has any impact on corrupt decisions.
3.2.7 Eliciting first-order beliefs
It is believed that beliefs are closely linked to actions and choices (Neumann & Vogt,
2009). To elicit this, each subject was asked to predict the percentage of participants
in the experiment that would choose to pay the bribe and the fast track fee. This
elicitation was monetary incentivised such that if the prediction were within the 10%
in either direction of the average for the treatment, one participant would randomly
receive £10.
3.2.8 Personality traits
To measure personality traits of the subjects, I use a 10-item version of big five developed
by (Gosling et al., 2003). It uses a score between 1 and 7 (inclusive) with 1 being
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‘strongly disagree’ about how much the statement appeals to the subject and 7 being
‘strongly agree’. The five personality traits measured are: openness, conscientiousness,
agreeableness, extraversion, and emotional stability. These characteristics are collected
to enable comparisons between different treatments.
3.2.9 Questionnaire and demographics
Prolific members can cash out their earnings from their Prolific account only if they
have more than five pounds. Payments from the experiment was used to simulate
different delivery options. Knowing the amount of money each subject had in their
account was therefore important. Due to inflexibility of Prolific platform, subjects
could not be pre-screened for this criterion. Thus, I opted to collect data on the amount
of money each participant had in their account. This was an optional question and
subjects could choose not to answer.
Another important question for the study was how they reached their decision. This
question was important to gain insights of why subjects choose specific options. The
answers to this question will be used to explain results. Other general questions
included the comments about the experiment and what the experiment was about,
see Appendix B 5.1 for the full copy of the instructions. Alongside this, demographic
information about age, profession, student status, country of residence, country of
birth, nationality and first language were also collected to carry out further analysis.
3.3 Experimental hypothesis
Broadly speaking, there are two types of concerns that I have reviewed in the literature
to aid me in the derivation of the hypothesis:
1. Strategic concerns: not wanting to be caught and faced with sanctions, either
of monetary or non-monetary nature (for instance exclusion from a program,
reputation or social-image damage).
2. Moral concerns: not wanting to break the law (self-image concerns i.e. aversion
to feeling shame and guilt), caring about not harming others/empathy (other-
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regarding preferences, aversion to negative externalities) and/or being averse to
creating inequity/unfairness by indulging in preferential treatment.
It is noteworthy that there are 3 effects that may influence the preference of subjects
vis-a-vis the fast track option and bribery: the existence of a negative externality (in
favour of the fast-track option), the difference in cost (in favour of bribery) and the
framing effect (in favour of the fast-track option). I am not able to comment on the
second and third effects with precision. More treatments are needed to do so.
Critically examining the literature on the determinants of corrupt or non-compliant
decisions, I derive the following hypothesis. First, I consider the case for no legal
fee (NLF) and legal fee with negative externality (LFNE) treatments. It is already
been established in Kahneman et al., (1986), Engel (2011) and others that people care
about the consequences of their actions on others. People are empathetic and care
if through their actions the resulting outcome is unfair. If a generic outcome (Y j)
is attained by jth subject in the baseline scenario. Bribery of ith subject creates an
unfair outcome (Y j∗) for jth subject such that the new outcome is lower (Y j∗ < Y j)
in the experiment, the cost is modelled through waiting time. To bribe forces one
other individual to wait twice as much as default waiting time. This is the direct
consequence of the bribe transaction. The other contributing factors as suggested in
the literature are social-image and self-image concerns. Social image is less of a concern
as the experiment will be anonymous and online. Self-image concerns is most relevant,
it is defined as the “psychological costs of seeing oneself doing bad compared to a
moral ideal” (Baumeister, 1999). Similarly, if c denotes the psychological costs for ith
subject, it negatively impacts the final outcome (Yi) for the same subject such that
the new outcome is lower (Y i − c < Yi). Following the theoretical discussions above, I
derive the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Subjects will choose to pay bribes less often when there is a fast track
option available to them.
To do this, I will compare the rate of bribes paid in NLF and LFNE treatments. In
LFNE treatment, the legal fee becomes available to subjects, while both treatments
always have the default delivery option. If the rate of bribes paid falls in LFNE
treatment, this will be considered as evidence of treatment effects.
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To derive the second and the third hypothesises the discussion on negative externality
of harming others through additional waiting time in the experiment and aversion to
norm-breaking models of social preferences (López-Pérez, 2008) takes the centre stage.
In the experiment illegality of the bribe option does not have punitive fines (i.e. there is
no risk of getting caught and fined), however the psychological costs associated to bribe
is captured via the aversion to norm breaking discussion (assuming implicitly that not
to bribe is the norm). This is in addition to the points on empathy (Kahneman et al.,
1986; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Engel, 2011) and self-image (Baumeister, 1999) from the
discussion under hypothesis one:
Hypothesis 2. Subjects will choose to pay bribes less often when there is a negative
externality.
Bribes are considered sub-optimal because of the negative externality they pose on the
rest of the society trying to access the same services. Based on this, the rate of paying
bribes should be less in LFNE treatment compared to LF treatment.
Hypothesis 3. More subjects will choose the fast track option (pay the fee) when a
negative externality is attached to paying bribes.
In treatments LFNE and LF, subjects have the ability to pay the legal fee (the fast
track option) or pay a bribe to access the service. I compare the negative externality
effects through decisions made with regards to legal fee uptake. If the rate of paying
the fee is higher in LF compared to LFNE treatment, this is evidence of treatment
effect. The difference between this with hypothesis 2 is that there, I investigate bribery
decisions but here we are concerned with choices concerning the legal fee. This is
important to investigate because in all treatments, subjects had the default option,
allowing them to switch away from both fast track and bribery to default.
Finally, first order beliefs are important in predicting actions and actual events
(Berninghaus et al., 2013; Neumann & Vogt, 2009). In all treatments, I elicit subject’s
first order belief about the rate of bribery and the rate of paying the fee in the experi-
ment after they have completed their choices. The order of eliciting predictions and
decisions is experimentally important (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). With this in mind,
I derive the last two hypothesises (H4 and H5):
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Hypothesis 4. There is a positive correlation between the predictions and actual rate
of paying bribes in each treatment and overall.
Hypothesis 5. There is a positive correlation between the predictions and actual





Subjects in the experiment had an average age of 26.55 years old and 30% of them
were female. Statistics on personality traits collected in this experiment can be seen in
Table 3.1. Only 36% of the subjects stated that they had less than £5 in their Prolific
accounts. I call this variable no cash withdrawal, controlling for this is important
because there is a limit imposed by the platform on participants ability to cash out
only if they have more than £5. Of the 600 subjects in the experiment only 8 of them
decided not to answer this question.
Table 3.1 Summary statistics
Variables Full sample NLF LFNE LF
Age 26.55 26.43 26.38 26.81
(7.79) (7.33) (8.37) (7.71)
Female 30.30 30 34 27
(0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45)
No cash withdrawal 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Earnings £1.48 £1.49 £1.46 £1.48
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Extraversion 3.65 3.68 3.69 3.57
(1.40) (1.33) (1.45) (1.42)
Agreeableness 4.43 4.36 4.47 4.46
(1.04) (1.03) (1.06) (1.03)
Conscientiousness 4.78 4.85 4.63 4.85
(1.20) (1.12) (1.2) (1.26)
Emotional stability 4.26 4.25 4.16 4.35
(1.35) (1.35) (1.36) (1.34)
Openness to experiences 4.98 4.91 4.99 5.05
(1.10) (1.11) (1.05) (1.14)
Number of subjects 600 203 192 205
LFNE means Legal fee and negative externality treatment;
NLF means No legal fee treatment;
LF means Legal fee treatment;
Mean coefficients; sd in parentheses.
Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test I compare treatment distributions to see if they
come from the same population (Smirnov, 1939). There are no significant differences
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between treatments. This means the treatments are sufficiently homogeneous and there
are no significant observable differences either.
3.4.2 Survey responses
At the end of the experiment subjects filled out an open-ended survey. To understand
the driving motives, subjects were asked how they reached their decisions. The survey
questions were optional and not incentivised. These answers are comprised to eight
categories, that is summarised in panels A-C in Table 3.2.2 For subjects who indicated
more than one reason, in most cases, the motive they valued most was chosen as their
category.
I follow the standard behavioural economics and psychology definitions for each of
the categories in the following manner: Empathy is considered as aversion to harming
others or caring about others. Self-image concerns means perceiving yourself moral by
not breaking the law and, relatedly, having aversion to feeling guilt or shame if doing
otherwise and considering patience as a virtue. Social image concerns are defined as
reputation damage for breaking the law and answers could be linked to experimental
demand effects. Aversion to preferential treatment is a specific type of inequity aversion
implies avoiding both the fee and the bribe. Profit maximising individuals are those
who consider money above all. Rationalisers are defined as individuals exploiting
the moral wiggle room or showing conflict/discomfort in accepting the bribe or the
fee or stating that the stake size was too low. Inconsistent categorises those who
have accepted the bribe but commented in favour of rejection and vice-versa. Finally,
non-informative includes blank and inconclusive responses.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4.3 Paying the fee (Choosing the fast track option)
Figure 3.1 shows the differences in paying bribes and the fast track fee in all three
treatments 3. Paying the fee was not available in the no legal fee (NLF) treatment,
therefore the values are missing. I begin with the non-parametric tests using a Fisher’s
exact test to compare differences in the choices made in all treatment configurations4.
A Fisher’s exact test is a simple comparison of acceptance or rejection proportions by
subjects in each treatment. All the choices and predictions were incentivised.
Fig. 3.1 Bribery and fee rates by treatment
Introducing a fast track option lowers bribery rate. In both NLF and LFNE treatments,
subjects had the default option and a choice to bribe whereas in LFNE, they also had
a fast track fee option available. The bribery rate in the absence of the fast track was
22.2% in NLF treatment. With the introduction of the fast track option in LFNE,
3See Table 5.1 in Appendix B for more detailed statistics
4Not reported here, performing a Chi-squared test produces similar p-values.
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bribery rates fell to 6.3%, Figure 3.1. A Fisher’s exact test strongly rejects the null
hypothesis that there is no significant difference (p-value = 0.0001).
Even though non-parametric tests offer evidence on the significance of treatment effects,
they do not tell us much about the direction and magnitude of the differences. To
investigate the signs and size of the effect while controlling for other factors, I carry
out a Probit regression due to the binary nature of the dependent variables (Cameron
& Trivedi, 2010; Long, 1997) 5.
The choice variable of interest is paying a bribe which takes the value of 1 if a citizen
pays a bribe, and 0 otherwise. The estimated Probit models take variations of the
following general form:
P (Bribe = 1/Xi) = ϕ(β0 + β1treatments + β2controls).
ϕ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function ϕ(z) = P (Z ≤ z), Z N(0, 1).
The predicted probability that Bribe = 1 can be estimated given Xi, which is the
treatment effects and control variables. βi is the effect on paying a bribe of a unit
change in regressors Xi, holding constant all other k − 1 regressors. It is difficult to
interpret the coefficients directly, I calculate and report average marginal effects. Legal
fee and negative externality (LFNE) treatment is the benchmark where bribery has
a negative externality attached to it. The results of the regression is presented in
Table 3.3.
The positive effects in NLF for both specifications show that the rate of bribery was
much higher when compared to LFNE. This effect (0.059∗∗) is statistically significant at
5% test (p-value = 0.0237) in specification (I) where I do control for bribery predictions.
In addition specification (II), where bribery predictions are not accounted for, the
effect (0.158∗∗∗) is significant at 1% level. As hypothesised, it is discernible that
the introduction of a fast track option that offers a preferential treatment against a
premium thwarts the rate of offering bribes. Given the above, I report the first finding:
Result 1. Less subjects pay bribes when a fast track option is available.
5The use of a random effects logit model would also be appropriate and produce similar results
but the Probit choice was motivated by the underlying normal distribution.
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Table 3.3 Paying the bribe
DV: Paying the bribe = 1 Coefficients dydx(I) Coefficients dydx (II)
Bribe predictions 0.0331*** 0.004***
(0.00330) (0.001)
No legal fee (NLF) 0.469** 0.059** 0.775*** 0.158***
(0.207) (0.024) (0.175) (0.034)
Legal fee (LF) 0.318 0.035 0.482*** 0.082**
(0.223) (0.024) (0.180) (0.030)
Extraversion -0.0120 -0.002 0.0135 0.003
(0.0608) (0.008) (0.0492) (0.010)
Agreeableness -0.152** -0.020** -0.0818 -0.017
(0.0744) (0.010) (0.0626) (0.013)
Conscientiousness 0.0153 0.002 0.00496 0.001
(0.0755) (0.010) (0.0574) (0.012)
Emotional stability 0.0622 0.008 0.0315 0.007
(0.0605) (0.008) (0.0522) (0.011)
Openness to experiences -0.0754 -0.010 0.00258 0.001
(0.0732) (0.010) (0.0629) (0.013)
No cash withdrawal -0.00691 -0.001 0.00779 0.002
(0.161) (0.021) (0.137) (0.029)
Age -0.00780 -0.001 -0.00609 -0.001
(0.0149) (0.002) (0.0128) (0.003)
Female 0.0304 0.004 -0.155 -0.033
(0.185) (0.024) (0.160) (0.034)
Student -0.123 -0.016 -0.114 -0.024
(0.191) (0.025) (0.163) (0.034)
Constant -2.100*** -1.146**
(0.665) (0.553)
Observations 581 581 581 581
Mean coefficients; Robust standard errors in parentheses;
(I) includes bribe predictions and (II) does not.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001;
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Assuming that the public officials are passive and cannot strategically obstruct the
process (due to an efficient fast track option), citizens do not pay bribes. They avoid
resorting to “greasing the wheels” so to speak.
In sum, I consider 3 effects that may influence the preference of subjects vis-a-vis the
fast track option and bribery: the existence of a negative externality (in favour of the
fast-track option), the difference in cost (in favour of bribery) and the framing effect
(in favour of the fast-track option). I am not able to comment on the second and third
effects with precision.
On framing effect, looking at bribery rate (14.1%) and fee rate (14.6%) in LF treatment
where the negative externality is not present, the difference between the two rates is
not statistically significant (p-value = 0.8964). This would tempt one to argue that
there is little framing effect. However, the fact that 14.1% of the subjects in the LF
treatment choose to pay the fee, in itself is evidence for framing. Otherwise due to
the cost effects, theoretically, one would expect zero percent for paying the fee. To
make more precise statements about these effects it is required to carry out additional
treatments. Since, these effects are constant across all treatments, it is safe to say that
they lead to a zero-net effect.
Even so the analysis of reasons presented in Table 3.2 from the survey responses offer
some insight and suggest that the cost and framing effects are not present. Most
subjects (50%) feel discomfort in choosing the preferential treatment of paying a legal
fee and nonetheless choose to pay. The next top two reasons are self-image concerns
and social-image concerns. Individuals care about their moral ideals that shapes their
perception of themselves when carrying out an action as well as what other’s think
of them when they pay the fee, see Table 3.2, Panel A, LF Treatment. Those who
offer bribes do not express caring about these two reasons, see Table 3.2, Panel B,
LF Treatment. They are more concerned with maximising private gains and try to
justify their action by rationalising (58%), an attempt to make themselves feel or look
good while acting dishonestly. Bearing in mind that this is in the absence of negative
externality effects.
On the other hand, in LFNE treatment over 29% of the subjects who pay the fee state
that they do not want to harm others by choosing to pay the bribe. Those who do pay
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the bribe either rationalise (41.37%) or state explicitly that they value money more
(16.7%) than other factors, see Table 3.2, Panel A & B, LFNE Treatment.
3.4.4 Negative externality
To investigate the effects of negative externality, I compare bribery rates in LFNE
and LF treatments, Figure 3.1. The difference between the two is that the bribe in
LF treatment does not have a negative externality. A Fisher’s exact test (p-value
= 0.0013), at 5% rejects the null that bribery rates do not change between these
treatments. In other words, there are sizeable differences between the choices, which
provides evidence for treatment effects.
In Table 3.3, specification (II), the positive margins on LF (0.082∗∗∗) shows that paying
bribes increased significantly compared to LFNE. The difference in bribery rates in the
regression is significant at 1% only when not controlled for subject’s predictions of how
much bribe others will pay in the experiment. Nonetheless, the predictions on bribery
were collected at the end of the experiment. This was when the decision on whether to
pay a bribe or pay a fee was already taken. The order of eliciting these aspects are
important. In this manner, subjects’ decisions on paying a bribe were not primed.
Therefore one can argue that the results in specification (II) are valid since bribe
predictions (first-order beliefs) refer to the profile of subjects, as do demographics, but
do not interfere directly with the decision-making process. This would not be the case
if subjects had been making a prediction followed by the decision on whether to bribe
or not to bribe.
Result 2. Subjects engage in bribery less when there is a negative externality attached
to it.
Rationalisers and profit-maximisers are the two types of behavioural responses that
is paramount among those who choose to bribe in treatments LFNE and LF, see
Table 3.2.
In addition, I examine the difference in paying the fee (fast track) between LFNE and
LF treatments to explore the effects of negative externality see Figure 3.1. A two-sided
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Fisher’s exact test strongly rejects the null that the rates are the same (p-value =
0.000).
With n= 384 subjects (NLF treatment has been excluded from the analysis because
the choice to pay the fee was not available in this treatment). The choice variable of
interest is paying a fee which takes the value of 1 if a citizen pays a fee, and 0 otherwise.
The estimated Probit models take variations of the following general form:
P (Fee = 1/Xi) = ϕ(β0 + β1Treatments + β2Controls).
ϕ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function ϕ(z) = P (Z ≤ z), Z N(0, 1).
The predicted probability that Fee = 1 can be estimated given Xi, which is the
treatment effects and control variables. βi is the effect on paying a fee of a unit change
in regressors Xi, holding constant all other k − 1 regressors. It is difficult to interpret
the coefficients directly, I calculate and report average marginal effects. Table 3.4
presents the results of a Probit regression analysis that specifically examines this
hypothesis. LFNE is the benchmark.
Model (I) shows the negative coefficient on Legal Fee (LF) is (−0.167∗∗∗) that paying
the fee declined in this treatment compared to LFNE. This is strongly significant. The
difference was the absence of negative externality on other participants. This confirms
that negative externality has an impact in corruption decisions, as stated in Result 3:
Result 3. Subjects choose fast track option more when a negative externality is
associated to the bribe option.
For example, many subjects stated empathy (29%) which is not harming others as their
reason in LFNE treatment for choosing to pay the fee, see Table 3.2, Panel A. Other
reasons include self-image (20%) and social-image (10%) concerns with paying the fee ,
see Table 3.2, Panel A, LF treatment. Again, both moral and strategic concerns are
important in support of choosing to pay the fee instead of paying the bribe. In line
with findings in (Barr & Serra, 2009), in a non-dynamic corruption setting, I find that
negative externality plays an important role in decision-making when subjects face
with a corrupt vs not corrupt choice. There is no evidence of negative reciprocity in
my experiment as it is a one-player setup and subjects are not playing against each
other or the computer. The most repeated anecdote was that through their decision
‘someone else will be harmed’.
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Table 3.4 Paying the fee
DV: Pay the fee = 1 Coefficients dydx(I) Coefficients dydx(II)
Fee predictions 0.0240*** 0.006***
(0.00305) (0.001)
Legal fee (LF) -0.637*** -0.167*** -0.821*** -0.24***
(0.164) (0.043) (0.150) (0.043)
Extraversion -0.00911 -0.002 0.00979 0.003
(0.0620) (0.016) (0.0562) (0.016)
Agreeableness 0.143* 0.037* 0.190*** 0.056**
(0.0805) (0.021) (0.0735) (0.021)
Conscientiousness -0.0691 -0.018 -0.0641 -0.019
(0.0657) (0.017) (0.0626) (0.018)
Emotional stability -0.0987 -0.026 -0.0846 -0.025
(0.0617) (0.016) (0.0564) (0.017)
Openness to experiences -0.0255 -0.007 -0.0920 -0.027
(0.0763) (0.02) (0.0716) (0.021)
No cash withdrawal 0.258 0.067 0.208 0.061
(0.173) (0.045) (0.155) (0.045)
Age 0.0116 0.003 0.0123 0.004
(0.0118) (0.003) (0.0112) (0.003)
Female -0.427** -0.111** -0.462** -0.135**
(0.201) (0.051) (0.184) (0.053)
Student 0.149 0.039 -0.0667 -0.02
(0.197) (0.051) (0.176) (0.051)
Constant -1.470** -0.343
(0.591) (0.539)
Observations 384 384 384 384
Mean coefficients; Robust standard errors in parentheses;
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001;
(I) includes bribe predictions and (II) does not.
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3.4.5 Beliefs
Beliefs are important predictors of actions. Participant’s beliefs about the percentage
of other subjects who may engage in bribery in the experiment was elicited. Due to
non-normal nature of the data distributions on belief variable, I use a Spearman’s
test of independence. There is strong evidence against the null (H0: the prediction
about the rate of bribery is independent of the actual engagement in bribery). This is
true for NLF (p-value = 0.000), LFNE (p-value = 0.0002) and LF (p-value = 0.000)
treatments. Furthermore, these beliefs are statistically significant at 1% and 5% level
for both male and female subjects separately.
From the regression results in Table 3.3 specification (I), I verify in the data that
predictions about bribery rates are positively and significantly (0.006∗∗∗) correlated to
actual bribery rates. This points out the importance of belief, if it is made common
belief that corruption rates are falling, this may lead to a perpetual reduction in bribery
rates as less and less will choose to engage. However, in reality this heavily depends on
actual measures to tackle bribery, if the effects are not observed or felt, communication
strategy effects may fade away over time.
Result 4. Predictions about the rate of bribery and actual engagement in corrup-
tion/bribery are positively correlated in each treatment.
In addition, beliefs about the rates of choosing the fast track option were also elicited.
I find strong evidence in the data (p-value = 0.000) against the null for treatments
LFNE and LF. Therefore, participant’s predictions about other subjects paying the fee
are highly correlated to actually choosing the fast track option.
From regression results in Table 3.4 specification (I), the actual rate of paying the fee
and fee predictions in the data are positively correlated (0.024∗∗∗). It suggests that
beliefs are important and that promoting the idea that many people use the fast track
option among the community will lead to a perpetual increase in usage of the option,
ultimately leading to lower bribes being offered by the citizens.
Result 5. Predictions about the percentage of subjects paying the fee and the actual
fast track payment rates in the experiment are positively correlated.
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The results on beliefs being positively correlated to actual rates of the events in the
experiment is in line with theoretical work on the role of beliefs in (Neumann & Vogt,
2009; Berninghaus et al., 2013).
3.4.6 Gender effects
Figure 3.2 shows the rate of bribes and fast track fees for male and female subjects by
treatment. There are two types of comparisons I will carry out in this section: First,
male vs female decisions within each treatment i.e. holding treatments constant using
a Wilcoxon ranksum test6. This is a non-parametric test of medians and the reason for
employing such a test is the non-normal distribution of the data. The null hypothesis
here is that the two medians are equal.
Fig. 3.2 Actual rates by gender and treatment
As it can be seen in Figure 3.2, there are large disparities between male and female
subjects paying bribes in treatments LFNE and LF. I find evidence that male subjects
6For robustness purposes, I carry out a two-sample independent t-test too but the results are not
reported here.
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bribe significantly (p-value = 0.003) more in LF than LFNE. The same choice for
female subjects is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.604), despite the difference
in the existence of the negative externality.
Following the logic that cost effects and framing effects result in a zero-net effect, it
is the externality of harming others that lead male subjects to avoid bribing in the
LFNE treatment. However, female subjects avoid paying the fee or the bribe. This is
an aversion to preferential treatment, classified as a specific form of inequity aversion,
female subjects avoid paying either. A closer look at the absolute numbers for females,
reveals that only 21 female subjects paid the bribe out of 182. The finding for female
inequity aversion being more pronounced than male subjects is in line with findings in
(Dollar et al., 2001; Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011; Rivas, 2013).
Second differences in (fe)male decisions i.e. holding the gender constant and looking
for differences in treatments, using a Fischer’s exact test for this purpose. There are
differences in male and female decisions in paying the fee within each treatment. For
example, male subject’s fast track fee rate in treatment LFNE is 42% whereas that
of their female counterparts is only 25%. This difference is statistically significant
(p-value = 0.0274), at 5% level, which points to the same direction that female subjects
are averse to the idea of preferential treatment.
Furthermore, estimates in model (I) in Table 3.4 shows that being female is negatively
correlated (0.111∗∗) with paying the fee. This is significant at 5% test level. This
gender difference in rejecting the fee should not be directly translated as higher bribery
rates either. Looking at absolute numbers, out of 121 female subjects, only 22 of them
paid the fee (remembering that those rejecting the fee mostly chose the default option
and a few chose to bribe).
Result 6. Male subject’s decisions are sensitive to negative externality, while female
subjects avoid paying the fee or the bribe.
Subjects pay the fee more when bribery harms other people in the experiment. I find
that female subjects (p-value = 0.060) pay the fee with higher frequency in treatment
LFNE compared to treatment LF. The difference between the two treatments is that
bribery has a negative externality associated to it. Similar results hold for male subjects
(p-value = 0.000). This is in line with the hypothesised prediction.
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Result 7. Both male and female subjects choose fast track option more frequently
when paying the bribe has a negative externality attached to it.
3.4.7 Student status
One may conjecture that student’s attitude toward paying bribes and choosing the
fast track option differs with that of non-student subjects. The discussion here focuses
on actual and prediction rates for both bribes and the fast track fee. I find that
non-student subjects consistently overpredict bribery rates than students. In the
experiment 50.85% of the subjects were students and the rest were non-students. The
data shows that non-student subjects’ predictions for bribery rates (50.6%) were higher
than that of student subjects (42.7%), see Figure 3.3. Using a Wilcoxon ranksum test,
this difference is only significant (p-value = 0.0442) at 5% level in NLF treatment.
Fig. 3.3 Bribery and fee predictions by students vs non-students
Similarly, students predict lower rates for paying the fee (30%) compared to non-
students (37.1%), and this difference is significant at 5% level for the full sample
(p-value = 0.0305). Moreover in LFNE treatment in Figure 3.3, student (36.3%)
have much lower prediction rates than non-students (46%) for the fee. This is also
statistically significant at 5% test level (p-value = 0.0156).
On the other hand for actual bribery rates, the percentage of non-student subjects
who bribe is 29%, which is almost twice as much as that of students 15.8% in NLF
treatment, Figure 3.4. Using a Chi-squared test, the difference is significant (p-value
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= 0.025) at 5% level. The null hypothesis for a Chi-squared test is that there is no
relationship between the two decisions. It performs well with small samples. These
results are not significant in the regression Table 3.3.
On the actual fee rates, Figure 3.4 also shows that there are differences between
students and non-students. In treatment LF, 17% of non-student subjects pay for the
fast track option compared to a 9% students.
Result 9. Student subjects are less corrupt, predict lower rates of bribery and fees
than non-student subjects do in the experiment.
However, these are crude results and must not be interpreted as final findings due
to several confounds. For example, the analysis does not take into account subjects
education level, socioeconomic status nor it takes into account cultural differences
among other factors that may affect preferences in choosing to bribery or to pay the
fast track fee.
Fig. 3.4 Actual bribery and fee by students vs non-students
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3.4.8 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this study is to explore the effects of introducing a fast track option that
is legal on the rate of bribery (by citizens). The literature suggests that there are both
moral and legal concerns. However, in societies where corruption is normalized, the
low likelihood of punishment makes legal concerns negligible. In such ‘corruption trap’,
moral concerns are the determining factor. Long and obsolete bureaucratic processes
in public services, common in low-income countries, may give way to corruption but it
can be minimized if preferential treatment is offered institutionally.
In this experiment, I observe that subjects are willing to pay extra to avoid paying
bribes when presented with a legal channel to access public services. Subjects go
through a real effort task and must wait to get paid unless they choose either the
cheaper bribe or the more expensive legal channel. Additionally, the bribe may imply
a negative externality on one other subject as it increases the latter’s waiting period.
When that is the case, subjects are less willing to choose the bribe option and will
prefer the more expensive legal channel. Most importantly, this study shows that even
if people are willing to pay to get their way, they are also willing to pay to keep within
the bounds of the law. In sum, people are willing to bribe but less so when a legal
channel is available or when it harms other people.
I use a novel structure for the experimental design in which individuals are fully
accountable over whether bribery is enforced or not. In previous designs, it would be
up to the official agent to enforce the bribe and ultimately carry the weight of imposing
the negative externality on other citizens. Outcomes could be interfered by confounds
such as fear of punishment for breaking the law, conditional cooperation i.e. the need
to reciprocate when paid a bribe, and the competing bias i.e. getting competitive upon
the opportunity to interact with other players. Thus, with the non-dynamic framework,
subjects are not assigned roles and are left to decide solely based on their preferences,
with no further strategic concerns.
Beliefs about the rate of bribery or paying the fee is a society are a strong predictor of
actual engagement in bribery or taking up of the fast track option. This has interesting
implication for authorities who want to adopt a fast track option to tackle bribery.
In conjunction with the introduction of preferential treatment, it is important to
communicate to the public how the new institutional reforms the public administrative
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system. The change in general beliefs that the need to resort to paying a bribe to
“grease the wheel” is rendered with the new system. I find that female subjects exhibit
higher aversion to any preferential treatment (the fee and the bribe) compared to male
subjects.
Moreover, the pool of subjects is composed of students and non-students. Students
pay less bribes and predict less levels of bribery in the experiment. Several factors
may drive these results that requires a closer examination, which is beyond the scope
of this study. These factors include education levels, other socioeconomic factors like
income and family education level.
With regards to limitations, more treatments can be carried to tease out specific
treatment effects such as framing or cost effects. The treatments chosen in this
experiment were a balance between the availability of funding and the goal of capturing
the reality of corruption in the ‘real-world’.
An immediate continuation of this research is to look at the public official’s side of the
story and decisions. Without assigning roles and conditional cooperation/reciprocity
among subjects, I will be looking at bribe acceptance decisions after being offered a
bribe in the following chapter.
Chapter 4
Public Official’s Bribery
To recall in this chapter, I study decisions to accept bribes from subjects who had
(depending on the treatments) a legal option to request their payments to be processed.
In doing so, the supply of or citizens offering bribes are assumed passive and referred
to as ’non-active participants’ in the experiment. The rationale behind this is twofold:
to eliminate cooperative or curiosity driven behaviour that may arise from subject’s
strategic concerns, discussed throughout this section in details. Secondly, to allow
subjects (in this case public officials) to carry the burden of their decisions alone.
What that means is that in an interactive setup, public officials as the second mover
end up determining whether the corrupt transaction takes place or not. This inhibits
understanding their true response to negative externality and corruption as a whole.
4.1 Experimental procedures
The experiment was carried out online using Prolific platform between February –
March 2020. The subject pool consisted of a selected sample of residents from countries
with GDP PPP below 35,000 USD using the IMF 2019 data (IMF, 2019). All those who
took part in the Willingness to Pay (WTP) pilot and the citizen’s bribery experiment in
chapter 3 of this thesis were not eligible, thus they were excluded from this experiment.
This gave access to over 6,000 pool of subjects who had been active in the past 90 days.
The sample included undergraduate and postgraduate students as well as non-student
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participants. The idea behind this is that administrative corruption is widespread in
countries with lower per capita income. This was to ensure consistency and subjects
would come from less developed economies where bribery is believed to be more
common. The experiment was designed using Otree software (Chen et al., 2016).
Subjects in the experiment had to assume the role of a public official implicitly without
being asked or assigned to do so. They received information that someone taking
part in an experiment had offered a bribe to receive their payoffs/payments on the
same day. In doing so, the timing of the payment to one other member of the society
(a passive participant who does not make any decisions in this experiment) will be
negatively affected. This member would have to wait twice longer than usual (22
days). Alternatively, there was a legal route to choose to be paid on the same day
that the subjects choose or did not choose. This manipulation constitutes the different
treatments in the experiment (discussed below). There were no interactions between
subjects and they were not exposed to all treatments, ensuring a between-subject
design. Each round was only repeated once. Participants were randomly allocated to
each treatment.
The experiment does not include risk of detection (punishment) in the design. The
rationale behind this is twofold: the research question is to study administrative
corruption which is a small part of the problem in the wider context of corruption.
Secondly in most developing countries where this type of corruption is widespread,
it goes unnoticed i.e. the probability of getting caught is very low and therefore
negligible. I abstract away from the use of neutral language and provide full setting
to the experiment. The default option is presented as ‘default’, bribe is presented as
‘bribe’ and fast track is presented as ‘fast track fee’. This was done to add realism with
the assumption that those engaged in bribery are almost always aware they are going
to pay a bribe or they have been offered a bribe.
4.2 Experimental treatments
I have four treatments to explore whether public officials accept or reject bribes to
provide preferential treatment to anonymous citizens who have offered bribes (depending
on the treatment). To recall, the research question asks whether a legal fee acts as
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deterrent for public officials accepting bribes. Each public official is told that each
citizen had options depending on which treatment (i.e. two in the NLF treatment,
three in the LF treatment and so on) to request their payments to be processed in an
experiment.
Public officials knew that choosing the default mechanism had 11 days of waiting time.
I did this to motivate the idea that standard service delivery mechanisms are less
efficient and relatively take longer in the public sector domain. Choosing to bribe at a
personal cost to the citizen fastens the process and the revenues from the bribe directly
benefits the public official. This option had a negative externality attached to it which
varied depending on the treatment. In the story presented to the officials, the negative
externality from the citiznes bribery experiment was to force one other participant to
wait a total of 22 days. However, officials accepting a bribe, would force one passive
participant who is not making any decisions in this experiment, and they would have
to wait twice longer to receive their payments. I recruited two passive participants for
each accepted bribe offer such that one would be paid on the day and one would have
to wait 22 days to receive their payments. This was to make sure that all decisions
were fully incentivised and no deception was involved.
Alternatively, public officials knew that citizens could choose to pay a legal fee (fast
track option) slightly more expensive than the bribe but did not have any negative
externality attached to it. This was done to capture the idea of two-tier public service
delivery systems. A legal fee would allow a fast track option to receive discriminatory
treatment but legally. The revenues from such a system would go directly to the central
authority rather than the public official.
4.2.1 No legal fee (NLF)
Public officials were told that subjects taking part in an experiment had two payment
options, default, and bribe with negative externality. The public officials were told
that the citizen chose to offer a bribe while being fully aware of the consequences of
their decision. Public officials were then asked whether to accept or reject the bribe. If
they accepted the bribe, it meant that the amount of the bribe (6 pence) was added
to their payoff directly and that meant they reciprocated the favour. If they rejected
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the bribe, they wouldn’t receive the bribe amount and one passive participant would
receive their payment as usual (11 days) instead of being fast tracked.
4.2.2 Legal fee and negative externality (LFNE)
The legal fee and negative externality (LFNE) treatment was exactly as NLF treatment
but public officials were told that citizens who offered the bribe also had the opportunity
to pay a legal fee (9 pence) only 50% more expensive than the bribe to access their
payments on the same day. The public officials in LFNE were told that citizen decided
not to pay the legal fee and paid a bribe instead that had a negative externality. Now
it was up to the official to reject or accept the bribe. They were aware that accepting
the bribe was forcing a non-active participant in the same experiment as them to wait
a total of 22 days to receive their payments.
4.2.3 Legal fee (LF)
Treatment three was the legal fee (LF), it was the same as LFNE but public officials
knew that the bribe offered by the citizen did not have any negative externality
associated to it. This was done to capture the importance of affecting others negatively.
Choosing to manipulate the timing of service delivery as proxy for public services that
citizens are legally entitled for free, I believe, best captures the idea of administrative
corruption. In such cases, citizens are entitled to get the service for free, but they are
agitated or provoked by the public officials to pay a bribe.
4.2.4 Legal fee and probabilistic negative externality
The fourth treatment deviated from mirroring the treatments in the citizen’s bribery
experiment in one fundamental way. It introduced a probability in the happenstance
of the negative externality. The story presented to the public officials about bribery of
the citizens, it was the same as LFNE however, they were told that the the negative
externality associated to accepting the bribe in their decision making, there is only a
50% chance of it actually happening.
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In other words, accepting the bribe in LFNE treatment had a certain (100%) chance of
negative externality incurring, whereas in the LF treatment there was no chance (0%)
of it happening. Now in the LFPNE treatment, there was a 50/50 chance of ‘inflicting
harm to others’ by pushing them down the queue. The reason behind doing this was
to capture a moral wiggle room hypothesis (Dana et al., 2007), whether accepting
bribes is changed if the public official knows that their decision doesn’t directly impose
the negative externality.
4.3 Experimental hypothesis
Examining the literature on the determinants of corrupt or non-compliant decisions,
I derive the following hypothesis. Both strategic and moral concerns will play an
important role in explaining the research questions and shaping the hypothesis in this
chapter. Strategic concerns include fears of sanctions monetary and non-monetary
like social image or reputation damage. Moral concerns encompass avoiding harming
others, inequity aversions and self-image challenges. Consider the case for no legal fee
(NLF) and legal fee with negative externality (LFNE) treatments: It is already been
established in Kahneman et al., (1986), Engel (2011) and others that people care about
the consequences of their actions on others. People have empathy and care about the
payoff of others especially if their actions affect those payoffs. If a generic outcome
(Y j) is attained by jth subject in the baseline scenario. Bribery of ith subject creates
an unfair outcome (Y j∗) such that the new outcome is lower (Y j∗ < Y j) for the rest of
the society, in the experiment modelled through waiting time. To accept a bribe forces
one other individual to wait twice as much as default waiting time. This is the direct
consequence of the corrupt transaction. Other contributing factors as suggested in the
literature are social-image and self-image concerns. Social image is less of a concern as
the experiment will be anonymous and online. Self-image concerns is most relevant, it
is defined as the “psychological costs of seeing oneself doing bad compared to a moral
ideal” (Baumeister, 1999). Similarly, if c denotes the psychological costs for jth subject,
it negatively impacts the final outcome (Yj) for the same subject such that the new
outcome is lower (Y j − c < Yj. Following the theoretical discussions above, I derive
the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Less people will accept the bribe when there is a fast track option.
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To derive the second and third hypothesises the discussion on negative externality of
harming others through additional waiting time in the experiment and aversion to
norm-breaking models of social preferences (López-Pérez, 2008) takes the centre stage.
In the experiment illegality of the bribe option does not have punitive fines (i.e. there is
no risk of getting caught and fined), however the psychological costs associated to bribe
is captured via the aversion to norm breaking discussion (assuming implicitly that not
to bribe is the norm). This is in addition to the points on empathy as a (Kahneman et
al., 1986; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Engel, 2011), and self-image (Baumeister, 1999) from
the previous section. The bribes in LF treatment does not affect when others are paid,
therefore bribery rates should be lower when compared to LFNE treatment.
Hypothesis 2. Less people will accept the bribe when there is a negative externality.
To derive hypothesises 3 to 5, I use differences created through the introduction of
uncertainty in the happenstance of the negative externality in LFPNE treatment with
other treatments. The probabilistic nature of the negative externality creates a “moral
wiggle room” (Dana et al., 2007; Haisley & Weber, 2010) will allow bribes to be
accepted more often and public officials may rationalise the notion that their decision
is not negatively impacting other participants directly. As a result, I conjecture that
bribery rates in LFNE treatment will be lower than LFPNE.
Hypothesis 3. The rate of accepting a bribe is higher when taking a bribe has a 50%
probability of incurring a negative externality relative to a 100% probability of incurring
a negative externality.
Alternatively, when the probability of incurring the negative externality is zero, LF
treatment, bribe acceptance will be higher than LFPNE, where there is still a 50%
chance.
Hypothesis 4. The rate of accepting a bribe is lower when taking a bribe has a 50%
probability of incurring a negative externality relative to a 0% probability of incurring
a negative externality.
With the introduction of the moral wiggle room with respect to the negative externality
in LFPNE treatment, the thinking process behind decision making may change. There-
fore, the rate of accepting bribes should not equal to the midpoint rate of accepting
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bribes in the treatments with 0 (LF) and 100% (LFNE) chance of negative externality.
The value may lie to the left or to the right of the midpoint.
Hypothesis 5. The rate of accepting a bribe with a 50% probability of incurring a
negative externality (T4) will be different than the midpoint of the rate from the 0%
(T3) and 100% (T2) probability treatments.
Finally, first order beliefs are important in predicting actions and actual events
(Berninghaus et al., 2013; Neumann & Vogt, 2009). In all treatments, I elicit subject’s
first order belief about the rate of accepting bribes in the experiment after they had
completed their choices. The order of eliciting predictions and decisions is experimen-
tally important (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). With this in mind, I derive the last
hypothesises (H6):
Hypothesis 6. There will be a positive correlation between the prediction about the
rate of accepting a bribe and the rate of bribery in each of the treatments and overall.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Summary statistics
On average participants had 25.28 years of age, with over 30% of them being female.
Over 40% of the participants had less than £5 in their prolific account. This is called no
cash withdrawal due to limits on Prolific participant’s ability to cash out their earnings.
I also include the average duration (in seconds), it took subjects to make their decisions.
This is to investigate if the length of time spent making the decision to accept or reject
the bribe is important. Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, I compare if treatments come
from the same population distribution (Smirnov, 1939). Except emotional stability
between treatments NLF and LFNE, and NLF and LF (p-value = 0.008; p-value =
0.09 respectively), all other observable characteristics are statistically similar between
treatments making them sufficiently homogeneous for further comparisons. The rest
are summarised in Table4.1
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics
Variables Treatments
Pooled NLF LFNE LF LFPNE
Age 25.28 25.16 25.14 25.53 25.31
(7.68) (7.25) (7.88) (7.36) (8.15)
Female 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.31 0.28
(0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.45)
Time taken (in seconds) 82.68 82.92 79.71 84.01 84.54
(55.9) (43.54) (42.32) (73.73) (59.16)
No cash widthrawal 0.42 0.47 0.40 0.36 0.47
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50)
Earnings £0.372 £0.367 £0.368 £0.38 £0.373
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Extraversion 3.63 3.74 3.58 3.51 3.69
(1.42) (1.35) (1.42) (1.42) (1.46)
Agreeableness 4.45 4.48 4.40 4.48 4.46
(1.03) (1.08) (0.97) (1.04) (1.04)
Conscientiousness 4.62 4.79 4.65 4.47 4.59
(1.25) (1.27) (1.16) (1.26) (1.30)
Emotional stability 4.14 4.35 3.96 4.06 4.23
(1.42) (1.53) (1.35) (1.36) (1.45)
Openness to experiences 4.92 4.94 4.99 4.77 4.97
(1.16) (1.02) (1.19) (1.27) (1.15)
Number of subjects 582 126 166 142 148
LFPNE means legal fee and probabilistic negative externality;
LFNE means legal fee and negative externality;
NLF means no legal fee; LF means legal fee;
Mean coefficients; sd in parentheses.
4.4.2 Self-reported reasons underlying decisions
One of the survey questions at the end of the experiment asked ‘how did you make
your decisions?’. The responses to this question provide insight into the behavioural
factors that contributed to accepting or refuting the bribe. These answers are divided
into seven categories and summarised in Table 1.2.1
These explanations provide a rich insight into the thinking process of the decisions-
makers in the experiment. 1) Self-image concerns: Perceiving yourself moral by not
breaking the law and, relatedly, having aversion to feeling guilt or shame if doing
1The categories were cross-checked independently with one other researcher (PhD colleague).
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otherwise and considering patience as a virtue. 2) Social image concerns: Reputation
damage for breaking the law and experimental demand effects. 3) Empathy: Aversion to
harming others and caring about other’s payoffs. 4) Aversion to preferential treatment
to both the fee and the bribe and stating that they have no or little rush to receive
their payments. 5) Profit maximising: Valuing money above all. 6) Rationalisation:
Exploiting moral wiggle room, showing conflict/discomfort in accepting the bribe or
the fee, stating that by doing so they are helping the briber or mentioning that the
stakes are low, etc. . . . 7) Inconsistent: Accepting bribe but commenting in favour of
rejection and vice-versa or discussing a different notion. All the answers that were left
blank were categorised as non-informative.
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Table 4.2 Survey responses
Treatments
A. Accepted the bribe Pooled NLF LFNE LF LFPNE
Aversion to preferential treatment 1.23% / 1.28% 1.02% 2.33%
Empathy 0.62% / / 1.02% 1.16%
Inconsistent 5.25% 4.84% 7.69% 3.06% 5.81%
Non-informative 9.88% 17.74% 11.54% 4.08% 9.30%
Profit-maximising 45.37% 38.71% 34.62% 52.04% 52.33%
Rationalisation 37.35% 38.71% 44.87% 37.76% 29.07%
Self-image concerns 0.31% / / 1.02% /
Number of subjects 324 62 78 98 86
B. Rejected the bribe
Aversion to preferential treatment 12.72% 4% 10.99% 22.45% 17.65%
Empathy 32.86% 40% 41.76% 14.29% 26.47%
Inconsistent 2.83% 1.33% 3.3% / 5.88%
Non-informative 12.37% 16% 9.89% 18.37% 7.35%
Profit-maximising 1.77% / 1.10% 6.12% 1.47%
Self-image concerns 34.28% 34.67% 29.67% 38.78% 36.76%
Social-image concerns 3.18% 4% 3.3% / 4.41%
Number of subjects 283 75 91 49 68
LFPNE means legal fee and probabilistic negative externality;
LFNE means legal fee and negative externality;
NLF means no legal fee; LF means legal fee;
Figures show percentages of respondents.
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4.4.3 Legal fee (fast track option)
Public official’s bribe acceptance rate for each treatment is presented in Figure 4.1. I
begin with simple non-parametric Fischer’s exact test. This is due to the categorical
nature of the outcome variable and the test requires a comparison of acceptance
proportions. The null hypothesis is that bribery proportion is the same in LFNE and
NLF treatments. Looking at the data, bribe acceptance rate in LFNE treatment is
higher than that of NLF treatment but it is not statistically significant (p-value =
0.484). The difference between these two treatments were the introduction of the legal
fee to act as a deterrent for public officials accepting bribes in treatment LFNE.
Fig. 4.1 Bribe acceptance rates
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To investigate these effects in a more robust manner and control for other factors, I
carry out a Probit regression analysis. The choice variable of interest is accepting a
bribe which takes the value of 1 if an official accepts a bribe, and 0 otherwise. The
estimated Probit models take variations of the following general form:
P (Bribe = 1/Xi) = ϕ(β0 + β1Treatments + β2Controls).
ϕ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function ϕ(z) = P (Z ≤ z), Z N(0, 1).
The predicted probability that Bribe = 1 can be estimated given Xi, which is the
treatment effects and control variables. βi is the effect on accepting a bribe of a unit
change in regressors Xi, holding constant all other k − 1 regressors. It is difficult to
interpret the coefficients directly, I calculate and report average marginal effects.
There are two specifications of the regression, one with the bribery prediction and one
without. This was a hypothetical question collected at the end of the experiment that
asked participants to predict the percentage of other participants who would accept
the bribe. Given the hypothetical nature of the question, I investigate results both
with and without including it in the regression. Treatment LFNE is the benchmark
where other treatments are compared against.
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Table 4.3 Accepting bribes, pooled sample
With predictions Without predictions
DV: Accepting bribes = 1 Coefficients dydx (I) Coefficients dydx (II)
Bribe prediction 0.0311*** 0.012***
(0.00274) (0.001)
NLF 0.0537 0.021 -0.0635 -0.025
(0.167) (0.067) (0.151) (0.059)
LF 0.364** 0.144** 0.575*** 0.223***
(0.164) (0.064) (0.150) (0.056)
LFPNE 0.240 0.095 0.259* 0.103*
(0.161) (0.064) (0.145) (0.057)
Extraversion 0.0431 0.017 0.0180 0.007
(0.0437) (0.017) (0.0406) (0.016)
Agreeableness -0.00407 -0.002 -0.0234 -0.009
(0.0593) (0.024) (0.0558) (0.022)
Conscientiousness -0.00472 -0.002 -0.00670 -0.003
(0.0496) (0.020) (0.0463) (0.018)
Emotional stability -0.0194 -0.008 0.000508
(0.0451) (0.018) (0.0407)
Openness 0.0133 0.005 0.0466 0.019
(0.0527) (0.021) (0.0499) (0.020)
Time taken 0.000761 0.00145 0.001
(0.00120) (0.00118) (0.000)
No cash withdrawal -0.149 -0.059 -0.0849 -0.034
(0.121) (0.048) (0.110) (0.044)
Age -0.0276** -0.011** -0.0303*** -0.012***
(0.0107) (0.004) (0.00928) (0.004)
Female -0.127 -0.051 -0.105 -0.042
(0.133) (0.053) (0.122) (0.048)
Student 0.0758 0.030 -0.0357 -0.014
(0.156) (0.062) (0.135) (0.054)
Constant -1.403** 0.470
(0.550) (0.458)
Observations 580 580 580 580
LFPNE means legal fee and probabilistic negative externality;
LFNE means legal fee and negative externality;
NLF means no legal fee; LF means legal fee;
Mean coefficients; Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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The difference between NLF and the control treatments is not statistically significant
in models (I) and (II). This is similar to the results obtained using the Fischer’s exact
test. In other words, in legal fee and negative externality (LFNE) treatment the
fast track option introduced to accommodate for the preferential treatment does not
prevent subjects (public officials) from accepting bribes. Even though the bribe had
a negative externality on one other person in the experiment. This is the opposite
of the conjecture made in the experimental hypothesis section. The subjects in this
experiment were not assigned to public official role. They acted purely as subjects
taking part in the experiment and were faced to make decisions to accept or reject a
bribe offer. Therefore, this finding does not suffer from the ‘triggering the right frame
of mind’ phenomenon, a criticism often put forward on experimental findings (Levitt
& List, 2007; Bardsley, 2005).
Result 1. The legal fee (fast track option) does not prevent public officials accept-
ing/demanding bribes.
In order to explain this result, I look at the responses to the survey question collected at
the end of the experiment, see Panel A in Table 4.2. On average over 36% of subjects
in NLF and LFNE treatments stated profit-maximisation in response to how they
made their decision. This involved reasons such as "wanting more money" or "benefits
me more" and so on. The guiding principle behind accepting bribes for this cluster of
subjects was money above all. While over 41% of subjects who accepted bribes tried
to rationalise their decision. The responses in this category included answers such as
"helping the briber", "I know its harming others but the stakes are too low to make
a huge difference" and so on. The basic principle in being in this category was if the
response showed conflict or discomfort in accepting the bribe but accepted it anyway.
The third highest share of responses were non-informative in these two treatments,
meaning that they were left blank.
With the responses in mind, two types of subjects (public officials) have emerged among
those who accepted the bribes: those who care about their private gain over that of
the community’s as predicted by the traditional profit maximisation economic view.
In addition, I find subjects who rationalise their corrupt decisions. This behavioural
type varies in their response and requires further research. For example, raising the
stakes for the negative externality or some other saliency may change the proportion
of rationalisers. Understanding more about this type of public officials will allow
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policymakers to be more targeted with their measures focusing on demand-driven
bribery.
4.4.4 Negative externality
In this section, I explore whether negative externalities attached to corrupt decisions is
important for public officials. Bribe acceptance rate in LFNE treatment is significantly
lower than that of LF treatment (p-value = 0.000; fisher’s exact test). The difference
between the two treatments was absence of the negative externality in LF treatment.
On the other hand bribe acceptance rates were almost 21 percentage point less in
LFNE treatment, see Figure 4.1. The regression results in Table 4.3 point in the same
direction. The effects on predicted probability of accepting bribes in LF treatment is
positive (0.144**) in model (I) indicating that bribe acceptance is higher than LFNE
treatment which is the benchmark and significant at 5% level. This is robust for all
the specifications, see Table 5.2 in Appendix 5.4. This finding is in accordance with
the hypothesised prediction.
Result 2. Less public officials (subjects) accept the bribe, when there is a negative
externality attached to it.
To explain the behavioural mechanisms behind this result, I look at participant survey
responses presented in Table 4.2, Panel B. Three types of behavioural responses emerge
for those who refuse the bribe in LFNE treatment: 1) those who empathise (42%),
covers specific aspects of the ‘other-regarding preferences’, those include aversion
to harming others and caring about others’ payoffs. 2) Those who are concerned
about their self-image (30%), include intrinsic feelings of aversion to guilt or shame,
perceiving oneself moral and ethical or not wanting to break the law or describing
oneself as patience in virtuous manner. 3) Those averse to preferential treatment (11%)
altogether, that is rejecting the bribe and showing aversion to paying a fee that will
result in inequality. This can be classified as a specific type of inequity aversion.
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4.4.5 Moral wiggle room
If the negative externality doesn’t have the certainty to incurring 100%, does this
matter in accepting bribes for public officials? To examine this, I compare bribe
acceptance rate in LFNE and LFPNE treatments. I find that acceptance rate is lower
in LFNE, see Figure 4.1 and that is only significant at 10% level (p-value = 0.095;
fisher’s exact test). The difference here is that incurring negative externality had only
50% chance of materialising on the other participant. In other words, the decision to
accept the bribe by the public official in LFPNE treatment did not directly transform
into harming other participants but a "moral wiggle room" was allowed (Dana et al.,
2007).
Similar results are obtained from the Probit regression analysis presented in Table 4.3,
specification (II). The effects on LFPNE treatment is positive (0.103*) but only
significantly at 10% level. This result is not robust, when I include the variable on
participant’s prediction about bribery rates.
Result 3. The uncertainty implied in LFPNE treatment allows public officials to
accept more bribes compared to LFNE treatment.
In addition, bribe acceptance rate in LFPNE treatment is lower than that of LF
treatment but only at 10% significance level (p-value = 0.059; fisher’s exact). The
difference is that in LF treatment there is no negative externality associated to the
bribe whereas in LFPNE treatment, there is 50% chance of incurring. In addition,
from the regression results presented in Table 4.3, the difference between the effects
in LF and LFPNE treatments shows a positive correlation indicating higher levels of
bribery in LFPNE (0.223*** – 0.103*) = 0.12**. This is only significant at 5% level
and it is robust.
Result 4. The uncertainty implied in LFPNE treatment allow public officials to accept
less bribes compared to LF treatment.
Unsurprisingly as expected the bribe levels are higher in LF treatment. To explain
this, looking at the survey responses for treatments LFNE, LF and LFPNE, all of
them provide similar explanations. I will use LFPNE treatment for this purpose, see
Table 4.2, Panel A. Over half (52%) of participants state profit-maximisation as their
reason for accepting the bribe. Similarly, approximately 30% of the subjects rationalise
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their choice of not refusing the bribe. The 50% chance of not incurring the negative
externality allows the public officials to adopt a “moral wiggle room” type hypothesis.
Since LF treatment certainly does not have a negative externality attached to it (0%
chance) and LFNE treatment certainly has a negative externality (100% chance), the
midpoint of the bribe acceptance rate for these two treatments may be different (greater
or smaller) from that of LFPNE treatment. The midpoint for the treatments LFNE
and LF is 0.5(0.4615 + 0.667) = 0.564. I use a binomial test to see if bribe acceptance
rate in LFPNE treatment with a 50% probability of incurring a negative externality is
equal to the midpoint value (0.564). The binomial tests the significance of deviations
for a single binary variable from a theoretically expected distribution. The result is not
significant (p-value = 0.935) and the values are not different from one another. This
goes against the hypothesised prediction in the hypothesis section in this chapter.
Result 5. The rate of accepting bribes with a 50% probability of incurring a negative
externality is no different from the midpoint of the rate from treatments LFNE and
LF.
4.4.6 Duration of the decision
There is an emerging literature in economics that discusses importance of the duration
of time spent on making a moral decision in explaining choices. For example, in the
case of rationalisers, those who accepted the bribe, must overcome the moral dilemma
of "thou shall not be corrupt" against the private gains of accepting to engage in
corruption. The decision to accept the bribe is incongruent and a reflexive choice, thus
takes longer to reach (Greene et al., 2004; Rustichini, 2018).
To test this conjecture in the case of accepting bribes, those who rationalised (average
time taken = 85; std dev = 63.5) in the experiment may have had a “reflexive choice”
and had to overcome an internal conflict of accepting the bribe and going against the
norm of corruption is bad, thus needed more thinking time. On the contrary, those
who are pure profit-maximisers (average time taken = 81.82; std dev = 44) may have
had an automatic response and didn’t require much thinking time. One individual
took over 480 seconds for profit maximisers, this was the only observation treated as
anomaly and excluded from the analysis, see Figure 4.2. The median time taken to
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accept the bribe for each group is 72 seconds, therefore a test of medians will not be
informative.
However, there are large variances and dispersion between the two times of acceptance.
Using a Bartlett’s test (Snedecor & Cochran, 1989) of equality of variances, I find
strong evidence against the null (p-value = 0.000) and the variance in time taken to
reach the decision for rationalisers are much longer than profit-maximisers. Noting
this difference, I report the following result:
Result 6. The dispersion in time taken to accept the bribe between subjects (public
officials) is significantly different between rationalisers and profit-maximers.
Fig. 4.2 Time taken to accept the bribe
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4.4.7 Beliefs
Beliefs about others accepting or rejecting bribes are very important in predicting actual
propensities to corrupt actions. From the results presented in regression Table 4.3
specification (I), I find strong evidence that subjects’ predictions about rates of bribery
is positively (0.012***) correlated to the choices of accepting bribes. Furthermore,
a Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient shows that the acceptance of bribes and
predictions on the percentage of participants engaging in bribery are not independent
of one another. This test measures direction and strength of the association between
the two outcomes and it is not sensitive to outliers. There is a positive correlation
between the two variables at 1% significance level. This is true for all treatments.
Result 7. There is a positive correlation between accepting bribes and predictions
about the rate of accepting bribes in all treatments and overall.
4.4.8 Student status
The use of undergraduate students is common in experimental economics, this has
drawn several criticisms to studies employing this methodology. In this experiment,
over 38% of the sample constituted non-student subjects with an average age of 30
years old. The average age for students was about 22 years of age. Using this, I test
differences in corrupt decisions between these two groups.
Given that the two samples are independent, using an independents means test, I find
evidence (p-value = 0.0547) that accepting bribes is different between student and
non-student subjects across the sample, see Figure 4.3. I also find evidence (p-value =
0.0041, one-sided2) that bribe acceptance rate in LFNE treatment where a legal fee
was introduced is much lower for non-student subjects compared to student subjects.
This is evidence that legal fees act as deterrent for non-student subjects.
2For all the tests in this section, I check the non-parametric counterparts, and the results are
robust.
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Table 4.4 Accepting bribes, students vs non-students
DV: Accepting bribes = 1 Coefficient dydx (I) Coefficient dydx (II)
Bribe prediction 0.0311*** 0.012*** 0.0311*** 0.012***
(0.00282) (0.001) (0.00274) (0.001)
NLF -0.152 -0.060 -0.186 -0.074
(0.170) (0.068) (0.172) (0.068)
LFNE -0.208 -0.083 -0.240 -0.095
(0.159) (0.063) (0.161) (0.064)
LF 0.145 0.057 0.125 0.049
(0.170) (0.066) (0.170) (0.066)
Extraversion 0.0361 0.014 0.0431 0.017
(0.0434) (0.017) (0.0437) (0.017)
Agreeableness -0.00453 -0.002 -0.00407 -0.002
(0.0587) (0.023) (0.0593) (0.024)
Conscientiousness -0.00847 -0.003 -0.00472 -0.002
(0.0488) (0.019) (0.0496) (0.020)
Emotional stability -0.0299 -0.012 -0.0194 -0.008
(0.0447) (0.018) (0.0451) (0.018)
Openness 0.0146 0.006 0.0133 0.005
(0.0526) (0.021) (0.0527) (0.021)
Time taken 0.000637 0.0003 0.000761
(0.00122) (0.0049) (0.00120)
No cash withdrawal -0.117 -0.0464 -0.149 -0.059
(0.120) (0.047) (0.121) (0.048)
Age -0.0276** -0.011**
(0.0107) (0.004)
Female -0.167 -0.066 -0.127 -0.051
(0.131) (0.052) (0.133) (0.053)
Student 0.320** 0.127** 0.0758 0.030
(0.125) (0.049) (0.156) (0.062)
Constant -1.944*** -1.164**
(0.451) (0.553)
Observations 580 580 580 580
Mean coefficients; Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
In addition, using a similar Probit model to Section 4.4.3, I run a regression to test
student vs non-student decisions on accepting bribes. LFPNE treatment is used as the
benchmark in this regression. The results are presented in Table 4.4. Model (I) shows
the effects on being a student increase in predicted probability of accepting bribes
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by (0.127∗∗) points but when we control for age, the difference between students and
non-students disappear in the regression.
Result 9. Legal fee acts as deterrent for accepting bribes among the non-student
subjects when compared to student subjects.
Fig. 4.3 Bribe Acceptance Rate Student vs Non-student by Treatment
4.5 Cultural background
Finally there is evidence documented previously in the literature that people (public
officials in this case) from countries with high Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
are more likely to engage in corrupt behaviour compared to people from countries
with low CPI. I will use current country of residence as proxy for cultural background
and test whether introducing a fast track option has an impact on bribe acceptance
rates of public officials in the experiment. Figure 4.4 shows bribe acceptance rates per
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treatments for all the five countries in the sample. From observations, bribe acceptance
rates in LFNE treatment is lower than that of NLF treatment in all countries except
for Poland and Greece. The largest difference in Poland is 10%, however it is not
statistically significant (p-value = 0.418; Wilcoxon ranksum test). Therefore, it is safe
to argue that legal fee doesn’t act as deterrent for the subjects (public officials) to
accept bribes. Furthermore, in Hungary bribe acceptance rates in NLF treatment is
much larger than that of LFNE treatment. The sample size is small for these two
treatments however it points in the same direction, such that legal fees do not deter
extortions.
Fig. 4.4 Bribe acceptance by country of residence
Another interesting observation in Figure 4.4 is that bribe accepting rates in LFPNE
treatment where bribery had only 50% chance of happening. Hungary has the highest
accepting rates, followed by Poland, Portugal, Greece and then Mexico.
Using a Probit regression similar to Section 4.4.3, when data is pooled across all
treatments, I compare country differences in accepting bribes. Hungary is used as
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the benchmark. The results are presented in Table 4.5. I find that subjects accept
significantly less bribes in Portugal, Greece and Mexico compared to Hungary. This
finding is in accordance with Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2019 ranking from
the Transparency International. Portugal (30th) and Greece (60th) are ranked lower
than Hungary (70th). However, Mexico (130th) is not ranked lower than Hungary. The
difference between accepting rates in Poland (41st) is not statistically different from
bribery levels in Hungary. These resutls are robust, see Table 5.3 in Appendix 5.6 for
more specifications.
Result 10. Bribe acceptance rates is lower for public officials from lower ranked CPI
countries compared to countries ranked higher except for Mexico.
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Table 4.5 Accepting bribes, country of residence
DV: Accepting bribes = 1 Coefficient dydx (I) Coefficient dydx (II)
Bribe prediction 0.0317*** 0.013***
(0.00288) (0.001)
Portugal -0.780*** -0.290*** -0.766*** -0.286***
(0.293) (0.096) (0.241) (0.079)
Greece -1.098*** -0.413*** -1.000*** -0.377***
(0.326) (0.108) (0.283) (0.097)
Mexico -0.811** -0.303** -0.856*** -0.321***
(0.359) (0.126) (0.298) (0.105)
Poland -0.375 -0.131 -0.367 -0.129
(0.290) (0.093) (0.239) (0.078)
Extraversion 0.0336 0.013 0.0124 0.005
(0.0463) (0.018) (0.0432) (0.017)
Agreeableness -0.0573 -0.023 -0.0573 -0.023
(0.0643) (0.026) (0.0605) (0.024)
Conscientiousness -0.00369 -0.001 -0.00523 -0.002
(0.0547) (0.022) (0.0486) (0.019)
Emotional stability -0.0425 -0.017 -0.0358 -0.014
(0.0489) (0.019) (0.0432) (0.017)
Openness -0.0165 -0.007 0.0149 0.006
(0.0541) (0.021) (0.0518) (0.021)
Time taken 0.00201* 0.001* 0.00215** 0.001**
(0.00122) (0.000) (0.00106) (0.000)
Age -0.0253** -0.010** -0.0273*** -0.011***
(0.0117) (0.005) (0.00991) (0.004)
Female -0.161 -0.064 -0.151 -0.060
(0.139) (0.055) (0.127) (0.050)
Student 0.167 0.066 0.0134 0.005
(0.166) (0.066) (0.143) (0.057)
No cash withdrawal -0.184 -0.073 -0.126 -0.050
(0.128) (0.051) (0.116) (0.046)
Constant -0.353 1.597***
(0.645) (0.542)
Observations 527 527 527 527
Observations 527 527
(I) and (II) shows robustness checks with additional controls
Mean coefficients; Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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4.6 Concluding remarks
This study explores bribery decisions, namely acceptance rates by public officials in
the presence of a legal fast track option. The economic literature suggests that both
moral and punitive costs matter for public officials who accept or reject bribes offered
to them.
In this experiment, I find that the legal fee mirroring the merits of a bribe that is
used to "grease the wheels" of a slow bureaucratic process does not stop public officials
accepting bribes on it is own. However, bribery rates are generally lower when there is
a negative externality of harming others, even when there is a moral wiggle room. In
addition in pursuit of maximising private gains, a significant percentage of subjects in
this experiment ‘rationalised’ their corrupt decisions. The rationalisation behaviour
provides individuals with sufficient self-serving incentive to continue accepting bribes
at the expense of others. Although subjects accept bribes but show signs of discomfort
and conflict on the issue of harming others. Policy measures targeting bribe acceptance
that pronounces the moral costs more boldly combined with punitive measures will be
more effective.
In situations where the public official’s private gains are at large, both moral and
punitive concerns must work together to be effective. This finding resembles the bribery
rates in toll payments by taxi drivers in response to financial rewards in (Reid &
Weigel, 2020). They found that public officials could strategically manipulate the
timings to delay the process and agitate the drivers to offer bribes.
In other words, to prevent the demand-driven bribery, it needs further complemen-
tary policies such as stricter monitoring regimes, piece rate payments to officials or
e-processing that reduces human interaction. Further research is required to test
specifically what measures are effective. The rationalisers come in several types, those
who discuss helping the briber, the negative externality not being about the payoffs,
but the timing of the payoff or even the minimum wage payment being too low in the
experiment as reasons for their decision. Of these, the low stake and other ways of
motivating the negative externality may need further research to understand whether
bribery rates change when these factors carry more weight.
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Finally, the subject pool in this experiment comes from countries of low GDP per
capita. In accordance to CPI measures, I confirm that those with less exposure to
bribery and corruption accept less bribes. In other words, subjects from countries with
higher CPI ranking, accept significantly more bribes than others. These results are
consistent with the previous literature that studies cultural effects.
In addition, I find that beliefs among male or female public officials about accepting
bribes are strong predictor of accepting actual bribes. The findings further confirm that
legal fee prevents bribe acceptance among non-student subjects more than students in
the sample.
Finally, there is no evidence whether time taken to make the decision to accept or
reject bribes had any impact. I examine specifically time taken to decide, that is the
amount of time spent on the page to make a choice. I find that there exists significant
dispersion in time spent accepting the bribe. This is particularly salient among subjects
who exhibit two types of behaviour: rationalisers and profit-maximisers. Such that
rationalisers show greater deviations in making their decision.
There are limitations to every study. Due to experimental funding, the stakes were set
to match minimum wages in the UK for this experiment and it was carried out online.
An interesting complementary study would be to carry out this in the lab with higher
stakes. In addition, more treatments can be carried out to isolate specific effects such
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Chapter 5
Appendix B
5.1 Instructions for citizen’s bribery experiment
This experiment has received approval from the University of Exeter’s research ethics
committee. No deception is involved: all our instructions are accurate, and we will
pay exactly as stated. No personally identifiable information is collected, and everyone
will remain anonymous. We will process personal data in accordance with the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). You consent to the publication of the
study results. No data will be personally identifiable. Anonymized data may be stored
for an indefinite period of time and/or made available online to other researchers. Any
published data will have your Prolific ID removed. You will not be able to withdraw
consent after completing the study as there will be no way to link you to your data,
but you are free to withdraw at any time during the study without giving a reason.
The study must be completed in one go so please only continue if you have
at least 10 minutes to complete it. By entering your Prolific ID and clicking next
you agree that you understand the above information and give your consent to taking
part in the study.
Stage One: Real effort task
In this part of the experiment you will be presented with a series of randomly selected
letters and numbers. You will need to type 20 sequences correctly to be able to continue.
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Once you have entered the string, click the Next button or press the Enter key. You
will earn £1.50 for completing this section of the experiment.
You will have a maximum of 10 minutes to complete the task which should be plenty
of time.
Stage Two: Treatments
Treatment 1: No legal fee (NLF)
By default, you will be paid in 11 days.
You do however have an option to pay a bribe where you will be paid today but
someone else taking part in the experiment today will have to wait 22 days
to be paid.
Do you choose to pay the bribe? “No” “Pay the bribe”
Treatment 2: Legal fee and negative externality (LFNE)
By default, you will be paid in 11 days.
You do however have an option to pay a bribe where you will be paid today but
someone else taking part in the experiment today will have to wait 22 days
to be paid.
Alternatively, you have an option to pay a fast track fee where you will be paid
today with no effect on when others are paid.
Do you choose to pay the bribe or fast track fee? “No” “Pay the bribe” “Pay the fast
track fee”
Treatment 3: Legal fee (LF)
By default, you will be paid in 11 days.
You do however have an option to pay a bribe where you will be paid today with no
effect on when others are paid.
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Alternatively, you have an option to pay a fast track fee where you will be paid today
with no effect on when others are paid.
Do you choose to pay the bribe or fast track fee? “No” “Pay the bribe” “Pay the fast
track fee”
Stage Three: Personality question (big five)
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please
write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or
disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits
applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.
1 = Disagree strongly; 2 = Disagree moderately; 3 = Disagree a little; 4 = Neither
agree nor disagree; 5 = Agree a little; 6 = Agree moderately; 7 = Agree strongly




4. Anxious, easily upset.




9. Calm, emotionally stable.
10.Conventional, uncreative.
Stage Four: Post-experimental questions
1. Do you have more than £5 in your Prolific account?
2. What do you think this experiment was about?
3. How did you reach your decision?
4. Any other comments?
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5.2 Average fee and bribe payments
Table 5.1 Bribery and fees paid by treatment
Variables Full sample NLF LFNE LF
Default option 69.2% 77.8 % 57.8% 71.3%
Observations (415) (158) (111) (146)
Bribery rates 14.3% 22.2% 6.3% 14.1%
Observations (86) (45) (12) (29)
Fee rates 24.9% 35.9% 14.6%
Observations (99) (69) (30)
Pay a bribe first order belief 40.9% 46.3% 34% 41.9%
Std dev. (0.265) (0.28) (0.23) (0.27)
Pay a fee first order belief 33.8% 40.9% 27.1%
Std dev. (0.266) (0.26) (0.25)
Observations 600 203 192 205
Percentages; Frequencies in parentheses
5.3 Instructions for public official’s bribery exper-
iment
This experiment has received approval from the University of Exeter’s research ethics
committee. No deception is involved: all our instructions are accurate, and we will
pay exactly as stated. No personally identifiable information is collected, and everyone
will remain anonymous. We will process personal data in accordance with the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). You consent to the publication of the
study results. No data will be personally identifiable. Anonymized data may be stored
for an indefinite period of time and/or made available online to other researchers. Any
published data will have your Prolific ID removed. You will not be able to withdraw
consent after completing the study as there will be no way to link you to your data,
but you are free to withdraw at any time during the study without giving a reason.
The study must be completed in one go so please only continue if you have
at least 10 minutes to complete it. By entering your Prolific ID and clicking next
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you agree that you understand the above information and give your consent to taking
part in the study.
Stage One: Treatments
Treatment 1: No legal fee (NLF) Several people taking part in this study earned
£1.50 for completing a task. They then chose to pay a bribe of 6p (£0.06) to be
paid on the day they took part rather than waiting 11 days to be paid.
They also knew that paying the bribe would cause someone else in the study to wait
22 days to be paid instead of 11 days.
Your choice today is whether you accept such a bribe.
If you accept then 6p will be added to your earnings. There are also two other
participants who are not making decisions today. By accepting the bribe, one will
receive their participation payment today and the other will wait 22 days.
If you reject, then the two other participants will both be paid in 11 days and
you will not receive the additional 6p.
Do you choose to accept the bribe? “Reject the bribe” “Accept the bribe”
Treatment 2: Legal fee and negative externality (LFNE)
Several people taking part in this study earned £1.50 for completing a task. They
then chose to pay a bribe of 6p (£0.06) to be paid on the day they took part
rather than waiting 11 days to be paid.
They also knew that paying the bribe would cause someone else in the study to wait
22 days to be paid instead of 11 days.
They also had the option to pay a fast track fee of 9p (£0.09) to be paid on the
day they took part with no effect on when others are paid. They did however
not pick this fast track option and paid the bribe instead.
Your choice today is whether you accept such a bribe.
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If you accept then 6p will be added to your earnings. There are also two other
participants who are not making decisions today. By accepting the bribe, one will
receive their participation payment today and the other will wait 22 days.
If you reject then the two other participants will both be paid in 11 days and
you will not receive the additional 6p.
Do you choose to accept the bribe? “Reject the bribe” “Accept the bribe”
Treatment 3: Legal fee (LF)
Several people taking part in this study earned £1.50 for completing a task. They
then chose to pay a bribe of 6p (£0.06) to be paid on the day they took part
rather than waiting 11 days to be paid. They also knew that paying the bribe would
have no effect on when others are paid.
They also had the option to pay a fast track fee of 9p (£0.09) to be paid on the
day they took part with no effect on when others are paid. They did however
not pick this fast track option and paid the bribe instead.
Your choice today is whether you accept such a bribe.
If you accept then 6p will be added to your earnings. There are also two other
participants who are not making decisions today. By accepting the bribe, one will
receive their participation payment today and the other will wait 11 days.
If you reject, then the two other participants will both be paid in 11 days and
you will not receive the additional 6p.
Do you choose to accept the bribe? “Reject the bribe” “Accept the bribe”
Treatment 4: Legal fee and probabilistic negative externality (LFPNE)
“Several people taking part in this study earned £1.50 for completing a task. They
then chose to pay a bribe of 6p (£0.06) to be paid on the day they took part
rather than waiting 11 days to be paid. They also knew that paying the bribe would
have no effect on when others are paid.
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They also had the option to pay a fast track fee of 9p (£0.09) to be paid on the
day they took part with no effect on when others are paid. They did however
not pick this fast track option and paid the bribe instead.
Your choice today is whether you accept such a bribe.
If you accept then 6p will be added to your earnings. There are also two other
participants who are not making decisions today. By accepting the bribe, one will
receive their participation payment today. The other will wait 22 days with 50%
chance and will wait 11 days with 50% chance (i.e. they are equally likely).
If you reject, then the two other participants will both be paid in 11 days and
you will not receive the additional 6p.
Do you choose to accept the bribe? “Reject the bribe” “Accept the bribe”
Stage Three: Personality question (big five) Here are a number of personality
traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a number next to each statement
to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should
rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic
applies more strongly than the other.
1 = Disagree strongly; 2 = Disagree moderately; 3 = Disagree a little; 4 = Neither
agree nor disagree; 5 = Agree a little; 6 = Agree moderately; 7 = Agree strongly




4. Anxious, easily upset.




9. Calm, emotionally stable.
10.Conventional, uncreative.
Stage Four: Post-experimental questions
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1. Do you have more than £5 in your Prolific account?
2. What do you think this experiment was about?
3. How did you reach your decision?
4. Any other comments?
5.4 Negative externality
Table 5.2 Accepting bribes, robustness check
With predictions Without predictions
DV: Accepting bribes= 1 Coefficients dydx Coefficients dydx Coefficients dydx Coefficients dydx
Bribe prediction 0.0309*** 0.012*** 0.0311*** 0.0120***
(0.00269) (0.001) (0.00274) (0.0010)
NLF 0.0674 0.021 0.0537 0.0210 -0.0550 -0.022 -0.0635 -0.025
(0.167) (0.067) (0.167) (0.0670) (0.150) (0.059) (0.151) (0.059)
LF 0.378** 0.144** 0.364** 0.1440** 0.589*** 0.228*** 0.575*** 0.223***
(0.164) (0.064) (0.164) (0.0640) (0.150) (0.056) (0.150) (0.056)
LFPNE 0.259 0.095 0.240 0.0950 0.265* 0.105* 0.259* 0.103*
(0.161) (0.064) (0.161) (0.0640) (0.145) (0.057) (0.145) (0.057)
Extraversion 0.0365 0.017 0.0431 0.0170 0.0123 0.005 0.0180 0.007
(0.0429) (0.017) (0.0437) (0.0170) (0.0399) (0.016) (0.0406) (0.016)
Agreeableness -0.0117 -0.002 -0.00407 -0.0020 -0.0294 -0.012 -0.0234 -0.009
(0.0591) (0.024) (0.0593) (0.0240) (0.0555) (0.022) (0.0558) (0.022)
Conscientiousness -0.00507 -0.002 -0.00472 -0.0020 -0.00670 -0.003 -0.00670 -0.003
(0.0496) (0.020) (0.0496) (0.0200) (0.0463) (0.018) (0.0463) (0.018)
Emotional stability -0.0173 -0.008 -0.0194 -0.0080 0.00181 0.001 0.000508
(0.0450) (0.018) (0.0451) (0.0180) (0.0407) (0.016) (0.0407)
Openness 0.0219 0.005 0.0133 0.0050 0.0517 0.021 0.0466 0.019
(0.0527) (0.021) (0.0527) (0.0210) (0.0496) (0.020) (0.0499) (0.020)
Time taken 0.000854 0.000761 0.00148 0.001 0.00145 0.001
(0.00120) (0.00120) (0.00118) (0.000) (0.00118) (0.000)
No cash withdrawal -0.158 -0.059 -0.149 -0.0590 -0.0870 -0.035 -0.0849 -0.034
(0.121) (0.048) (0.121) (0.0480) (0.109) (0.043) (0.110) (0.044)
Age -0.0304*** -0.011*** -0.0276** -0.0110** -0.0290*** -0.012*** -0.0303*** -0.012***
(0.00874) (0.004) (0.0107) (0.0040) (0.00763) (0.003) (0.00928) (0.004)
Female -0.118 -0.051 -0.127 -0.0510 -0.102 -0.041 -0.105 -0.042
(0.133) (0.053) (0.133) (0.0530) (0.122) (0.048) (0.122) (0.048)
Student 0.0758 0.0300 -0.0357 -0.014
(0.156) (0.0620) (0.135) (0.054)
Constant -1.285*** -1.403** 0.422 0.470
(0.492) (0.550) (0.413) (0.458)
Observations 582 580 580 580 582 582 580 580
LFPNE means legal fee and probabilistic negative externality;
LFNE means legal fee and negative externality;
NLF means no legal fee; LF means legal fee;
Mean coefficients; Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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5.5 Country of residence
Table 5.3 Accepting bribes, country of residence
With predictions Without predictions
DV: Accepting bribes = 1 Coefficient dydx Coefficient dydx Coefficient dydx Coefficient dydx
Bribe prediction 0.0317*** 0.013*** 0.0359*** 0.014
(0.00288) (0.001) (0.00590) 0.002
Portugal -0.780*** -0.290*** -0.363 -0.766*** -0.286*** -0.418
(0.293) (0.096) (0.290) (0.241) (0.079) (0.264)
Greece -1.098*** -0.413*** -1.419*** -1.000*** -0.377*** -1.255**
(0.326) (0.108) (0.511) (0.283) (0.097) (0.509)
Mexico -0.811** -0.303** -0.899 -0.856*** -0.321*** -0.914*
(0.359) (0.126) (0.605) (0.298) (0.105) (0.500)
Poland -0.375 -0.131 -0.367 -0.129
(0.290) (0.093) (0.239) (0.078)
Extraversion 0.0336 0.013 -0.124 -0.049 0.0124 0.005 -0.145 -0.058
(0.0463) (0.018) (0.0929) 0.037 (0.0432) (0.017) (0.0913) (0.036)
Agreeableness -0.0573 -0.023 -0.258* -0.103 -0.0573 -0.023 -0.263** -0.104**
(0.0643) (0.026) (0.149) 0.059 (0.0605) (0.024) (0.127) (0.051)
Conscientiousness -0.00369 -0.001 0.145 0.058 -0.00523 -0.002 0.110 0.044
(0.0547) (0.022) (0.116) 0.046 (0.0486) (0.019) (0.104) (0.041)
Emotional stability -0.0425 -0.017 -0.0898 -0.036 -0.0358 -0.014 -0.117 -0.047
(0.0489) (0.019) (0.107) 0.042 (0.0432) (0.017) (0.0942) (0.037)
Openness -0.0165 -0.007 0.174 0.069 0.0149 0.006 0.168 0.067
(0.0541) (0.021) (0.124) 0.049 (0.0518) (0.021) (0.117) (0.046)
Time taken 0.00201* 0.001* 0.00192 0.001 0.00215** 0.001** 0.00272 0.001
(0.00122) (0.000) (0.00208) 0.001 (0.00106) (0.000) (0.00215) (0.001)
Age -0.0253** -0.010** -0.0269 -0.011 -0.0273*** -0.011*** -0.0248 -0.010
(0.0117) (0.005) (0.0211) 0.008 (0.00991) (0.004) (0.0189) (0.008)
Female -0.161 -0.064 -0.331 -0.132 -0.151 -0.060 -0.237 -0.094
(0.139) (0.055) (0.328) 0.131 (0.127) (0.050) (0.298) (0.119)
Student 0.167 0.066 -0.0156 -0.006 0.0134 0.005 -0.288 -0.115
(0.166) (0.066) (0.349) 0.139 (0.143) (0.057) (0.304) (0.121)
No cash withdrawal -0.184 -0.073 -0.415 -0.165 -0.126 -0.050 -0.508** -0.202**
(0.128) (0.051) (0.282) 0.112 (0.116) (0.046) (0.246) (0.098)
Constant -0.353 -0.548 1.597*** 2.184**
(0.645) (1.109) (0.542) (0.949)
Observations 527 527 125 125 527 527 125 125
Mean coefficients; Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
